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Semantic Comprehension? 
 
Summary 
Our thoughts and behaviours can sometimes be influenced by stimuli that we 
are not consciously aware of having seen. For example, the presentation of a word that 
is blocked from entering conscious visual perception through masking can subsequently 
influence the cognitive processing of a further target word. However, the idea that 
unconscious cognition is sophisticated enough to process the semantic meaning of 
subliminal stimuli is controversial. This thesis attempts to explore the extent of 
subliminal priming. Empirical research centering on subjective methods of measuring 
conscious knowledge is presented in a series of three articles. 
 
The first article investigates the subliminal priming of negation. A series of 
experiments demonstrates that unconscious processing can accurately discriminate 
between two nouns beyond chance performance when subliminally instructed to either 
pick or not pick a given noun. This article demonstrates not only semantic processing of 
the instructional word, but also unconscious cognitive control by following a two-word 
subliminal instruction to not choose the primed noun. The second article investigates 
subliminal priming of active versus passive verb voice by presenting a prime sentence 
denoting one of two characters as either active or passive and asking which of two 
pictorial representations best matches the prime. The series of experiments demonstrates 
that overall, participants were able to identify the correct image for both active and 
passive conditions beyond chance expectations. This article suggests that individuals are 
able to process the meaning of word combinations that they are not aware of seeing. The 
third article attempts to determine whether subliminal processing is sophisticated 
enough to allow for the activation of specific anxieties relating to relationships. Whilst 
the findings reveal a small subliminal priming effect on generalised anxiety, the 
evidence regarding the subliminal priming of very specific anxieties is insensitive. The 
unconscious is shown in these experiments to be more powerful than previously 
supposed in terms of the fine grained processing of the semantics of word combinations, 
though not yet in terms of the fine grained resolution of emotional priming. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
1.1. A Brief History of Subliminal Priming   
The idea that the thoughts and behaviours of an individual can be influenced by 
information presented outside of conscious awareness dates back centuries (Smith, 
2011), with early Greek history demonstrating the use of subliminal messaging as a 
method of manipulation and persuasion. In the late nineteenth century, Peirce and 
Jastrow (1884) are believed to have provided the first empirical study relating to 
unconscious perception (Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992). In their experiment, 
in which they themselves were the participants, they attempted to distinguish the greater 
pressure of two barely discernible stimuli placed on the skin whilst reporting subjective 
confidence in their decisions. Their results indicated that they were able to successfully 
discriminate between the two pressures, at above chance performance, despite 
subjectively being unaware of any difference between the stimuli. Similarly, Sidis 
(1898) demonstrated the above chance ability of participants to reliably distinguish 
between letters and numbers at a distance at which the participants believed themselves 
to be guessing. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Dunlap (1900) investigated 
subliminal perception using the Müller-Lyer illusion. The Müller-Lyer illusion is a 
well-known effect in which the judgments of line length are influenced depending on 
the direction of the arrow heads at the ends of the lines. That is, lines that end in ‘tails’ 
(i.e., > <) are judged to be longer than lines of equal length ending with ‘heads’ (i.e., < 
>). The participants in Dunlap’s study were required to judge the length of lines in 
which the arrow heads were formed from imperceptible shadows. Despite not being 
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consciously aware of the shadows, participants nevertheless reliably rated lines with 
‘tails’ to be longer than those with ‘heads’. This subliminal Müller-Lyer illusion effect 
demonstrated by Dunlap later contributed to Hollingworth (1913) concluding that 
subliminal messaging would be a valuable tool to utilise within the field of advertising 
(Pratkanis, 1992). 
Subliminal perception attracted considerable public attention and interest in 
1957 when market researcher James Vicary claimed to have successfully used 
subliminal advertising in a Fort Lee, New Jersey, movie theatre (Weinberger & Westen, 
2008). By using a tachistoscope, a device that allows for the very brief presentation of 
stimuli, Vicary proclaimed to have interspersed the messages ‘Drink Coca Cola’ and 
‘Eat Popcorn’ into the showing of the film Picnic over a period of six weeks. Every five 
seconds, one of the two primes was presented onto the screen for approximately one 
third of a millisecond, thereby bypassing conscious perception of the message 
(Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006). Vicary claimed that these subliminal primes 
resulted in an approximate 57% increase in popcorn sales, and a Coke sales increase of 
approximately 18%. 
Despite Vicary later admitting to having fabricated the results of his study 
(Pratkanis, 1992), public belief in the power of subliminal suggestion and subliminal 
advertising persisted. In the 1970’s, Key (1973) released a book entitled ‘Subliminal 
Seduction: Ad Media’s Manipulation of a not so Innocent America’ in which he 
presented a number of film and print advertisements that he believed contained 
subliminal messages in the form of sexual imagery and words. In 1978, following a 
national manhunt for the so called ‘blind, torture, kill’ killer in the United States, a 
Kansas television station inserted subliminal messages such as ‘Now call the chief’ into 
a news broadcast in the belief that it would persuade the relevant individual to contact 
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the police (Moore, 1982). In the same year, in an attempt to prevent shop lifting and 
theft, a number of Toronto department stores began to broadcast subliminal auditory 
messages into the shop itself. Similarly, a Seattle radio station attempted to increase its 
listening figures by broadcasting the subliminal auditory message ‘TV’s a bore’ 
(Moore, 1982). 
In 1985, the suicide of two teenagers in Nevada was blamed on the 
subliminally backmasked auditory message ‘do it’ in a song by the British heavy metal 
band Judas Priest (Loftus & Klinger, 1992). Backmasking of auditory words is achieved 
by reversing the sound, so that only when it is played backwards is it consciously 
perceived (Jones, 1991). Such was the fear surrounding the issue of subliminal priming, 
due to this and similar cases, that United States legislature lead to the necessity of 
placing warning labels on records and tapes sold in the state of Nevada (Thorne & 
Himelstein, 1984; Vokey & Read, 1985). Whilst in certain countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia the use of subliminal priming in an advertising context has been 
made illegal, the Federal Communications Commission in the United States has 
retained the right to revoke the broadcasting license of any company if they are found to 
be surreptitiously using subliminal messages (Bermeitinger et al., 2009).  
In 1990, there were approximately 2,000 companies in the United States and 
Canada producing subliminal self-help audiotapes (Oldenburg, 1990). These tapes 
contained subliminal auditory messages that were designed to help with a variety of 
personal issues including weight loss, smoking cessation, self-confidence, memory, 
addiction, and mental health issues. Despite a definitive lack of empirical support for 
the effectiveness of these subliminal self-help aids (e.g., Greenwald, Spangenberg, 
Pratkanis, & Eskenazi, 1991; Merikle & Skanes, 1992), sales of subliminal message 
tapes in the United States reached an estimated fifty million dollars in 1987 alone 
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(Natale, 1988). However, despite public conceptions of subliminal priming and its 
effectiveness, just how much information and knowledge can be acquired through 
subliminal perception, or just how intelligent unconscious cognitive processing is, 
remains a controversial topic throughout psychological and empirical research 
(Greenwald, 1992).  
1.2. Evidence Demonstrating the Comprehension of Subliminal Stimuli 
Within the field of psychology, the intellectual capabilities of unconscious 
cognition and the extent of subliminal (i.e., below the limen of conscious perception, 
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) processing is a familiar and often controversial theme 
(Greenwald, 1992; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009). Loftus 
and Klinger (1992) propose that the unconscious comprehension of subliminally 
presented letters would arguably demonstrate a more intelligent interpretation of 
unconscious processing than would the unconscious analysis of simple lines and angles. 
Similarly, the semantic comprehension of a single word would indicate a yet more 
sophisticated version of unconscious cognition, whilst the semantic and syntactic 
analysis of subliminally presented multiple word strings, or sentences, should certainly 
demonstrate an ‘intelligent’ unconscious. 
In a typical subliminal priming experiment, a fixation point is followed by a 
prime stimulus that is presented for a brief duration of time and is prevented from 
entering conscious perception through the use of either a forward or backward mask 
(see Figure 1 for an example of the typical trial procedure used) (Carr & Dagenbach, 
1990). This mask is typically in the form of either a pattern mask (i.e., a distribution of 
target fragments, random letters, or symbols), or noise mask (i.e., a mask composed of a 
set of random dots or squares) (Delord, 1998). The mask thus renders the prime 
5 
 
unconscious by interfering with conscious visual processing and analysis of the prime. 
However, other methods of masking such as contrast masking and continuous flash 
suppression involve the simultaneous presentation of prime and mask. Contrast masking 
interferes with conscious visual perception by presenting the stimulus at a subtly 
differing contrast level to the prime background (Lamy, Mudrik, & Deouell, 2008). 
Alternatively, continuous flash suppression involves the presentation of a rapidly 
changing stimulus to one eye in order to prevent the conscious perception of a further 
static stimulus presented to the other eye (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). However the prime 
is masked, when subsequently presented with a test stimulus or task, subliminal priming 
is assumed to have been successful if the prime effects either the processing of the test 
stimulus or task performance (Johnston & Dark, 1986).  
  
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
An example of this priming effect can be seen when a subliminally presented 
word (e.g., dog) either accelerates the processing of a semantically related target item 
(e.g., cat), termed positive priming (e.g., Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dell’Acqua & 
Grainger, 1999; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Klinger & Liu, 1989), or 
inhibits the processing of the test stimulus, termed negative priming (e.g., Abad, 
Noguera, & Ortells, 2003). One theory that attempts to explain the effect evidenced in 
+ 
dog 
##### 
cat or book 
Time 
Prime stimulus 
Backward mask 
Target stimulus 
Figure 1: An example of the procedure used in a typical subliminal priming 
experiment. 
Fixation 
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positive priming experiments is that of the spreading activation phenomenon (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Klinger, Burton, & Pitts 2000). This 
theory suggests that conceptually and semantically related items within the mental 
lexicon, termed nodes, are stored together within an interconnected network (Marcel, 
1983a; Neely, 1977, 1991). The presentation of a subliminal prime thus activates its 
representation within the network, with this activation subsequently spreading to its 
associated and interconnected nodes. This lexical activation consequently allows 
semantically related items to be processed more quickly, leading to an accelerated 
response. 
1.2.1. Subliminal Priming of Single Words 
Cognitive and neuropsychological research provides a wealth of evidence 
demonstrating the subliminal processing of single words. An example of the procedure 
adopted by a typical positive priming experiment demonstrating semantic processing of 
subliminal words is provided by Marcel (1983b). Marcel first briefly presented 
participants with either a word or a blank field followed immediately by a pattern mask. 
The participants were then required to judge whether or not a word had been presented. 
After each presence-absence judgment, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA – the time 
interval between the onset of one stimulus to the onset of the next) was reduced. 
Subliminality was measured by the point at which the participant reached an SOA at 
which they began to make judgment errors, at which point the threshold setting stage 
moved on to the experimental phase. This phase required the participant to make one of 
three separate judgments after each trial; 1) whether a word was presented or not, 2) 
which of two subsequent words shared a graphical similarity with the prime, or 3) 
which of two further words shared a semantic similarity with the prime. The results 
suggested that despite being unable to detect the presence of a word, participants were 
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nevertheless able to make correct judgments on graphic and semantic similarity. Correct 
responses as to whether or not a word was presented, or which of the two subsequent 
words were graphically similar to the one presented, need not necessarily have required 
a semantic interpretation of the subliminal prime. All that was necessary for these tasks 
to be successfully completed was for the participant to have been aware that 
‘something’ was presented, and for simple recognition processes to map the overall 
shape of the prime to the overall shape of one of the two subsequently presented words. 
However, for a participant to have correctly inferred semantic similarity, a level of 
semantic activation of the subliminal prime to its associated nodes is presumed to have 
occurred. 
Similarly, Ortells, Daza, and Fox (2003) demonstrated successful semantic 
activation by presenting participants with a set of subliminal primes that were either a 
body part (e.g., hand) or animal (e.g., cow). Participants were then required to 
categorise a set of target words that were also either body part or animal. On 20% of the 
trials, prime-target pairs were congruent (e.g., hand-finger; cow-bull), whilst on 80% of 
occasions, prime-target pairs were incongruent (e.g., hand-bull; cow-finger). The results 
indicated a congruency effect in that participants were significantly quicker to 
categorise targets when the prime-target relationship was congruent. Therefore, the 
presentation of a word outside of conscious awareness accelerated access to 
semantically and categorically related items within the mental lexicon, as explained by 
the spreading activation network. 
Neuropsychological research provides further evidence demonstrating the 
successful analysis and semantic comprehension of single-word subliminal primes (Lau 
& Passingham, 2007). For example, Dehaene et al., (2001) used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to demonstrate that masked words led to an activation of 
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brain areas that were not activated for masked blank intervals of the same duration. 
Similarly using fMRI, Diaz and McCarthy (2007) went further to demonstrate that 
unconscious backward masked words activated left hemisphere cerebral areas of the 
brain that are typically associated with language comprehension and conscious reading. 
In their experiment, participants were required to take part in a lexical decision task in 
which they had to decide whether a visible letter string was a word or non-word, having 
been subliminally primed with a semantically related word, unrelated word, or 
pronounceable non-word. As well as the expected results in terms of semantically 
related primes leading to an accelerated categorisation response, the results indicated 
that areas of the brain associated with conscious reading, including the inferior frontal 
gyrus, the angular gyrus, and posterior regions of the lateral temporal cortex, were 
activated during the presentation of a masked word in contrast to subliminal backward 
masked non-word letter strings which failed to produce any measurable activation. The 
authors conclude that the pattern of brain activation evidenced likely represents the 
neural correlates involved in the spreading semantic activation phenomenon. 
1.2.2. Subliminal Priming of Pictures 
A simple demonstration of subliminal priming using pictures is provided by 
Mandler, Nakamura, and Van Zandt (1987). Mandler and colleagues briefly presented 
participants with a series of irregular geometric octagons for a period of two 
milliseconds using a tachistoscope. When participants were subsequently presented with 
a series of novel and primed shapes and were asked to rate the shapes on the basis of 
preference, participants consistently rated the subliminally primed shapes as being both 
brighter and more likeable than the new, novel shapes. This effect relates to the mere 
exposure effect established by Zajonc (1968), which proposes that an individual’s 
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attitude towards a stimulus object can be enhanced merely through its repeated exposure 
(Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 2001). 
Cooper and Cooper (2002) placed twelve images of a Coca Cola can as well as 
twelve instances of the word ‘thirsty’ into an eighteen minute episode of ‘The 
Simpsons’. An experimental group viewed the altered version of the programme whilst 
a control group watched the original, unaltered, version of the same episode. Their 
results indicated that post-experimental thirst ratings differed significantly from pre-
experimental ratings for the experimental group, but not for the control group, a result 
supported by Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna (2002). Whilst it is difficult to separate the 
individual contributions of the pictorial and textual stimuli in this experiment, Bar and 
Biederman (1998) subliminally presented participants with a series of line drawings of 
objects such as tools and means of transport and required the participant to name the 
object. Their results suggested that when subliminally presented again a short time later, 
naming accuracy increased by approximately 34%. 
Whilst these studies demonstrate the ability to produce successful affective and 
behavioural priming from subliminally presented pictures and images, these studies fail 
to adequately demonstrate semantic activation from pictorial stimuli. However, 
Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) subliminally presented participants with a series of line 
drawings depicting concrete concepts from either artifactual (e.g., tools, vehicles) or 
natural (e.g., animals, vegetables) categories. When subsequently presented with a 
target word, participants were required to categorise the target as either artifactual or 
natural. The results indicated that participants were significantly faster to categorise the 
target when target and picture-prime were semantically congruent. Hermans, Spruyt, De 
Houwer, and Eelen (2003) similarly demonstrated this facilitation of semantic 
information through the use of prime-target congruency using subliminal real-life 
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pictures rather than drawings. Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) argue that due to the 
inability to derive phonological form from an image, successful subliminal priming 
from pictures indicates that sufficient semantic information must be unconsciously 
extracted from the image to activate associated semantic representations.  
1.2.3. Subliminal Priming of Emotion 
The subliminal priming of anxiety is one such area regarding emotion that has 
been heavily researched in psychological literature (Fox, 1996). Anxiety, an unpleasant 
psychological emotion, often leads to the development of cognitive biases that aid in the 
identification of potential threats (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). These cognitive biases 
involve the rapid detection of, and diversion of attention to, threat related stimuli and 
often inhibit the processing of less vital information. This effect is often demonstrated 
by the use of the Emotional Stroop paradigm (Mathews, Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997). 
The Emotional Stroop paradigm uses emotive and neutral words and presents them in 
different ink colours. The participant is then required to ignore the word and respond 
with the ink colour. It is proposed that the anxiety experienced upon presentation of the 
emotive words prevents cognitive resources from quickly processing the ink colour, as 
research has consistently demonstrated that individuals high in anxiety are slower to 
respond to the ink colour of threatening and unpleasant words when compared to neutral 
words (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Perhaps more interestingly, this cognitive bias effect 
towards anxiety inducing words is similarly evidenced in unconscious Emotional Stroop 
tasks in which the threatening stimuli is presented outside of conscious awareness (Fox, 
1996; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Manguno-Mire, Constans, & Geer, 2005; Mogg, 
Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Wiiliams, & Matthews, 1993; Öhman, 
1999; Li, Zinbarg & Paller, 2007; Van Honk, Peper, & Schutter, 2005). 
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Soares and Öhman (1993) and Öhman and Soares (1994) subliminally primed 
a group of fearful (i.e., spider or snake phobic) and non-fearful (i.e., control) 
participants with pictures of snakes, spiders, flowers and mushrooms. The skin 
conductance responses (SCRs) from fearful participants to spider and snake pictures 
demonstrated higher anxiety levels when compared to either neutral pictures or the 
SCRs from the control group. Tyrer, Lewis, and Lee (1978) subliminally or 
supraliminally presented groups of participants with a series of negatively valenced 
words such as ‘cancer’, ‘death’, and ‘coffin’ either whilst also presenting neutral words 
such as ‘shelf’ and ‘brick’ with a tachistoscope, or by embedding the words within a 
short film. Current ratings of anxiety taken both pre- and post-experimentally 
demonstrated an increase in anxiety levels for both subliminal and supraliminal priming 
conditions, a result supported by Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (1987). However, due to the 
lack of a control group in either of the two experiments conducted by Tyrer et al., it is 
unclear whether to attribute any increase in subjective anxiety to experimental 
manipulation or to experimental artefact.  
Robles, Smith, Carver, and Wellens (1987) attempted to address this issue with 
the inclusion of a control group in an effort to determine whether subliminal stimuli 
could influence subjective mood ratings. Robles et al. embedded pictorial images into a 
two minute video of a woman walking through a forest. For the positive condition, these 
images were static pictures of smiling cartoon characters, and for the negative condition, 
the images consisted of violent stills from well-known horror films. For the control, or 
neutral, condition, the images inserted were of grey and featureless backgrounds. 
Immediately after the short film, the participants were required to complete a subjective 
anxiety measure. The results indicated that post-experimental anxiety ratings were 
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highest for those participants in the negative condition, and lowest for those in the 
positive condition. 
In addition to the subliminal priming and activation of anxiety, research has 
demonstrated the successful subliminal activation of further emotional concepts such as 
fear (Lee, Kang, Lee, Namkoong, & An, 2011), sexual arousal (Gillath, Mikulincer, 
Birnbaum, & Shaver, 2007), disgust (Neumann & Lozo, 2012), and guilt (Zemack-
Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 2007). For example, Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) 
subliminally exposed their participants to a series of words that related to the emotional 
concept of hostility, such as ‘insult’ and ‘inconsiderate’.  When compared to those 
exposed to fewer hostility related items, those participants in the high exposure 
conditions consequently reliably rated the ambiguous behaviours of a target individual 
as more hostile and aggressive.  
The amygdala, an area of the brain located in the medial temporal lobes, has 
long been associated with the regulation of emotion (Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony, 
2008). In addition to emotion regulation, the amygdala is increasingly believed to be 
vital in cognitively processing and evaluating the emotional content of incoming 
information (Gallagher & Chiba, 1996). In support of this, event-related potential (ERP) 
and fMRI studies have consistently demonstrated an increase in amygdala activation in 
response to the presentation of both supraliminal and subliminal emotive stimuli 
(Brooks et al., 2012; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998; Stenberg, Lindgren, Johansson, 
Olsson, & Rosén, 2000; Whalen et al., 1998). For example, Williams et al., (2006) 
subliminally and supraliminally primed participants with a series of faces depicting 
either fearful or neutral expressions. Functional neuroimaging results indicated an 
increase in activation of the amygdala in response to fearful stimuli in both subliminal 
and supraliminal conditions. More interestingly, Naccache et al. (2005) demonstrated a 
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similar result using emotive words as opposed to images. In their study, intracranial 
electrodes measured brain potentials from the amygdala whilst participants were 
subliminally primed with either negatively valenced (e.g., ‘danger’ and ‘kill’) or neutral 
(e.g., ‘cousin’ and ‘see’) words. The results demonstrated a pattern of amygdala 
activation in response to negatively valenced words that was similar to the activation 
evidenced in the conscious processing of emotive stimuli, providing further support for 
the semantic comprehension of subliminal stimuli.   
1.2.4. Subliminal Priming of Arithmetic Computations  
Naccache and Dehaene (2001) have argued that the majority of subliminal 
perception studies have tended to focus on the ability of unconscious cognition to derive 
semantic content from subliminal stimuli, whilst ignoring the possibility of conducting 
manipulations on subliminal stimuli outside of conscious awareness. However, in 
addition to words, pictures, and emotive stimuli, many subliminal priming studies have 
been used to demonstrate that numbers and arithmetic computations can also be 
processed and semantically categorised outside of conscious awareness. As a simple 
demonstration of the comprehension of numbers and number order, Dehaene et al. 
(1998) subliminally presented participants with a number between 1 and 9. When 
subsequently presented with a target number, participants were required to indicate with 
a left or right hand key press whether the target number was bigger or smaller than the 
figure 5. Reaction times indicated that participants were significantly quicker to classify 
the target number when the trials were congruent (i.e., subliminal prime and target both 
above or below 5) compared to incongruent (i.e., subliminal prime and target on 
opposite sides of 5). Furthermore, fMRI results indicated that the subliminal 
presentation of a number led to the left or right activation of the motor cortex 
corresponding to the hand that would indicate whether the subliminal prime number 
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was bigger or smaller than 5. For the incongruent trials, the authors argue that this 
initiation of a motor response corresponding to the primed number leads to a reaction 
time delay as the initial reaction needs to be inhibited. Whilst this study indicates the 
possibility that unconscious processing is able to comprehend the simple meaning of 
numbers and numerical order, further research suggests that unconscious processing is 
actually capable of completing some rather complex mathematical computations (Ric & 
Muller, 2012; Rusconi, Priftis, Rusconi, & Umiltà, 2006; Sklar & Hassin, 2011). 
García-Orza, Damas-López, Matas, and Rodríguez (2009) investigated whether 
single digit multiplications could be computed unconsciously. In their study, 
participants were required to name aloud a visibly presented target numeral that 
appeared on a computer screen (e.g., ‘6’). Before the number appeared, participants 
were subliminally presented with a congruent or incongruent number prime (e.g., 
congruent with the target, ‘6’, or incongruent with the target, ‘32’), or multiplication 
prime (congruent with the target, ‘2 × 3 = ‘, or incongruent with the target, ‘4 × 8 =’). 
When reaction times to number naming were compared for number and multiplication 
primes, the results suggested that participants were significantly faster to name the 
number when preceded by a number prime. This delay in response times suggests that 
multiplication primes are somehow analysed differently to number primes, but does not 
in itself demonstrate unconscious arithmetic. The time delay evidenced may instead be 
attributable to prime length differences or number versus symbol priming. However, 
support for unconscious single digit multiplications comes from the congruency results, 
which indicated that incongruent multiplication primes resulted in slower number 
naming latencies when compared to congruent trials. 
Using continuous flash suppression that allows for the presentation of 
subliminal stimuli to reach presentation durations of up to 2 seconds, Sklar et al. (2012) 
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presented participants with a series or 3 digit arithmetic subtraction or addition 
equations (e.g., “9 ˗ 3 ˗ 4 =” or “3 + 2 + 4 =”). Participants were then required to read 
aloud a target number that either equalled the prime equation (i.e., congruent condition), 
or disagreed with the equation (i.e., incongruent condition). The results demonstrated a 
significant priming effect of congruency in the subtraction condition, indicating that 
participants were significantly quicker to name the number when it solved the primed 
equation. Interestingly, this priming effect was not evidenced in conditions whereby 
addition was the mathematical operation. The authors attributed this lack of a priming 
effect to a number of plausible explanations. Firstly, computing the solution to an 
addition equation is arguably easier, and thereby quicker, than for a subtraction 
equation. Therefore, the solution to an addition equation may have already decayed by 
the time the target appears, thereby eliminating any priming effects. The second 
explanation is based on research demonstrating that individuals often undertake 
numerous (and often unnecessary) parallel unconscious computations when presented 
with an easy, as opposed to difficult, mathematical task (e.g., Sackur & Dehaene, 2009). 
As a result, when primed with an addition equation, it is possible that participants 
conducted a number of unnecessary cognitive tasks which left fewer cognitive resources 
available to finding a solution to the equation. In support of this explanation, Sklar et al. 
conducted a further experiment which prevented participants from performing any 
unnecessary computations, which subsequently resulted in a positive priming effect for 
addition equations. Whilst not strictly addressing linguistic semantics, these studies do 
suggest an intelligent and sophisticated version of unconscious cognition capable of 
comprehending numerical order and mathematical operations.  
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1.2.5. Subliminal Priming of Multiple Words 
In regards to semantic activation, Greenwald (1992) provided a comprehensive 
account on the abilities of unconscious cognition and issued a challenge relating to the 
subliminal processing of multiple word primes. This challenge asserted that in order to 
claim successful processing of multiple word stimuli, each word needs to be processed 
in unison, and that none of the individual words should independently impart sentence-
level meaning. Greenwald and Liu (1985) attempted to meet this challenge by 
subliminally priming participants with two-word primes. In their first experiment, 
participants were required to evaluate a series of singular primes on the basis of their 
positive or negative valence. Their results indicated a positive priming effect, indicating 
semantic interpretation of the subliminal prime. In their follow up study, the same 
participants were then presented with a series of two-word primes (created from the 
earlier singular primes) that were designed to be of individually congruent valence with 
each other, but combine to create a prime of opposite valence. For example, the two 
words “enemy” and “fails” are of singularly negative valence. Yet when combined, 
“enemy-fails” becomes evaluatively positive. Whilst successful evaluation of “enemy-
fails” as positive would provide evidence demonstrating the semantic analysis of 
sentence level meaning, the results indicated that subliminal priming was instead 
determined by individual word valence alone, leading the authors to conclude against 
the possible subliminal priming of multiple words.    
However, further research investigating the subliminal priming of sentences 
has been more successful. The majority of studies successfully demonstrating the 
unconscious processing of multiple-word strings or sentences involve a method of 
priming termed subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA). SPA involves the 
activation of psychopathological internal conflict relating to psychoanalytic theory 
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using subliminal stimuli (Silverman, 1983). For example, Silverman Ross, Adler, and 
Lustig (1978) subliminally primed a group of male participants with a set of primes 
relating to the Oedipus complex and subsequently rated dart throwing performance. The 
prime ‘BEATING DAD IS WRONG’ was intended to exacerbate the oedipal conflict, 
whilst the prime ‘BEATING DAD IS OK’ was designed to alleviate it. Their results 
indicated that the group of participants subliminally presented with the conflict-
alleviating prime ‘BEATING DAD IS OK’ performed significantly better than either 
the group exposed to the conflict-exacerbating prime, or the neutral prime ‘PEOPLE 
ARE WALKING’. 
Superficially, the results of the Silverman et al. study appear to demonstrate the 
possible semantic activation of multiple-word subliminal primes. Although, a 
measurable difference in dart throwing performance need not necessarily require the 
unconscious semantic processing of each word of the prime, as any effect evidenced 
may instead be due to simple single-word priming of “OK” versus “WRONG”. After 
all, the ultimate aim of SPA studies is to subliminally induce internal conflict, not to 
ensure that each word in the sentence prime is semantically attended to. However, 
Palumbo and Gillman (1984) replicated and extended the Silverman et al. (1978) study 
by additionally including the primes ‘BEATING HIM IS WRONG’ and ‘BEATING 
HIM IS OK’. Their results replicated the Silverman et al. finding in that participants 
presented with the conflict-alleviating prime performed significantly better than those 
primed with the conflict-exacerbating prime. More interestingly, performance in the 
‘BEATING HIM IS WRONG’ and ‘BEATING HIM IS OK’ conditions did not 
significantly differ from the control stimulus ‘PEOPLE ARE WALKING’. That there 
was a measurable difference between the ‘BEATING DAD IS WORNG’ and 
‘BEATING HIM IS WRONG’ conditions suggests that unconscious cognition was 
18 
 
capable of separating the semantic difference between DAD and HIM. However, again, 
this result may demonstrate single-word priming differences between “DAD” and 
“HIM” rather than sentence level meaning. 
Despite some significant criticisms and contradictory evidence (e.g., Allen & 
Condon, 1982; Condon & Allen, 1980; Haspel & Harris, 1982; Heilbrun, 1980; Oliver 
& Burkham, 1982; Vitiello, Carlin, Becker, Barris, & Dutton, 1989), SPA studies 
employing multiple-word primes have received some positive support (Silverman & 
Weinberger, 1985). For example, Bronstein and Rodin (1983) primed a clinical sample 
of schizophrenic males with a series of subliminal primes that related to either SPA 
oneness conflicts such as ‘MOMMY AND I ARE ONE’, ‘MOMMY AND I ARE THE 
SAME’ and ‘MOMMY AND I ARE ALIKE’, or neutral primes such as ‘PEOPLE ARE 
WALKING’, ‘PEOPLE ARE LOOKING’ and ‘BOYS ARE STANDING’. Their results 
suggested that only the SPA prime ‘MOMMY AND I ARE ONE’ produced a reduction 
in subsequent pathological thoughts and behaviours within the sample. Silverman 
(1982) reported similar ameliorative effects using SPA oneness primes on a sample of 
patients with depression.  
Other examples of studies demonstrating successful subliminal priming using 
sentences include a study conducted by Talbot, Duberstein, and Scott (1991). Talbot et 
al. subliminally primed a sample of male participants with SPA primes relating to 
oneness. Results demonstrated that participants primed with “Mommy is Leaving Me” 
made significantly lower subjective ratings of own attractiveness, and demonstrated a 
reduction in eating behaviour when compared to participants primed with “Mona is 
Loaning It”. Sohlberg and Birgegard (2003) similarly presented SPA oneness primes to 
a sample of female participants and measured subjective ratings on a number of 
psychological variables including depression and self-mother similarity. Their results 
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indicated that participants primed with ‘Mommy and I are one’ generated higher ratings 
on the self-mother similarity scale between seven and fourteen days after initial 
exposure. Ariam and Siller (1982) subliminally presented neutral and SPA oneness 
primes to a group of school students. Their results indicated that the students exposed to 
‘Mommy and I are one’ primes demonstrated an increment in mathematical 
performance when compared to neutral conditions. Despite the criticisms aimed at SPA 
studies in general, these and other studies demonstrating similar effects (e.g., Hardaway, 
1990; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Waller & Barter, 2005) nevertheless go some 
way towards demonstrating the possible semantic activation of multiple-word 
subliminal primes.  
More recently, Sklar et al. (2012) investigated subliminal priming of sentences 
using continuous flash suppression that allowed for the presentation of subliminal 
stimuli to reach up to 2 seconds, increasing the chances of successful subliminal 
priming. Sklar and colleagues presented participants with a series of semantically 
coherent (e.g., “The lion ate a zebra”) and incoherent (e.g., “the bench ate a zebra”) 
sentences, and measured the time taken for the expressions to ‘pop’ into consciousness. 
The results indicated that semantically incoherent sentences popped into conscious 
perception significantly quicker than the semantically coherent sentences did. It is 
argued that the cognitive conflict which ensues as a result of analysing the semantically 
incoherent expression forces the sentence into consciousness in order to further analyse 
its content. The authors argue that as semantic coherence is determined by word 
combinations rather than the individual words themselves, then these findings 
demonstrate the successful subliminal priming of multiple-word sentences. However, 
there may have been a word-level effect influencing popping times as different words 
were used in different conditions (e.g., “bench” versus “lion”). Nevertheless, the results 
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of this experiment does raise the question of what sort of combinations of stimuli are 
possible to prime subliminally. 
1.3. Evidence Against the Comprehension of Subliminal Stimuli 
Despite a wealth of evidence demonstrating the successful semantic activation 
of subliminal words and even multiple-word sentences, controversy remains regarding 
the precise extent of subliminal priming (Draine, 1997; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004; 
Moore, 1982, 1988; Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1988). Pratkanis (1992) has argued that 
many studies that purport to have successfully demonstrated a subliminal priming effect 
are often either in some way flawed or are nonreplicable, whilst the majority of priming 
studies that have failed to demonstrate a subliminal effect go unreported due to non-
significant results. Similarly, in his examination of unconscious cognition, Greenwald 
(1992) has argued that unconscious processing of subliminal stimuli is in fact far less 
sophisticated than is often reported, and often demonstrates nothing more elaborate than 
the processing of letters or word fragments. Therefore, rather than the semantic 
activation of subliminal primes, successful priming effects are often attributed instead to 
other processes such as the retrieval of pre-existing stimulus-response links, processing 
at the sublexical level, or partial conscious awareness.  
1.3.1. Stimulus Response Links 
A large body of research has been amassed which demonstrates the superior 
priming effect of subliminal primes that have first been practised as conscious targets 
(e.g., Abrams & Grinspan, 2007; Draine & Greenwald, 1998). That is, the priming 
effects of subliminal primes that have earlier been perceived as conscious targets prove 
more successful than non-practiced novel primes. More specifically, many researchers 
21 
 
argue that the effectiveness of subliminal primes are dependent upon whether or not 
they have been consciously presented beforehand (Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 
2002). This effect is demonstrated by Damian (2001), who presented participants with a 
series of real-world objects that could be classified as either small (e.g., ‘apple’) or large 
(e.g., ‘house’). The participants were required to make size judgments on these target 
words having been subliminally primed with an object that was either congruent in size 
(e.g., spoon-apple) or incongruent (e.g., house-apple). Prime-target pairs were created 
by combining the same stimuli, meaning that whilst ‘spoon’ may occur as a size-
congruent subliminal prime for ‘apple’ in one trial, ‘spoon’ could later appear as a target 
word in another trial. The results demonstrated a decrease in response time for size 
judgments when prime and target were congruent. However, a further experiment 
employing the same size judgement task using a set of novel prime-target pairs, that is, 
prime words that never appeared as targets, failed to demonstrate the same semantic 
congruity effect.   
Therefore, significant criticisms have arisen regarding the use of practised 
primes as subliminal stimuli; with the superior priming effect evidenced being attributed 
to the creation of an episodic memory trace established during conscious rehearsal that 
is later automatically reactivated upon subsequent subliminal presentation (Damian, 
2001; Elsner, Kunde, & Kiesel, 2008; Forster & Davis, 1984; Kiesel, Kunde, & 
Hoffmann, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). 
Abrams and Grinspan (2007) have proposed that all that is required to identify a 
stimulus that has been predicted by experience and expectation is simple cognitive 
processing at the level of individual features. When primes are consciously rehearsed, 
they acquire a memory trace between the stimulus and a given motor response. These 
automatised stimulus-response (S-R-) mappings subsequently remain in short term 
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memory and are later reactivated upon presentation of the same stimuli displayed 
subliminally. Therefore, whilst S-R links may lead to successful subliminal priming, 
these results indicate that the semantic analysis of subliminal primes need not 
necessarily occur as the semantic system is by-passed.  
Functional neuroimaging studies have provided evidence to demonstrate that, 
when compared to novel stimuli, a previously exposed stimulus results in a decrease in 
neural activity (Schacter & Buckner, 1998). In an fMRI study investigating S-R 
mappings in conscious tasks, Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, and Schacter (2004) 
consciously presented participants with a series of pictures relating to everyday objects 
(e.g., acorn, push-chair). The participants’ task was to determine whether the presented 
object was bigger or smaller in size than a shoe box. As well as a decrease in response 
time to previously exposed stimuli, the fMRI results indicated a decrease in activation 
within the left prefrontal and fusiform regions of the brain upon presentation of a 
previously presented item with its associated motor response. Therefore, the authors 
concluded that a previously attended to stimulus that has an associated response fails to 
elicit the same level of processing and analysis when compared to novel stimuli. 
Furthermore, similar results have been demonstrated when using subliminal stimuli 
(Dehaene et al., 1998; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998).  
However, additional research has demonstrated effective subliminal priming 
that cannot be due to the retrieval of simple S-R mappings (e.g., Klauer, Eder, 
Greenwald, & Abrams, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Naccache & Dehaene, 
2001; Van den Bussche et al., 2009). Rather than practiced stimuli leading to a learned 
association between a given stimulus and its motoric response, Abrams, Klinger, and 
Greenwald (2002) have argued that practice instead establishes mappings between a 
word and its semantic category. Abrams et al. (2002) required participants to categorise 
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a block of visible words as either pleasant (e.g., ‘happy’ and ‘warm’) or unpleasant 
(e.g., ‘scum’ and ‘kill’) in valence by using either the “a” or “5” key on a computer 
keyboard. The second phase of the experiment required the participant to categorise a 
series of subliminal primes based on their emotive valence, some of which were novel 
items, and some the previously practiced items. However, the key assignment for 
pleasant and unpleasant was reversed for practiced stimuli. Therefore, no motor 
response could have been learned between the stimulus and required key press. 
Nevertheless, the results demonstrated a significant priming effect of word valence 
despite key reversal, leading the authors to conclude that practiced subliminal primes 
actually activate mappings between words and their semantic categories as opposed to 
mappings between a stimulus and motor response.  
1.3.2. Processing at the Sublexical Level 
In addition to criticisms relating to the retrieval of pre-established S-R links, it 
has been argued that research demonstrating subliminal priming effects often 
demonstrate nothing more elaborate than the processing of individual letters or word 
fragments (Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000). For example, Abrams and Greenwald 
(2000) have provided empirical evidence to suggest that far from analysing whole-word 
meaning, the unconscious analysis of words is actually only completed at the level of 
word-parts. In their first experiment, Abrams and Greenwald required participants to 
consciously evaluate the emotional valence of a set of parent primes that were 
unequivocally positive or negative in meaning. Having categorised the parent primes, 
participants were subliminally presented with a set of nonsensical ‘hulip-type hybrid 
primes’ that were created by combining two parent primes of congruent valence (e.g., 
humour-tulip-hulip; smut-bile-biut). The results indicated that when asked to rate 
emotional valence, participants were successfully able to categorise emotional valence 
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based on the valence of parent primes despite the nonsensical nature of the hybrid 
primes. In a follow up study (Experiment 2), participants were again required to 
evaluate the emotional valence of the same set of consciously perceived parent primes 
used in Experiment 1. However, a set of ‘tumour-type hybrid’ subliminal primes were 
generated by combining two congruent parent primes to create a semantically 
comprehensible prime of incongruent valence to parent primes (e.g., humour-tulip-
tumour, smut-bile-smile). The results indicated that when asked to again rate valence, 
participants continued to categorise emotional valence according to the valence of the 
parent prime rather than the valence of tumour-type primes, even to the extent that 
‘smile’ was categorised as negative. Greenwald and Abrams (2002) later went on to 
demonstrate that a single string of consonants (e.g., LLLLL) from a parent prime (e.g., 
‘tulip’) was sufficient to generate a priming effect based on parental prime valence. 
These combined results led the authors to conclude that subliminal processing is limited 
to the unconscious appraisal of sub-word elements.  
As a further example, Hutchison, Neely, Neill, and Walker (2004) investigated 
sublexical priming using a stem completion task, in which the participant is required to 
complete a word stem (e.g., dr_ _ _ ) with a primed word (e.g., dream) or a different 
word (e.g., drink). In their first experiment, Hutchison et al. (2004) compared the 
priming effects evidenced between a set of identity primes (e.g., ‘candy’, ca_ _ _ ) and a 
set of form primes sharing an orthographic overlap in which the last three letters 
overlapped with the missing letters in a given stem (e.g., ‘windy’, ca_ _ _ ), whereby the 
participant was required to complete the word stem with a non-primed word. If the 
unconscious analysis of subliminal primes occurs at the sublexical level, then the level 
of priming for identity primes should equal the level of priming for the orthographic 
form primes. Whilst the results indicated a significant priming effect for both identity 
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and form primes, this priming effect was significantly higher for identity primes, 
suggesting lexical as opposed to sublexical access. However, the authors argue that the 
additional priming effects evidenced with the use of identity primes may instead be due 
to greater phonological similarity between prime and target with identity primes when 
compared to form primes. Therefore, a further experiment aimed to compare the 
priming effects evidenced between a set of identity primes (e.g., ‘write’, wr_ _ _) and 
homophonic primes that shared the same phonology but differed in spelling (e.g., 
‘right’, wr_ _ _). Therefore, if the unconscious analysis of subliminal primes occurs at 
the lexical level, any priming effects should be higher for the identity primes than for 
homophonic primes. Whilst the results indicated significantly higher identity priming 
effects when compared to homophonic priming, additional analyses reveal that these 
higher priming effects could be explained by combining the priming effects from 
sublexical, orthographic and phonological contributions; further supporting the 
contention that unconscious processing operates at the sublexical level rather than the 
semantic level.   
However, Schütz, Schendzielarz, Zwitserlood, and Vorberg (2007) utilised a 
stem completion task to demonstrate that unconscious priming operates on the semantic 
level as opposed to the sublexical. Word stems were chosen on the basis that each stem 
(e.g., ‘T_NT’) had only two solutions; a dominant (e.g., ‘tent’) and a subordinate (e.g., 
‘tint’) solution. Schütz et al. attempted to compare lexical and sublexical contributions 
to subliminal priming by using semantic and form related primes to prime the 
subordinate solution. Semantic primes (e.g., ‘hue’ to tint) were chosen based on their 
semantic similarity with the subordinate solution and dissimilarity with the dominant, 
and with the assurance that they differed orthographically and phonologically to the 
subordinate and dominant solutions. Similarly, form related primes (e.g., ‘lint’ to tint) 
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were chosen based on their semantic, orthographic, and phonological differences to the 
dominant solution, and orthographical and phonological similarity to the subordinate. 
Therefore, due to these prime differences, any positive priming effects evidenced in the 
semantic condition must be due to semantic and lexical activation. As predicted, the 
results revealed significant priming effects for form related primes, but also for 
semantic primes that shared no sublexical overlap with the solution. Similarly, Klauer, 
Eder, Greenwald, and Abrams (2007) demonstrated positive semantic priming in which 
a sublexical explanation would have predicted the opposite results.   
1.3.3. Partial Awareness 
In addition to S-R mappings and processing at the sublexical level, Kouider 
and Dupoux (2004) suggest that partial conscious awareness of a ‘subliminal’ prime 
often creates the illusion of positive semantic priming. The authors argue that awareness 
is often conceptualised as an all or nothing phenomenon. Whilst true in some cases, 
more complex stimuli such as words and sentences are mentally organised on several 
levels of detail including feature, letter and phoneme representations. Therefore, it may 
be possible that masking may obscure some of these levels of processing, but not all. 
This distinction between partial and global awareness then implies that partial 
awareness may allow for the reconstruction of a prime based on minimal letter and 
feature identification, with this reconstruction leading to semantic access and thus 
giving the appearance of semantic activation of subliminal stimuli. Kouider and Dupoux 
demonstrated this effect using the unconscious Stroop paradigm. Participants were 
presented with two types of prime; a set of four French colour words (e.g., ‘rouge’, 
‘jaune’ etc.) and four pseudo colour words (based on a variation of the colour words, 
e.g., ‘rugoe’, ‘janue’ etc.) presented for either 29 or 43 milliseconds. When the 
participant was subsequently required to name the ink colour of a series of ampersands, 
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semantic activation of the prime was assumed to have occurred if colour naming was 
slower for incongruent conditions. The authors proposed that conditions leading to 
partial awareness (e.g., 29 ms) would make it difficult to distinguish between real and 
pseudo colours, yet the similarity between letter fragments (e.g., ja_ _e) would allow for 
the mental reconstruction of the prime and lead to a priming effect. However, longer 
prime durations (e.g., 43 ms) would lead to more of a global awareness of the prime, 
allowing for the distinction to be made between real and pseudo colours. Therefore, 
only if awareness of the prime is partial should there be a priming effect evidenced for 
both real and pseudo colours. As expected, the results revealed a positive priming effect 
for both real and pseudo colour words for shorter prime durations, but only for real 
colour words in longer prime durations, leading to the conclusion that the retrieval of 
semantic information of a prime is dependent upon (at least) partial conscious 
awareness. 
In his extensive review of literature pertaining to subliminal perception, 
Holender (1986) has argued that evidence demonstrating positive subliminal priming 
effects are more often than not attributable to stimuli that are consciously identified due 
to, for example, dark adaptation. However, Klinger and Greenwald (1995) employed a 
method of dichoptic pattern masking to demonstrate how the influence of conscious 
perception can actually adversely affect unconscious cognitive processing. In their 
experiment, the participants’ task was to determine whether two target words were 
associated (e.g., eagle-falcon) or unassociated (e.g., eagle-polka), having been primed 
with either a related (e.g., hawk) or unrelated (e.g., nurse) word. Before analysing the 
results, the participants were classified into one of two groups, either high or low 
detectors, based on their ability to detect masked prime words. The results indicated that 
participants classified as low detectors demonstrated a significant priming effect in 
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terms of response latencies to target associations. However, no semantic priming effect 
was evidenced for high detecting participants, supporting additional research suggesting 
that partial detection of the primed word actually interferes with semantic activation 
(e.g., Dagenbach, Carr, & Wilhelmsen, 1989). As an explanation, Klinger and 
Greenwald propose that there are two processes involved in the semantic activation of 
mental representations. The first of these processes is the aforementioned spreading 
activation phenomenon, which is in itself an unconscious process. The second process 
involves a limited capacity attentional mechanism that consciously attempts to activate 
semantically related mental representations which adversely interferes with unconscious 
processing. Therefore, high detectors were exposed to a briefly presented blurred or 
fragmented image of a word in which the conscious process attempted to activate 
mental representations, whilst the spreading activation phenomenon was simultaneously 
suppressed. This then led to the lack of semantic priming effects evidenced in high 
detecting participants. Therefore, partial conscious awareness of the prime may actually 
hinder unconscious processing rather than enhance it. 
As demonstrated by the evidence both for and against unconscious cognition 
presented here, the degree of information complexity that can be retrieved from stimuli 
presented subliminally, or simply how intelligent unconscious processing is, remains a 
highly controversial theme within psychological literature (Van den Bussche et al., 
2009). However, the point of this controversy often appears to revolve around the 
subject of what exactly constitutes subliminality, and individual researchers’ 
interpretations of ‘unconscious’. Put simply, how can researchers present stimuli 
subliminally whilst ensuring the exclusion of conscious awareness? In support of 
Holender (1986), Reder and Gordon (1997) propose that methodological issues make it 
extremely difficult to claim successful semantic activation of subliminal stimuli without 
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the possibility of success being attributed to an element of conscious identification of 
the prime (e.g., Jaśkowski, 2008). Therefore, this issue of what constitutes 
‘unconscious’ needs further exploration.  
1.4. What Constitutes ‘Unconscious’ and how can it be Measured? 
It is widely accepted that subliminal perception can be defined as the 
presentation of a stimulus that subsequently affects the thoughts or actions of an 
individual despite the stimulus never entering the individual’s conscious awareness 
(Velmans & Schneider, 2008). However, it is this term ‘conscious’ that remains 
somewhat contentious (cf. Kihlstrom, 1987) and needs further definition. Or, more 
precisely, a definition of consciousness is required in order to determine what renders a 
stimulus ‘unconscious’. In its simplest form, Velmans and Schneider (2008) define 
consciousness as an awareness of our environment, our bodies, and of our thoughts. 
With this in mind, the term ‘unconscious’ can generally be conceptualised as ‘unaware 
of’. Greenwald (1992) proposes that this definition of unconscious can be further 
subdivided into two quite different interpretations of unaware: outside of attention, and 
an inability or failure to introspect.   
At any given time, an individual is exposed to a multitude of incoming 
information to which it is impossible to fully attend (Treisman, 1969). As such, an 
individual must selectively choose what to devote attention to. However, this does not 
mean that information falling outside of selective attention does not have an effect on 
consequent thoughts or behaviours (Greenwald, 1992). Consider, as an example, talking 
to another person at a crowded event. Although your attention may be selectively 
focused on the current conversation and the person you are talking with, you are 
nevertheless likely to be either consciously or unconsciously aware of other people in 
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the room, conversations going on around you, the background music that is playing, and 
so on. This is often aptly demonstrated by suddenly hearing one’s name being spoken 
across a crowded room despite selective attention previously being focused elsewhere.  
Empirically, the influence that stimuli presented outside of the foci of selective 
attention has on higher order cognitive functioning has been investigated by Rahnev, 
Huang, and Lau (2012). Participants were presented with four black circles against a 
dark background on a computer monitor, with each circle being located equally within 
one of the four quadrants of the screen. The participants were cued to focus on a 
particular circle, in which a series of white dots moved in random directions within each 
of the four circles. After 100 milliseconds, all of the white dots in the cued circle moved 
either upwards or downwards, whilst the dots in the circle at a diagonal moved in either 
a congruent or incongruent direction. After a further 400 milliseconds, a number 
appeared on the screen. The participant’s task was to state whether the number was 
bigger or smaller than 5 if the dots were moving upwards. If the dots were moving 
downwards, the participant was required to state whether the number was odd or even. 
The results supported Rahnev and colleagues predictions in that shorter reaction times 
and higher accuracy levels were observed in trials in which movement in the cued and 
diagonal circles was congruent when compared to incongruent. Therefore, the authors 
conclude that higher cognitive functions such as task setting were nevertheless 
influenced by the direction of movement in the diagonal circle, despite that movement 
being outside of the focus of selective attention.  
As well as outside of attention, the further interpretation of ‘unaware of’ refers 
to the inability or failure to subjectively report on experience (Greenwald, 1992). In 
other words, if an individual is known to have attended to a particular task or stimulus 
but is unable to report experience of having attended to it, then this provides evidence of 
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an unconscious experience. This type of metacognition, knowing about knowing, is 
believed to be a uniquely conscious process (Koriat, 2007). An example of this 
phenomenon is often experienced by proficient car drivers. Driving requires a 
combination of many physiological and psychological functions including hand and 
foot motor control, and visual regulation and vigilance. Nevertheless, an experienced 
driver can often complete a practiced journey with no conscious recollection of having 
completed said journey. However, this does not mean that the driving was in itself an 
unconscious process, it merely demonstrates the inability to subjectively introspect on 
an attended to process. Empirically, studies investigating unconscious cognition using 
subliminal stimuli often include a measure of introspection following the conclusion of 
experimental trials, to test for subjective experience (e.g., Diaz & McCarthy, 2007).  
According to Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth (1992) and Cleeremans and Jiménez 
(2002), the ability to control cognition and behaviour by excluding certain responses is 
an ability unique to consciousness. Therefore, in an attempt to isolate the separate 
contributions of conscious and unconscious perception to a given subliminal task, 
Jacoby (1991) developed the process-dissociation procedure (i.e., inclusion and 
exclusion tasks) for stem completion tasks. Inclusion tasks require the participant to 
complete a word stem (e.g., st_ _ _ ) with a previously presented subliminal prime (e.g., 
‘storm’). If, beyond a baseline performance, the participant is able to successfully 
complete the word stem, then it is assumed that there must have been conscious 
knowledge of the primed word (Debner & Jacoby, 1994). However, an exclusion task 
requires the participant to complete the word stem with a different word to the primed 
stimulus (e.g., ‘steam’). If, as evidenced by a below baseline performance, the 
participant continues to complete the word stem with the primed word, then this can be 
used as evidence to demonstrate unconscious knowledge (e.g., Debner & Jacoby, 1994; 
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Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). That is, if knowledge of the prime was conscious, 
the participant would fulfil task instructions by excluding the primed stimulus. Jacoby 
argues that it is precisely this inability to exercise cognitive control over excluding the 
primed word that provides evidence of unconscious knowledge.  
However, further research investigating unconscious cognition has provided 
evidence to suggest that the unconscious is sufficiently capable of exerting cognitive 
control over responding (e.g., Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans, & Hansenne, 2011; Dienes, 
Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Perner, 2007; Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010; 
Norman, Price, & Jones, 2011; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; Wan, 
Dienes, & Fu, 2008). Again, this empirical disagreement between what can and cannot 
be cognitively controlled through subliminal priming is in part due to the discrepancy 
between what constitutes conscious and unconscious perception. Therefore, we use 
higher order thought theory in an attempt to further explore the distinction between 
mental states and to define what makes a stimulus ‘subliminal’.  
1.4.1. Higher Order Thought Theory 
Higher order theories of consciousness attempt to distinguish between the 
separate properties of consciousness by exploring the relationship between a particular 
conscious state and its associated higher order representation (Carruthers, 2011; 
Timmermans et al., 2012). In the 1980’s, Rosenthal developed the higher order thought 
(HOT) theory of consciousness (Rosenthal, 1986, 2005), which supposes that a 
conscious mental state is a mental state of which we are conscious, and that the way in 
which we become conscious of a mental state is by thinking about it (Dienes, 2008). 
1.4.1.1. A conscious mental state is a mental state of which we are conscious: Rosenthal 
proposes that there are two uses of the word consciousness; that of transitive 
consciousness and state consciousness (Dienes, 2008). According to Rosenthal (1993), 
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when an individual senses or thinks about an object, we can presume that the individual 
is transitively conscious of that object. Therefore, transitive consciousness refers to an 
individual being conscious of an object, of ‘something’. For instance, one can look at an 
apple on the table and be (transitively) conscious of the apple. Alternatively, state 
consciousness refers to being conscious by virtue of having perceptions or thoughts 
which are themselves conscious. For instance, one can consciously see that the apple is 
on the table. Subliminally seeing an apple would mean one was transitively conscious 
of the apple, but the seeing was not state conscious. This distinction between transitive 
and state consciousness can be aptly demonstrated by patients with a neurological 
disorder known as blindsight. Blindsight is a condition whereby damage to the striate 
cortex and optical nerve fibres leads to information within the visual field not being 
transmitted to the brain, consequently resulting in blindness (Overgaard, Fehl, 
Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008). However, despite a lack of conscious 
visual information, when asked to respond to an object in the affected visual field, 
blindsight patients are often able to correctly identify object position, motion, or even 
colour (e.g., Stoerig & Cowey, 1989; Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 
1974). Therefore, a patient with blindsight that can correctly indicate that a balloon in 
the affected visual field is moving upwards is demonstrating transitive consciousness; 
the balloon is moving up. However, the patient is lacking state consciousness; they are 
not conscious of seeing that the balloon is moving upwards. 
1.4.1.2. The way we become conscious of a mental state is by thinking about it: 
According to HOT theory, a mental state becomes conscious when we either perceive it 
or think about it. That is, I can either see that the apple is on the table, or I can think of 
the apple being on the table; however, both perceiving and thinking result in awareness 
of the apple. Therefore, Rosenthal proposes that a HOT affirming that we are in that 
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mental state is necessary in allowing a mental state to become conscious. Continuing 
with the apple on the table as an example, a first order thought would have content that 
‘the apple is on the table’. However, it is the higher order thought ‘I am aware that I see 
the apple is on the table’ that makes us introspectively aware of having that perception. 
When applied in a subliminal context, similar to a blindsight patient, an 
individual should be transitively conscious of the presented prime but should lack state 
consciousness as they would not be conscious of having perceived the prime. For 
instance, the subliminal presentation of the prime ‘lion’ should activate the first order 
thought ‘the word lion’. Whilst perhaps sufficient to activate semantic associations, it is 
the absence of a higher order thought - with content ‘I see the word lion’, that renders 
the prime subliminal. Therefore, although perception of the prime involves being 
conscious of the prime, the lack of a higher order thought indicates that subjectively, we 
lack conscious awareness of the prime. Higher order thought theory, and higher order 
theories of consciousness in general, highlight the importance of utilising a subjective 
measurement of subliminality when assessing the extent of unconscious cognition.  
Rosenthal’s theory is given as a clear example of a higher order theory. But 
one may dispute for example whether the higher order representation has to be a thought 
rather than a perception (Carruthers, 2011), or something else (simply the right sort of 
representation; Cleeremans, 2011). Cleeremans proposes a higher order representation 
theory that requires a higher order network to represent the accuracy of a lower order 
network in order for the lower order content to be conscious. By not stipulating the 
higher order representation must specifically be a thought, the theory can assign 
conscious states to organisms more easily than Rosenthal’s theory, and also allows a 
computational theory to be more easily built. In terms of linking theory to methodology, 
Cleeremans theory will serve just as well as Rosenthal’s so long as it is assumed that the 
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higher order network would express its content in verbal report whenever the person is 
probed for the content; i.e., what appears as possibly sub-personal content in the theory 
is made personal when probed. 
1.4.2. Subjective and Objective Thresholds 
One explanation that attempts to account for the apparent failure of many 
studies to successfully demonstrate subliminal semantic priming focuses on the 
adherence to strict objective measures when measuring subliminality. Objective 
methods of assessing unconscious cognition presume that any trial accuracy beyond a 
baseline (i.e., chance) performance indicates conscious knowledge of the prime (Seth, 
Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008). In other words, regardless of whether 
or not you are introspectively aware that you saw the prime, if you are correct then you 
must have conscious knowledge. As such, many subliminal studies use either an 
arbitrary presentation speed of sufficiently short duration to ensure chance level 
performance (e.g., Hutchison et al., 2004), or systematically reduce prime duration until 
the participant is performing at (or below) chance level (e.g., Greenwald & Liu, 1985).  
Snodgrass, Bernat, and Shevrin (2004) propose a nonmonotonic relationship 
between priming and awareness as stimulus intensity increases. That is, rather than the 
traditional positive relationship in which performance steadily increases as stimulus 
intensity increases between the thresholds, performance actually decreases initially 
before then becoming positive. The authors suggest that unconscious processing is 
maximal at the objective detection threshold (ODT; presence/absence tasks, when the 
ability to determine whether a word was presented is at chance) and then decreases as 
stimulus intensity increases until it reaches the objective identification threshold (OIT; 
discrimination tasks, when the ability to identify which particular word had been 
presented was at chance). This initial decrease in performance is attributed to increasing 
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conscious processing which is not yet sufficient to perform high level tasks overriding 
unconscious processing. This nonmonotonic U shaped performance curve then 
continues to increase until it reaches the subjective threshold and beyond. Whilst 
performance at the subjective threshold is analogous to performance at the ODT 
threshold, Snodgrass (2002) and Snodgrass and Shevrin (2006) argue that conscious 
processing, albeit weak conscious processing, is responsible for the priming evidenced 
at the subjective threshold. Therefore, Snodgrass and colleagues argue that only 
stringent objective measures which preclude all conscious processing produce maximal 
priming effects. 
However, Miller (1991) has argued that the distribution of thresholds for 
conscious awareness varies across sets of trials, and that it is this variability in 
thresholds that may have resulted in previous studies failing to demonstrate subliminal 
priming. More precisely, the use of static thresholds at minimum baseline accuracy will 
significantly reduce the likelihood of demonstrating subliminal perception due to this 
variation in prime detection. For example, if a participant’s true objective threshold is at 
40 milliseconds for half a set of trials and 20 milliseconds for the other half, the single 
lowest estimate of detection would be used for subsequent experimental trials, resulting 
in a biased estimation of subliminal perception. Consequently, the use of objective 
methods in measuring priming levels has been heavily criticised for testing not just 
unconscious cognition, but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & 
Passingham, 2006). 
Therefore, what objective methods of assessing subliminal perception by 
definition fail to take into account is individual subjectivity; that is, an individual’s 
conscious awareness of their own accuracy (cf. Merikle, 1992; Merikle, Smilek, & 
Eastwood, 2001). It was Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1986) that first distinguished 
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between the two types of subliminal thresholds; objective and subjective. In a series of 
experiments, Cheesman and Merikle presented participants with a colour word (blue, 
green, red or yellow) in which the participants were required to state which of the four 
colour words had been presented. After each block of 40 trials, the SOA was reduced 
until the participant was performing at chance level. In addition to reducing SOA, after 
each block of trials, participants were required to rate how confident they were that they 
had chosen the correct word. Participants were encouraged to give a rating between 25-
100%; with a confidence rating of 25% indicating that they were guessing, whilst a 
confidence rating of 100% indicated that they were certain they had responded 
correctly. The subjective threshold then referred to the point at which participants 
believed they were performing at chance (i.e., they were not consciously aware of 
having seen the prime), whilst the objective threshold referred to the point at which 
participants actually were performing at chance. The point being that the two thresholds 
differed in prime duration, with a later colour naming task resulting in unconscious 
processing occurring below the subjective threshold but limited unconscious processing 
below the objective. These results demonstrate the importance of using subjective 
thresholds when attempting to determine the full extent of unconscious processing. 
The relative impact of feedback on performance and accuracy delivered at the 
objective and subjective thresholds was directly investigated by Masters, Maxwell, and 
Eves (2009). Once individual objective and subjective thresholds had been determined 
by a position detection phase, participants took part in a golf-putting task in which they 
were required to hit a golf ball at a target which was hidden from view. After each trial, 
the participant was presented with feedback which indicated the location of their ball 
relative to the target area. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three 
conditions; condition one received feedback at the objective threshold, condition two 
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received feedback at the subjective threshold, and condition three received feedback 
supraliminally (i.e., at an SOA that guaranteed conscious awareness). The results 
indicated that across trials, participants that received their feedback supraliminally and 
at the subjective threshold improved in their performance and accuracy, whilst those 
receiving feedback at the objective threshold did not. Although, in a meta-analysis 
investigating subliminal priming moderators, Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, and 
Reynvoet (2009) demonstrated that whilst priming effect sizes increased as prime 
visibility increased (i.e., between the objective and subjective thresholds), there was not 
a significant effect of using objective versus subjective thresholds. However, as 
demonstrated by the theories of consciousness discussed previously, any measure of 
subliminal perception should search for the presence of higher order thoughts (i.e., 
being consciously aware of the prime) as opposed to merely focusing on performance 
accuracy.  
1.4.3. Subjective Methods of Measuring Subliminality 
Perhaps the most widely used methods of measuring individual subjective 
thresholds for subliminal stimuli are the guessing criterion used by Cheesman and 
Merikle (1984), and the zero-correlation criterion (ZCC). Using the guessing criterion, 
subjective thresholds of awareness are assessed by asking the participant to rate 
confidence in their accuracy after every trial or block of trials (Dienes, 2008). 
Subjective thresholds are thus reached as soon as the participant believes they are 
performing at chance. If performance accuracy is then beyond chance expectations and 
yet the participant believes themselves to be guessing, then this should be considered as 
evidence of unconscious knowledge (Ziori & Dienes, 2006). On the other hand, the 
zero-correlation criterion assumes that if knowledge of the prime is conscious, then 
there will be a relation between confidence and accuracy (Dienes, 2008). If however 
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there is zero relation, then this too should be considered as evidence of unconscious 
knowledge. 
As mentioned above, if a participant believes themselves to be guessing whilst 
at the same time performing at above chance expectations, it can generally be assumed 
that they possess unconscious knowledge. However, Sandberg, Timmermans, 
Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010) argue that this above chance performance may 
instead be a consequence of participants failing to be complete in their subjective 
estimates of conscious awareness. That is, some tests of subjective awareness may fail 
to fully account for conscious contributions to task performance. Currently, the three 
primary methods of actualising the guessing criterion in measuring whether or not one 
is aware of knowing (i.e., subliminal perception) are confidence ratings (CR), post 
decision wagering (PDW), and the perceptual awareness scale (PAS). The simplest and 
most straightforward method of measuring confidence in accuracy requires the 
participant to rate on a scale of ‘guess’ to ‘know’. Therefore, CRs can either be 
indicated on a graded Likert scale from complete guessing to complete certainty (e.g., 
Dienes et al., 1995) or on a percentage scale from 50% (i.e., depending on item 
numbers) indicating guessing, to 100% indicating absolute certainty (e.g., Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1986).  
Verbal confidence ratings may be prone to bias as a result of participants 
perhaps believing that they know something (i.e., a degree of conscious knowledge), but 
not reporting it. Therefore, the PDW method developed by Persaud, McLeod, and 
Cowey (2007) involves the participant placing a wager on the likelihood of their 
response being correct. If they are accurate, they win and if they are not, they lose. 
Persaud et al. applied the PDW in combination with an artificial grammar task, in which 
participants were required to place either a high (£2) or low (£1) wager based on their 
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decisions being correct. The PDW method operates under the assumption that a higher 
wager indicates a higher certainty in accuracy, which in turn indicates a higher 
likelihood of possessing conscious knowledge. However, Dienes and Seth (2010a) 
directly compared CR and PDW in an artificial grammar task and found that CR was a 
more sensitive method of assessing subjective awareness. The authors argued that a 
level of risk or loss aversion can consequently result in a suboptimal wagering 
performance. That is, the prospect of losing money may be more of an incentive to be 
conservative in wagering and thus not represent the conscious status of knowledge. 
Therefore, the authors developed a “no loss gambling” method of PDW; wherein the 
participant could choose to either gamble on their accuracy, or on a secondary measure 
in which the odds were 50/50 (e.g., a coin toss). Whether the participant chose to 
gamble on accuracy or the 50/50 odds, the participant either won or did not win; but 
they did not lose. In this way, gambling on the 50/50 odds corresponded with 
‘guessing’. When CR was again directly compared to the no-loss gambling paradigm, 
both methods were equally sensitive in measuring conscious awareness. 
Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004) constructed the PAS measurement of subjective 
awareness as a purely introspective measure of visual experience as opposed to asking a 
participant to report on their own accuracy. The PAS requires the participant to rate the 
clarity of visual experience on a four point scale; (1) no experience (i.e., answers are a 
guess, no visual experience), (2) brief glimpse (i.e., a feeling that something has been 
shown but no idea of what), (3) almost clear experience (i.e., a feeling of almost being 
certain, properties of the stimulus known), (4) clear experience (i.e., no ambiguity 
whatsoever). Therefore, PAS can often be used as a measure of subjective awareness 
when there is no correct answer to the task (Overgaard, Timmermans, Sandberg, & 
Cleeremans, 2010). Sandberg et al. (2010) investigated the predictive ability of PAS, 
41 
 
CR and PDW to measure the separate contributions of conscious and unconscious 
processing in an identification task. Participants viewed one of four shapes (circle, 
square, diamond, or triangle) for varying durations (ranging from 16 to 192 
milliseconds) and were required to indicate which shape they had seen with a key press. 
After making their choice, the participants were required to indicate awareness using 
one of the three scales. The results demonstrated that CR was a better measure of 
unconscious processing than PDW. However, of the three scales, PAS was the most 
sensitive since the ZCC results indicated the occurrence of more conscious processing, 
as people can be aware of seeing something before knowing that they have seen 
something relevant.    
As a rebuttal to the Sandberg et al. conclusion that PAS provides the most 
exhaustive measure of conscious awareness, Dienes and Seth (2010b, 2010c) argue over 
the distinction between any content versus relevant content. Whilst the participant may 
be consciously aware of having seen ‘something’, that does not imply that the 
consciously perceived content is in any way relevant to the task at hand. Therefore, 
Dienes and Seth argue that CR is a far more reliable indicator of the conscious status of 
content and knowledge. Similarly, in an investigation into the unconscious processing 
of visual emotion in faces, Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchoń, and Cleeremans, 
(2013) found CR to be a more sensitive measure of conscious awareness than either 
PAS or PDW (though see Sandberg, Bibby, & Overgaard, 2013). However, what is 
clear from the literature is that what constitutes the best subjective measure of the 
conscious status of knowledge and perceptual awareness remains a matter of further 
debate. 
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1.5. Summary and Outline of Articles 
As reviewed here, the literature regarding subliminal perception remains 
controversial. What can and cannot be primed, what constitutes consciousness, and the 
most appropriate measurement of unconscious perception is varied and debateable. 
Whilst a number of studies have demonstrated successful priming of single words, 
pictures, emotion, arithmetic, and multiple word strings, other studies have attributed 
subliminal priming effects to the retrieval of stimulus response links, priming at the 
sublexical level, or partial conscious awareness. However, the controversy regarding 
subliminal perception appears to concentrate around the diverse interpretations and 
measurements of ‘unconscious’. Each of the following three articles employs the 
definition of conscious, and therefore unconscious, as defined by higher order thought 
theory of consciousness. That is, if an individual is not aware of having seen the prime, 
then the content is perceived unconsciously. Therefore, we utilise subjective thresholds 
of conscious awareness and subliminality as measured by confidence ratings and the 
zero correlation criterion (ZCC). Each of the three articles attempts to address a number 
of the issues raised throughout this literature review. 
1.5.1. Article I - Subliminal Understanding of Negation: Unconscious Control by 
Subliminal Processing of Word Pairs 
The first article utilised subjective measures of conscious awareness and 
knowledge in an attempt to demonstrate successful semantic priming of two word 
primes. This was achieved by presenting participants with a subliminal instruction to 
either pick or not pick an accompanying noun when subsequently presented with the 
accompanied noun, and a further noun. In doing so, this article attempted to address 
Greenwald’s (1992) two-word challenge by necessitating comprehension of both words 
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in the prime in order to fulfil task instructions. Furthermore, by subliminally instructing 
the participant to exclude, we attempted to challenge Jacoby, Lindsay, and Toth’s 
(1992) assertion that the ability to control cognition by excluding certain responses is an 
ability unique to consciousness. In addition to endeavouring to demonstrate subliminal 
semantic priming of two word primes, we attempted to ensure that any priming effects 
evidenced could not be attributable to S-R mappings or partial conscious awareness. 
This article has been accepted for publication: 
Armstrong, A.M., & Dienes, Z. (2013). Subliminal Understanding of Negation: 
Unconscious Control by Subliminal Processing of Word Pairs. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 22(3), 1022-1040. 
1.5.2. Article II - Subliminal Understanding of Active vs. Passive Sentences 
The second article attempted to investigate whether or not unconscious 
cognition was sophisticated enough to distinguish between active and passive verb 
voice. This was achieved by presenting participants with a short subliminal sentence in 
which one of two characters (i.e., characters A or B) were active or passive within the 
sentence. When subsequently presented with two pictorial representations (i.e., one 
depicting character A as active and B passive; the other depicting character B as active 
and A passive), participants were required to choose the picture that best represented the 
prime sentence. Naccache and Dehaene (2001) have argued that the literature pertaining 
to unconscious processing has largely ignored the possibility of conducting semantic 
manipulations on stimuli perceived subliminally. Therefore, Article II attempted to 
successfully demonstrate that participants would be able to draw sufficient semantic 
information from the prime to construct a visual representation of the prime sentence, 
allowing the participant to correctly infer who was active and who was passive to 
identify the correct pictorial representation. As in Article I, we attempted to achieve 
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semantic priming whilst ensuring any priming effects could not be attributable to partial 
conscious awareness, as measured by the guessing criterion and ZCC, or S-R mappings. 
This article has been accepted for publication: 
Armstrong, A.M., & Dienes, Z. (in press). Subliminal Understanding of Active 
vs. Passive Sentences. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 
1.5.3. Article III – Supraliminal and Subliminal Priming of Specific Relationship 
Anxieties  
The third article attempted to contribute to the literature demonstrating the 
activation of anxiety through supraliminal and subliminal priming. Whilst the majority 
of research investigating the activation of anxiety through priming has tended to focus 
on inducing a global level of anxiety, Article III attempted to investigate whether it was 
possible to prime very specific anxieties relating to relationships. Therefore, the focus of 
Article III was centred around the possibility of supraliminally and subliminally 
eliciting four separate relationship anxieties; the fear of being close to a partner, the fear 
of being far from a partner, the fear of being controlled by a partner, or the fear of being 
controlling with a partner. Once the participant had been primed, they were required to 
categorise a series of emotional adjectives as congruent or incongruent with the anxiety 
induced, and a series of self-related items as something to be fearful of or not. The 
response times and congruency results were then compared to a control group that had 
received no priming. Therefore, we attempted to demonstrate that not only is it possible 
to activate a generalised level of anxiety through supraliminal and subliminal 
presentation of stimuli, but that unconscious cognition is sophisticated enough to 
semantically differentiate between relationship anxieties, allowing for the activation of 
more specific anxieties. This article has been submitted for publication: 
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Armstrong, A.M., & Dienes, Z. (submitted). Supraliminal and Subliminal 
Priming of Specific Relationship Anxieties. Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, 
 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate just how powerful processing of 
subliminal stimuli can be when subliminality is established using a method that attempts 
to maximise the power of unconscious processing (i.e., subjective vs. objective 
thresholds): Can people exclude responses when instructed to do so subliminally, can 
people process syntax of subliminal word combinations, and can the unconscious 
resolve very specific anxieties through subliminal priming?   
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2. Article I - Subliminal Understanding of Negation: 
Unconscious Control by Subliminal Processing of Word-Pairs 
2.1. Abstract 
A series of five experiments investigated the extent of subliminal processing of 
negation. Participants were presented with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not 
pick an accompanying noun, followed by a choice of two nouns. By employing 
subjective measures to determine individual thresholds of subliminal priming, the 
results of these studies indicated that participants were able to identify the correct noun 
of the pair – even when the correct noun was specified by negation. Furthermore, using 
a grey-scale contrast method of masking, Experiment 5 confirmed that these priming 
effects were evidenced in the absence of partial awareness, and without the effect being 
attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-response links established during conscious 
rehearsal.  
2.2. Introduction 
Just how much information and knowledge can be acquired through subliminal 
perception, or just how intelligent unconscious cognitive processing is, remains a 
familiar and controversial theme (Greenwald, 1992; Norman, 2010). In a classic 
priming experiment, subjects are briefly presented with a word, or prime, that is 
prevented from entering conscious perception through the use of a forward or backward 
mask. When subsequently presented with a further target word, participants are quicker 
to categorise the target if both the prime and target are semantically related. Whilst the 
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unconscious analysis of letters is more sophisticated than the analysis of individual lines 
or angles, the semantic analysis of subliminal words or even multiple word-strings 
would indicate a far more intelligent and sophisticated interpretation of ‘unconscious 
cognition’ (Loftus & Klinger, 1992). Evidence suggests that the subliminal presentation 
of a word facilitates lexical and semantic access (e.g., Abad, Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; 
Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Forster & Davis, 1984; 
Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; Gaillard et al., 2006; Marcel, 1983a; 
Ortells, Daza, & Fox, 2003), although the precise interpretation of these results will be 
addressed below.  
Subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA) studies offer evidence of some of 
the most sophisticated subliminal priming effects, apparently demonstrating the 
semantic analysis of multiple word primes (Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Nissenfeld, 1979; 
Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Waller & 
Barter, 2005). However, SPA studies have been heavily criticised by others that have 
tried and failed to replicate results (Allen & Condon, 1982; Condon & Allen, 1980; 
Heilbrun, 1980). Furthermore, whatever the replicability of the results, given that the 
sentences used differ in the specific words used, any effect evidenced may instead be 
attributable to simple single-word priming. In fact, there still exists controversy 
regarding whether or not the semantic analysis of subliminal primes even occurs 
(Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Hutchison, Neely, Neill, & Walker, 2004; 
Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). In an article investigating the extent of unconscious 
cognition, Greenwald (1992) has argued that unconscious cognitive processing is far 
less sophisticated in its analytical capabilities than is often reported. Greenwald’s 
(1992) argument rests on the premise that additional research has demonstrated 
unconscious analysis and processing of nothing more elaborate than word fragments. 
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As an example, Abrams and Greenwald (2000) required participants to 
categorise a set of consciously perceived ‘parent’ primes as either positive or negative 
in valence. Participants were subsequently required to categorise a set of subliminally 
perceived ‘hulip-type hybrid primes’, a non-word hybrid of two positive or two negative 
parent primes (e.g., humour-tulip-hulip, smut-bile-biut). Results indicated that 
participants were successfully able to categorise emotional valence despite the 
nonsensical nature of the hybrid primes. In a follow up study, having consciously 
categorised parent primes, participants were required to positively or negatively 
categorise a set of so called ‘tumour-type hybrid primes’. These primes were similarly 
created by combining two congruent parent primes to create a semantically 
comprehensible prime of different valence to parent primes (e.g. humour-tulip-tumour, 
smut-bile-smile). Results indicated that participants continued to classify emotional 
valence according to the valence of the parent prime rather than tumour-type prime, 
even to the extent that ‘smile’ was categorised as negative. The results of this study 
compellingly suggest that words are analysed at the level of (consciously primed) word-
parts as opposed to whole-word meaning. 
However, Sklar et al. (2012) have suggested that subliminal processing may 
have appeared limited in past research because of the small time windows that 
processing is given for backward masked stimuli (typically in the order of 30 ms). Their 
solution was to use continuous flash suppression, maintaining stimuli as subliminal for 
as long as two seconds. Impressively, they found that semantically incoherent sentences 
(e.g., “The bench ate a zebra”) broke through suppression faster than coherent sentences 
(e.g. “The lion ate a zebra”). However, as with SPA studies, there may have been a 
word-level effect influencing breakthrough as literally different words were used in the 
different conditions (in this example, “bench” versus “lion”). In a second series of 
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experiments, they found that three-term subtractions (e.g. 9 - 3 - 4) (though not 
additions) primed the speed of pronunciation of the subsequent correct answer. In 
neither the sentence coherence nor three-term subtraction experiments did the stimuli 
constitute obvious “set phrases” that may have been previously well learnt as a unit.   
These results raise the question of what sort of combinations of stimuli are 
possible to process subliminally. For example, Van Opstal, Gevers, Osman, and Verguts 
(2010) demonstrated that a same/different judgement task on consciously perceived 
number targets (e.g., 1-1 or 1-3) extended to subliminal letter stimuli (e.g., a-A or a-D) 
even when participants were unaware of the presence of the letters. Van Opstal, 
Calderon, Gevers, and Verguts (2011) extended this finding by demonstrating that 
responding to the subliminal same/different judgements (e.g., a-A) could be modulated 
by unconscious context (e.g., either a-a or a-D). Therefore, priming effects were 
dependent upon the processing of both elements. We similarly wished to demonstrate 
semantic priming of two-element (word) primes and unconscious cognitive control by 
investigating whether it is possible to process instructions to exclude (i.e., negation) 
subliminally. As we will discuss, negation has a special place in consciousness research.  
The use of negation allows easy control of stimuli, because stimuli can consist 
of the same words, just with or without “not”. The use of negation also addresses one of 
the theoretical limits assigned to unconscious processes. According to Jacoby, Lindsay, 
and Toth (1992), what the conscious is uniquely equipped to do is control behaviour by 
excluding certain responses. Unconscious control exerted by subliminal stimuli was 
investigated by, for example, Lau and Passingham, (2007), in which a subliminal shape 
indicated which of two tasks to perform; and by van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, and 
Lamme (2010), in which a subliminal no-go cue slowed down responses and activated a 
frontal-parietal inhibition network (see van Gaal, de Lange, & Cohen, 2012, for a 
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review of related work). Van den Bussche, Segers, and Reynvoet (2008) indicated limits 
to unconscious control in that the proportion of conscious stimuli could be used to 
modulate responding but not the proportion of subliminal stimuli. In contrast to 
previous studies that have looked at subliminal control, we will be exploring it in the 
specific case of linguistic negation processing. Although not dealing with linguistic 
negation, the previous work is encouraging in showing that there exists a mechanism by 
which unconscious control could operate. In this respect, the current work is consistent 
with Dienes and Perner’s (2007) cold control theory of hypnosis, which postulates that 
hypnosis consists of unconscious executive control. It is also consistent with the 
findings of, for example,  Norman, Price, and Jones (2011) and Wan, Dienes, and Fu 
(2008), who showed people could exert control over the use of structural knowledge, 
even when it was unconscious. That is, while the processing of subliminal linguistic 
negation has not been shown, it is plausible that the unconscious can deal with control 
and exclusion.  Thus, the subliminal processing of negation in two-word phrases 
presents itself as possible on those theories that allow unconscious control (contrast 
Jacoby et al.),  but beyond what has so far been shown to occur subliminally. 
The present set of studies attempted to assess whether, contrary to Abrams and 
Greenwald (2000), subliminal perception is sensitive to the semantic comprehension of 
word combinations and sentence structure. In summing up his argument against 
complex unconscious cognition, Greenwald (1992) issued an empirical two-word 
challenge. This two-word challenge asserts that to demonstrate successful subliminal 
priming of two-word primes, neither word should individually impart the final meaning. 
Therefore, to claim successful unconscious processing of multiple words, each word 
would need to be individually processed. The present experiments aimed to meet this 
challenge by presenting participants with a two word instruction, instructing them 
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which of two subsequent words to choose. Therefore, performance would depend on the 
successful semantic processing of both words. 
One explanation to account for the failure of many studies to demonstrate 
successful subliminal semantic activation of single or multiple word primes may be due 
to the adherence to strict objective thresholds using backward masking when measuring 
subliminality. Objective methods of assessing unconscious cognition presume that trial 
accuracy, beyond what would be expected by chance, indicates conscious knowledge 
(Seth et al., 2008). However, objective methods of assessing subliminal perception fail 
to take into account subjectivity; that is, an individual’s conscious awareness of 
accuracy. The two thresholds differ, with unconscious processing occurring below the 
subjective threshold but limited unconscious processing below the objective. Therefore, 
the use of objective methods in measuring subliminal perception and unconscious 
processing have been heavily criticised for testing not just unconscious cognition, but 
degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & Passingham, 2006). This 
indicates that to determine the full extent of unconscious processing, it is necessary to 
use the subjective threshold (compare Masters, Maxwell, &  Eves, 2009; contrast Van 
den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009, who found no significant effect of 
using objective versus subjective thresholds in a meta-analysis of subliminal priming 
effects 
1
). 
Therefore, using subjective methods of measuring subliminality, the following 
series of experiments required the participants to choose between two common nouns 
                                                 
1
 The mean effect for subjective thresholds was 0.85 (SE ≈ 0.5) and for objective, 0.68 (SE ≈ 0.24). While 
the difference is non-significant, a rough Bayes Factor calculated on the difference (0.17, SE ≈ 0.55), 
using a uniform from 0 to 0.85, is 0.87, indicating the non-significant result is insensitive (as the Bayes 
factor is between 1/3 and 3), and no conclusions follow from this contrast (see Dienes, 2011, for more on 
Bayes Factors, which are also explained in more detail below). Note also that these studies were not 
designed to test the difference between subjective and objective thresholds under otherwise equivalent 
conditions, unlike, for example, Cheesman and Merikle (1984). 
 
52 
 
(e.g. ‘kite-moon’), having been subliminally instructed with which noun to choose (e.g. 
‘pick kite’, or ‘not kite’). Correct identification of the instructed noun would then 
indicate that unconscious cognition is capable of both processing and comprehending 
more complex demands, such as the pick and not instructions in this study. 
Furthermore, successful subliminal priming of negation would be in contrast to a similar 
experiment carried out by Draine and Greenwald (1996), who failed to demonstrate the 
priming of negation (at the objective threshold) and concluded that the process of 
negation exceeded the processing powers of unconscious cognition. Whilst it could be 
argued that success in the ‘pick’ conditions may not necessarily demonstrate the 
semantic comprehension of pick but rather simple recognition processes or partial word 
analysis (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000), success in the ‘not’ conditions would 
require the participant to inhibit initial recognition processes. In turn, this inhibition of 
recognition processes would imply lexical and semantic comprehension of negation. 
Therefore, if correct identification is above chance expectations, then this would 
indicate that cognition is capable of processing word combinations outside of conscious 
perception, as measured by the guessing criterion (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986) 
and/or the zero-correlation criterion (ZCC). Like Sklar et al. (2012), we will attempt to 
determine the limits of subliminal perception when it is given more time to operate than 
allowed by objective thresholds found with backward masking. 
2.3. Experiment 1 
Current investigations into subliminal perception and unconscious cognition 
have shown the superior priming effects of practiced versus novel primes (Abrams & 
Grinspan, 2007; Abrams, Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; Draine & Greenwald, 1998). 
That is, the priming effects of subliminal primes that have earlier been perceived as 
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conscious targets prove more successful than non-practiced novel primes. This effect 
has been attributed to consciously perceived primes creating an episodic memory trace 
which is later re-activated upon subsequent subliminal presentation (Forster & Davis, 
1984).  
Therefore, to achieve maximum likelihood of successful subliminal priming 
effects, all subliminal primes in Experiment 1 were first practiced as a series of 
conscious trials. It was expected that for the conscious trials, participants would identify 
the correct noun in both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions on close to 100% of the trials. For 
the subliminal trials, it was hypothesised that, using a subjective threshold, participants 
would identify the correct noun for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond chance 
expectations (that is, beyond 50% correct). In addition, the inhibition of recognition 
processes necessary in ‘not’ conditions makes it likely that noun identification in ‘pick’ 
conditions would be faster than noun identification in ‘not’ conditions. Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be 
faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials. In this first 
experiment we attempted to make the effect likely to occur, so that its absence would be 
informative. To anticipate, in subsequent experiments we tighten up alternative 
explanations to determine if the effect goes away.    
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being 
the dependent variable, 25 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. Fifteen of the participants 
were female and ten male, with ages ranging from 18 to 40 years (M = 22.63, SD = 
8.52). 
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2.3.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
The experiment was presented on a Dell laptop with a 60Hz screen refresh rate, 
limiting minimum stimulus presentation to 16 ms, with 16 ms increments. The study 
was created using E-Prime version 2.0. Trials were created from 20 common nouns, 
making up a total of 10 noun-pairs (e.g. ‘baby-yard’ and ‘ant-sky’). All nouns were 
between 3-5 letters in length, and noun-pairs were phonemically and semantically 
distinctive and matched in length (see Appendix A for the noun pairs used in practice, 
conscious, SOA, and subliminal trials in Experiment 1). Each screen display was 
centrally presented in lower-case, black, bold Courier New font, and point size 18 on a 
white background. From a viewing distance of 60 cm, the dimensions of the conscious 
and subliminal primes subtended 1.43° of visual angle (height), and a range of 4.76-
6.65° of visual angle (width). The arrangement of each of the 10 noun-pairs and 
instructions were counterbalanced so that participants viewed each of the eight 
permutations for each noun-pair (e.g. ‘pick yard...1. baby, 2. yard’, ‘pick yard...1. yard, 
2. baby’, ‘not yard...1. baby, 2. yard’ and ‘not yard...1. yard, 2. baby’ etc.), creating a 
total of 80 distinct conscious and subliminal trials.   
2.3.1.3. Procedure  
Participants were tested individually in a small quiet space. All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision, and English was the first language for all 
participants. All trials consisted of four separate components: a fixation cross presented 
for 350 ms, the stimulus instruction (e.g. ‘pick baby’ or ‘not baby’), a backward mask, 
longer in length than the stimulus and in the form of a series of ampersands (i.e., 
&&&&&&&) presented for 150 ms, and the final component consisting of the noun-
pair choice (e.g. ‘1. baby, 2. yard’) in which the participant was required to indicate the 
number corresponding to the noun in which they had been instructed to choose. The 
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experiment was separated into four continuous phases; conscious trials, SOA setting, 
subliminal trials, and re-testing the SOA threshold to check for drift.  
2.3.1.3.1. Conscious Trials. Having read the instructions, the procedure began with a set 
of six practice conscious trials to accustom the participant to the task required. The 
common noun-pairs used in all practice trials were different from those used in 
experimental conscious and SOA setting phases. Following the fixation cross, the 
stimulus instruction was presented for 350 ms to ensure conscious perception. 
Programming in E-Prime ensured that the offset of the stimulus instruction was 
immediately followed by the onset of the backward mask in all experimental trials. This 
was especially important for subliminal trials in order to eliminate conscious visual 
perception. After the backward mask, participants were presented with the noun-pair 
choice in which they were required to press ‘1’ if they had been instructed to choose the 
first word, and ‘2’ if they had been instructed to choose the second. The noun-pair 
choice remained on the screen until the participant had made their choice. Having made 
their choice, a 250 ms pause preceded the onset of the next trial. Having completed the 
set of six practice trials, participants were instructed to continue to the experimental 
conscious trials. The procedure for the conscious trials followed the exact procedure 
used in the practice trials. Participants completed two blocks of 40 randomly presented 
conscious trials, with an emphasis placed on accuracy as opposed to speed. Participants 
were not informed whether their choice was correct or incorrect.  
2.3.1.3.2. SOA Setting. The SOA of each participant was assessed separately to 
ascertain individual subjective thresholds. Following the two blocks of conscious trials, 
participants moved on to the SOA setting phase. Participants were required to complete 
the same task format used in the conscious phase. Participants were presented with the 
fixation cross and the instruction prime, followed immediately by a backward mask and 
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then the noun-pair choice. Following each trial, participants were required to rate, on a 
scale of 50-100%, how confident they were that they had chosen the correct noun; 
100% would indicate that the participant absolutely knew which noun to choose, whilst 
50% would indicate that they were purely guessing. During this part of the experiment, 
if a participant rated confidence to be anything above 50%, stimulus duration was 
reduced by 16 ms after each trial, from a starting point of 140 ms. Once a participant 
had rated confidence to be at 50% (guessing), the SOA remained at that same 
presentation duration for the following trials. Once confidence had been rated at 50% 
(chance performance) for five successive trials, the experiment proceeded to the 
subliminal phase. If during any of these five successive trials participants rated 
confidence to be anything above 50%, SOA was again reduced until five successive 
trials at 50% confidence had been completed. Before the SOA setting phase began, 
participants completed a set of six practice trials to accustom themselves to the 
confidence procedure. For the practice trials, prime presentation was held at 140 ms. 
The common noun-pairs used in both practice and SOA setting phases were different 
from those used in conscious and subliminal phases.     
2.3.1.3.3. Subliminal Trials. Once the SOA setting phase had been completed, the 
subliminal phase of the experiment consisted of the same 80 trials used in the conscious 
phase, divided into the same two blocks of 40 randomly placed trials. There were no 
practice trials for the subliminal phase. Stimulus duration for the subliminal trials was 
determined by the point at which participants had rated confidence to be at 50% for five 
successive trials during the SOA setting phase. To prevent rhythmic pressing of the “1” 
and “2” keys, and to remind participants of the task required, each block of 40 
subliminal trials additionally contained 10 randomly placed conscious trials (at 350 ms 
exposure) (cf. Pratte & Rouder, 2009), creating two blocks of 50 trials.  
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2.3.1.3.4. Threshold Drift. The final phase of the experiment aimed to assess whether 
individual subjective thresholds of awareness had drifted through the course of the 
experiment. If the SOA at the finish of the experiment was lower than at the beginning 
of the subliminal trials, this could indicate that participants may have been consciously 
aware of the subliminal primes (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). The SOA threshold drift 
phase followed the exact format used in the SOA setting phase, using the same 
materials, with 16 ms decrements in presentation duration from a starting point of 140 
ms. Once the participant again rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials, 
the participants were thanked and the experiment ended. After completion of the 
experiment, participants were fully debriefed and received an information sheet giving 
some background to the study as well as experimenter details. 
2.3.2. Results 
2.3.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 64 ms, with an 
average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 48 ms (SD = 15).  
2.3.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
It was expected that for the conscious phase of the experiment, participants 
would get approximately 100% of the trials correct. In fact, the mean number of correct 
identifications for conscious trials was slightly off 100% (M = 97%, SE = .5). For the 
‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = .9), whilst for ‘not’ 
trials, mean correct identification averaged at 98% (SE = .4). 
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Mean correct noun identification for subliminal trials was 62% (SE = 2), with 
accuracy for ‘pick’ (M = 66%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 59%, SE = 2) conditions being 
presented in figure 2, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. For all 
statistical tests, we used an alpha level of .05 to determine significance. Accuracy in 
both ‘pick’ (t(24) = 7.46, p < .001, d = 3.05) and ‘not’ (t(24) = 3.9, p = .001, d = 1.59) 
conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. In addition, a 
paired-sample t-test looking at the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the 
subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) significantly 
differed between ‘pick’ (M = 66%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 41%, SE = 2, t(24) = 5.97, p 
< .001, d = 2.44) conditions. Such discrimination was also assessed in terms of (logistic) 
d’, which differed significantly from zero, M = .60, SE = .11, t(24) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 
2.29.  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean percentage values for correct identification of the noun in 
subliminal pick and not conditions for Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, with a 50% 
reference line indicating chance performance. 
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There was a significant relationship between initial SOA and performance 
accuracy for both subliminal ‘pick’, r = .5, p = .009 and ‘not’, r = .4, p = .04 conditions, 
indicating possible conscious processing, or else better unconscious processing for 
longer SOAs. 
2.3.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the instructed noun was recorded for both conscious 
and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-
test suggested that on average, participants were significantly quicker to identify the 
noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 712 ms, SE = 20) when compared with ‘not’ conditions 
(M = 844 ms, SE = 32, t(24) = -5.92, p < .001, d = 2.42). Similarly, for the subliminal 
trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were significantly 
quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 864 ms, SE = 50) when compared 
to ‘not’ conditions (M = 894 ms, SE = 50, t(24) = -2.27, p = .03, d = 0.93). 
2.3.2.4. Threshold Drift.  
Data from the threshold drift phase revealed that subjective threshold durations 
ranged from an SOA of 32 ms to 80 ms, with a mean experimental subliminal 
presentation duration  of 48 ms (SD = 16.24), matching the sample mean value found in 
the SOA setting phase, t(24) = .04, p = .97, d = 0.02. For 15 of the 25 participants, 
SOA’s at the finish of the subliminal trials differed from the SOA at the start of the 
subliminal phase. Subjective thresholds reduced by 16 ms for seven of the participants, 
and by 32 ms for one participant. For six of the participants, SOA increased by 16 ms, 
and for one participant the SOA increased by 48 ms. There was a significant 
relationship between the SOA setting stage and the SOA threshold drift phase, r = .4, p 
=.04, indicating there was some consistency in measuring the threshold.  
60 
 
2.3.2.5. Trial Accuracy and Response Time.  
When the data from the eight participants whose SOA had reduced by ≥16 ms 
was removed, d’ significantly differed from zero (M = .56, SE = .15, t(16) = 3.60, p = 
.002, d = 1.8), and accuracy in both subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 3, t(16) = 4.81, p 
< .001, d = 2.41) and ‘not’ (M = 58%, SE = 3, t(16) = 2.63, p = .02, d = 1.32) conditions 
significantly differed from what would be expected by chance alone. Similarly, when 
the instruction is ignored, the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the 
subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 3) 
and ‘not’ (M = 42%, SE = 3, t(16) = 3.8, p = .002, d = 1.90) conditions. In addition, on 
removal of the eight participants, participants remained significantly quicker to identify 
the noun in subliminal ‘pick’ conditions (M = 845 ms, SE = 64) when compared to ‘not’ 
conditions (M = 1139 ms, SE = 86, t(16) = -2.66, p = .02, d = 1.33). 
2.3.3. Discussion 
Noun identification in the subliminal ‘pick’ trials indicated that participants 
correctly identified the noun on an average 66% of the trials, whilst accuracy in 
subliminal ‘not’ trials averaged 58%. Therefore, as hypothesised, participants 
successfully identified the correct noun at above chance expectations for both 
subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. Whilst it could be argued that correct 
identification in the subliminal ‘pick’ trials may have demonstrated the ability of 
unconscious processing to merely recognise letter patterns, correct identification in the 
subliminal ‘not’ trials would require the inhibition of these recognition processes. 
Furthermore, the occasions in which the participant simply chose the subliminally 
presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, further 
demonstrating the appropriate use of the subliminal instruction. Consequently, the 
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success of Experiment 1 in demonstrating successful subliminal priming in the ‘not’ 
condition may demonstrate the semantic comprehension of ‘not’.  
The use of the guessing criterion for establishing subliminal perception could 
be criticized on the grounds that participants come with different interpretations as to 
what “guess” means. However, in the instructions, and on each screen shot when 
participants were required to rate confidence, they were given a definition of what 
‘guessing’ (and ‘know’) means. The participants were told to give a value of 50% if 
they believed that they were purely guessing; that they had no idea which word to 
choose and that they may as well have tossed a coin. They were also told that if they 
had any confidence at all, if they believed they saw anything of potential relevance at 
all, they were to give a value above 50.  Poorly defined end points on a confidence scale 
can render the guessing criterion meaningless; thus, the instructions precisely defined 
the required concept of “guess”. 
Further support for the unconscious processing of negation in subliminal 
conditions was provided by response time data, which demonstrated the difference in 
cognitive difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions. Once the word pick has been 
read and cognitively processed, the word indicates that the accompanying noun is the 
correct noun to choose. Therefore, upon presentation of the noun-pair choice, the letter 
mapping and recognition processes required to identify the just-presented noun respond 
quickly. However, the word not indicates that the accompanying noun is not the correct 
noun to choose. Consequently, upon presentation of the noun-pair choice, it is first 
necessary to identify the just-presented noun using the same letter mapping and 
recognition processes used in ‘pick’ trials, before then indicating the other noun. 
Therefore, the additional time required to indicate the correct noun in ‘not’ conditions 
should be evident in both conscious and subliminal response times. Response times for 
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the conscious trials suggested that, as predicted, it took significantly longer to identify 
the noun in ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions, an average 131 
milliseconds longer. Although it only took an average 30 milliseconds longer to identify 
the noun in subliminal ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions, this 
difference in response times was also significant, thereby demonstrating the difference 
in task difficulty, even though participants were not consciously aware of which noun to 
choose. 
Past research investigating the extent of subliminal priming paints a 
controversial and confusing picture. Whilst some studies clearly demonstrate successful 
(e.g., Diaz & McCarthy, 2007; Ortells, Daza, & Fox, 2003), and even sophisticated 
(e.g., Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985) 
semantic subliminal priming, other studies suggest that the unconscious analysis of 
words is actually only completed at the sublexical level (e.g. Abrams & Greenwald, 
2000; Hutchison, Neely, Neill, & Walker, 2004). Experiment 1 aimed to successfully 
demonstrate the cognitive processing of subliminally presented two-word instructions 
using individual subjective thresholds. That is, if the individual believed they did not 
know the correct noun to choose, it can be assumed that they did not possess conscious 
knowledge (Dienes, 2008).  
However, whilst the results of Experiment 1 appear to have demonstrated 
successful unconscious semantic processing, threshold drift data suggests that for eight 
of the participants, subliminal subjective thresholds may have reduced between SOA 
settings phases and completion of the subliminal trials. This in turn may indicate 
conscious, as opposed to unconscious, knowledge of which noun to choose for some of 
the participants. In addition to potential conscious awareness, significant criticisms arise 
due to the use of practiced versus novel primes (Damian, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel, & 
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Hoffmann, 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). Abrams and Grinspan (2007) argue 
that simple processing at the feature level is all that is needed to identify a stimulus that 
is predicted by experience and expectation. As mentioned previously, when primes are 
practiced consciously they acquire memory traces between a given stimulus and motoric 
response. These stimulus-response (S-R) mappings remain in short-term memory and 
are later re-activated upon presentation of the same trials presented subliminally. Whilst 
these S-R mappings may result in successful subliminal priming, it indicates that the 
semantic analysis of subliminal primes need not necessarily occur as the semantic 
system is by-passed. That is, participants may simply have formed an S-R link between, 
for example, “not baby” and “yard” (although “yard” was associated with each button 
press equally in this situation). A subsequent correct response merely relies on the 
successful retrieval of the established S-R link and not the semantic processing of “not”. 
Experiment 1 used conditions that were most likely to find a priming effect if there were 
one, and so the results motivate further and more rigorous testing of subliminal priming. 
Therefore, the issue of practiced versus novel primes and S-R mappings are explored 
further in Experiment 2. 
2.4. Experiment 2   
In Experiment 2, participants performed the same task performed in 
Experiment 1; a set of conscious trials were followed by an SOA setting phase, a set of 
subliminal trials and finally a threshold drift phase. However, separate sets of common 
nouns were used in conscious and subliminal trials to avoid potential successful 
subliminal priming being attributed to the retrieval of S-R links. To achieve maximum 
likelihood of successful priming without the establishment of S-R links, participants 
first practiced ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials consciously with one set of nouns. Participants then 
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consciously viewed the list of nouns that would be used in subliminal trials, in an 
attempt to activate word representations, before continuing with the experiment. In this 
way, any positive results could not be credited to the retrieval of S-R links as at no point 
had the subliminal nouns been paired with any particular response.  
 
2.4.1. Method 
2.4.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being 
the dependent variable, 25 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants 
took part in Experiment 1. Eighteen of the participants were female and seven male, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 44 years (M = 20.96, SD = 6.2). 
2.4.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
Apparatus for Experiment 2 replicated that used in Experiment 1. The 10 noun-
pairs used in Experiment 1 were used as conscious trials in Experiment 2, with an 
additional 20 common nouns between 3-5 letters in length creating a further 10 
phonemically and semantically distinctive noun-pairs for subliminal trials (see 
Appendix B for noun pairs used in practice, conscious, SOA, and subliminal trials in 
Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5).  
2.4.1.3. Procedure 
Procedure replicated that of Experiment 1, however following the conscious 
trials and before the SOA setting, participants were presented with a list of the 20 nouns 
that would be used in the subliminal trials. Each noun in the list appeared at the centre 
of the screen for 2000 ms, with a 150 ms pause between each noun. This list of 20 
nouns was presented twice.  
65 
 
2.4.2. Results 
2.4.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 64 ms, with an 
average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 48 ms (SD = 15).  
2.4.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
The mean rate of correct identifications made on conscious trials was 95% (SE 
= .01). Mean correct identifications was 94% (SE = .8) for ‘pick’ trials, and 97% (SE = 
.6) for ‘not’ trials. The mean number of correct noun identifications for the subliminal 
‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 58%, SE = 2) conditions are presented in 
figure 2 with a reference line indicating 50% chance performance. On subliminal trials, 
accuracy on both ‘pick’ (t(24) = 8.17, p < .001, d = 3.34) and ‘not’ (t(24) = 4.31, p < 
.001, d = 1.76) conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by 
chance. A paired-sample t-test looking at the percentage of occasions participants 
simply chose the subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) 
significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 64%, SE = 2) and ‘not’ (M = 42%, SE = 2, 
t(24) = 6.67, p < .001, d = 2.72) conditions. Overall subliminal d’ values also differed 
significantly from zero (M = .51, SE = .08, t(24) = 6.63, p < .001, d = 2.71). There was a 
significant relationship between initial SOA and performance accuracy for both 
subliminal ‘pick’, r = .7, p < .001 and ‘not’, r = .6, p = .001 conditions, indicating 
possible conscious processing, or else better unconscious processing for longer SOAs. 
2.4.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the noun they had been instructed to choose was 
again recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. A paired-
sample t-test revealed that on average, for the conscious trials, participants were 
significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 685 ms, SE = 11) 
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than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 875 ms, SE = 28, t(24) = -6.53, p < .001, d = 2.67). Whilst 
the results suggested that participants were similarly quicker in subliminal trials to 
identify the noun in ‘pick’ (M = 885 ms, SE = 49) conditions when compared to ‘not’ 
conditions (M = 952 ms, SE = 33), a paired-sample t-test revealed that this difference in 
response times was not significant (t(24) = -1.76, p = .09, d = 0.72). 
However, from the non-significant result we were unable to determine whether 
this implied that there was evidence for the null hypothesis, that there would be no 
difference in response times between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, or that 
there was no evidence for any conclusion (Dienes, 2011). To do this, we can use a 
Bayes Factor. Whilst values under 1/3 are substantial evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis, values over 3 are seen as substantial evidence in support of the experimental 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1963); a Bayes Factor of 1 indicates the evidence is exactly neutral 
between the two theories. Values between 1/3 and 3 indicate data insensitivity and no 
conclusions should be drawn. To calculate the Bayes Factor, it is first necessary to 
specify the likely mean response time difference. The difference in subliminal response 
times for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions in Experiment 1 was 30 ms. Thus, a half normal 
was used with a standard deviation equal to 30 (as per the guidelines in Dienes, 2011, 
Appendix).  The sample mean difference between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions 
was 67 ms (SE of the difference = 38), leading to a Bayes Factor of B = 2.46, indicating 
more support for the experimental hypothesis than the null hypothesis (Bayes Factor 
greater than 1), but also indicating that the data were not sensitive. 
2.4.2.4. Threshold Drift.  
Data from the threshold drift phase revealed that subjective SOA durations 
ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 80 ms, with an average experimental subliminal 
presentation duration of 48 ms (SD = 17), matching the mean value found in the SOA 
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setting phase, t(24) = .65, p = .52, d = 0.27.  However, for 17 of the participants, SOA’s 
at the end of the experiment differed from the SOA at the start of the experiment. 
Subjective thresholds reduced by an average of 16 ms for ten of the participants, and for 
seven of the participants, SOA increased by 16 ms. There was a significant relationship 
between the SOA setting stage and the SOA threshold drift phase, r = .67, p < .001, 
indicating there was some consistency in measuring thresholds.  
2.4.2.5. Trial Accuracy and Response Time.  
When the data from the 10 participants whose SOA had reduced by 16 ms was 
removed, overall d’ values remained significantly above zero (M = .47, SE = .1, t(14) = 
4.64, p < .001, d = 2.48). Accuracy in both subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 63%, SE = 2, t(14) = 
6.03, p < .001, d = 3.22) and ‘not’ (M = 57%, SE = 3, t(14) = 2.72, p = .02, d = 1.45) 
conditions significantly differed from what would be expected by chance. Similarly, 
when the instruction is ignored, the percentage of occasions participants simply chose 
the subliminally presented noun significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 63%, SE = 
2) and ‘not’ (M = 43%, SE = 3, t(14) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 2.48) conditions. On removal 
of the 10 data sets, the difference in response times between subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 975 
ms, SE = 39) and ‘not’ conditions (M = 1019 ms, SE = 76), remained non-significant 
(t(14) = -.55, p = .59, d = 0.29). 
2.4.3. Discussion 
The accuracy data from the conscious trials in Experiment 2 replicated that 
found in Experiment 1. For the subliminal trials, participants correctly identified the 
noun in ‘pick’ trials at an average rate of 63%, whilst correct identification in subliminal 
‘not’ trials averaged at 57-58%. The results of Experiment 2 replicate those found in 
Experiment 1 in that the data appears to support the hypothesis that participants would 
successfully identify the correct noun, above chance performance, for subliminally 
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presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions. Similarly, when the instruction was ignored, the 
occasions in which the participant simply chose the subliminally presented noun 
significantly differed between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions, providing further evidence to 
support the appropriate processing of the subliminal instruction. As in Experiment 1, 
response time data suggested that for conscious trials, participants were significantly 
quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions when compared to ‘not’ conditions, by 
an average 189 ms. Although participants were on average 67 ms quicker to identify the 
noun in subliminal ‘pick’ conditions when compared to ‘not’, this difference in reaction 
time was not statistically significant. However, a Bayes Factor indicated insensitive data 
not strong enough to yet draw conclusions, albeit with more support for the hypothesis 
of a difference in response times than for the null hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the findings from Experiment 1, whilst 
avoiding the assumption that successful subliminal priming was a result of the retrieval 
of S-R links established during conscious rehearsal of stimuli. By consciously viewing 
the nouns to be used in subliminal trials, presented individually, participants gained the 
advantage of practiced rather than novel primes (Kunde, Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2003), but 
were prevented from establishing S-R links by viewing the nouns in the absence of 
either ‘pick’ or ‘not’ instructions or an associated motor response, supporting research 
demonstrating that semantic priming can extend to novel and unpractised stimuli (e.g., 
Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). The results of Experiment 2 appear to support the 
contention that participants would successfully discriminate between the two nouns at 
above chance performance in subliminal trials.  
However, whilst the results of both Experiments 1 and 2 provide support 
demonstrating successful unconscious processing of logical negation, threshold drift 
data from both experiments could suggest that conscious processing may be responsible 
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for success in subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. It has been found, for example, 
that practice with an initially subliminal task can result in participants learning to be 
conscious, admittedly over considerably more trials than we used (Schwiedrzik, Singer , 
& Melloni, 2009, 2011). In both Experiments 1 and 2, the threshold drift phase aimed to 
determine whether individual subjective thresholds of subliminality remained the same 
at the start and at the end of the subliminal phases of the experiment. If subjective 
thresholds at the end of the experimental subliminal condition were lower than at the 
start, it could be argued that participants may have consciously been aware of the 
stimulus instruction, and thus possessed conscious knowledge as to which noun to 
choose. While there was not an overall drift down in subjective thresholds, some 
participants drifted down whilst some drifted up. When the data from those participants 
whose SOA had drifted down were excluded, the effect remained intact. However, the 
presence of changes in the assessed thresholds mean that it is possible there existed 
trials where perception was conscious. The issues regarding conscious awareness and 
threshold drift were explored further in Experiment 3. 
2.5. Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that the cognitive unconscious is 
capable of analysing the syntactic function of subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ 
instructions without attributing the priming effect to the retrieval of established S-R 
links. However, individual visual thresholds may vary from trial to trial as a result of, 
for example, dark adaption (Holender, 1986). This variation in visual threshold may in 
turn allow conscious perception of stimuli that is intended to be subliminal. The 
threshold drift data from both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate this possible variance in 
subjective thresholds as for a number of participants; the measured SOA differed 
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between the start and finish of the subliminal phase. For those participants whose SOA 
reduced between SOA setting and threshold drift, conscious perception of subliminal 
primes may be responsible for any successful priming effects. For those participants 
whose SOA increased between SOA setting and threshold drift, we cannot be sure there 
was a simple linear increase. Therefore, Experiment 3 aimed to replicate Experiments 1 
and 2 by investigating subliminal processing whilst continually assessing subjective 
thresholds (cf. Marcel, 1983b, who also assessed stability of thresholds throughout the 
priming phase). This was achieved by requiring participants to rate their confidence in 
selecting the right noun after each trial in the subliminal phase.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, it was hypothesised that for the subliminal trials, 
participants would correctly identify the noun for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions 
beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in Experiment 1, it was predicted that 
response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ 
conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials.    
2.5.1. Method 
2.5.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being 
the dependent variable, 24 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants 
took part in Experiments 1 or 2. Nineteen of the participants were female and five male, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 32 years (M = 20.21, SD = 3.27). 
2.5.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
Replicated Experiment 2. 
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2.5.1.3. Procedure 
Replicated Experiment 2. Participants were also asked to rate their confidence 
in choosing the correct noun on a scale of 50-100% after each subliminal trial. 
Participants were required to rate over 50% if they believed they had any awareness of 
which noun to choose, and to rate 50% if they believed they were guessing.  
2.5.2. Results 
2.5.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 64 ms, with an 
average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 48 ms (SD = 17).  
2.5.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
The mean rate of correct identifications made on conscious trials was 98% (SE 
= .4). Mean correct identifications was 96% (SE = .8) for ‘pick’ trials, and 99% (SE = 
.3) for ‘not’ trials. For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated 
confidence to be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 80 
subliminal trials, the number of trials upon which each participant rated confidence to 
be above 50% ranged between 0 and 26 trials (M = 7, SD = 7). Mean percentage correct 
responses for subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 58%, SE = .6) and ‘not’ (M = 51%, SE = .6) 
conditions are presented in figure 2, with a 50% reference line indicating chance 
performance. On subliminal trials, overall d’ values significantly differed from zero (M 
= .20, SE = .02, t(23) = 10.57, p < .001, d = 4.40). Accuracy on ‘pick’ (t(23) = 12.58, p 
< .001, d = 5.25) trials was significant, whilst ‘not’ (t(23) = 1.84, p = .07, d = 0.77) trials 
did not significantly differ from what would be expected by chance alone. In the 
previous two experiments, the subliminal ‘not’ trials produced an effect approximately 
8% above baseline. A Bayes Factor, using a half-normal with SD equal to 8%, of B = 
2.09, indicated that the data were insensitive, but if anything supported the hypothesis 
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of a subliminal effect. Furthermore, looking at the percentage of occasions participants 
simply chose the subliminally presented noun (i.e. ignoring the preceding instruction) 
significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 58%, SE = .6) and ‘not’ (M = 49%, SE = .6, 
t(23) = 10.82, p < .001, d = 4.51) conditions. Only if pick and not were differentially 
processed could there be a significant difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials in the 
proportion of times the presented word was selected. There was a not a significant 
relationship between SOA and performance accuracy for both subliminal ‘pick’, r = .3, 
p = .09 and ‘not’, r = .1, p = .73 conditions. 
Conscious knowledge of the subliminal instruction was also assessed using the 
zero-correlation criterion (ZCC) to establish whether there was a relationship between 
confidence and accuracy on trials when the participant rated confidence to be above 
50%. The difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was -.54%, 
which was not significant (t(23) = 1.69, p = .11, d = 0.70). A Bayes Factor was 
conducted to assess whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there was no 
relation between confidence and accuracy. Firstly, the range of effect sizes expected if 
there were conscious knowledge needed to be specified. The maximum slope was 
determined by the overall accuracy in Experiment 3 (3%) divided by the proportion of 
confident responses (.08)
2
. Therefore, the maximum slope = 37.5%. Using a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 37.5 (sample M = -.54, SE = .31) produced a Bayes Factor of 
0.00, providing strong evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no relation 
between confidence and accuracy
3
. The correlation between confidence and accuracy 
                                                 
2
 Let X be a weighted average of the performance above baseline when guessing (G) and when conﬁdent 
(C), with the weights being the proportions of each type of response. That is, X = (1 - pc) * G + pc * C. 
By deﬁnition, our measure of conﬁdence accuracy relation, the slope, is C–G. This will be maximum 
when all guessing responses are at baseline, i.e. when G = 0. In this case, slope = C–G = C. Also in this 
case, X = pc * C, with the G term dropping out. Rearranging, C = X/pc. Thus, since maximum slope = C 
in this case, maximum slope = X/pc. QED. See, for example, Guo et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2013) for the 
previous use of this method for the zero correlation criterion.  
3
 Kanai, Walsh and Tseng (2010) offer a subjective discriminability of invisibility (SDI) index to further 
discriminate between a lack of confidence as a result of either perceptual or attentional blindness. 
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was additionally measured using Type II d’. Type II d’ did not significantly differ from 
zero (M = -.01, SE = .01, t(23) = -1.69, p = .10, d = 0.70). A Bayes Factor was 
conducted to assess whether the Type II data supported the null hypothesis that there 
was no relation between confidence and accuracy. Given plausible assumptions, Type II 
d’ does not exceed Type I (Barrett, Dienes & Seth, in press). Thus, the alternative 
hypothesis that there existed some relation between confidence and accuracy (i.e., some 
conscious perception) was modelled as a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean 
Type I d’ of .2. The Bayes Factor of 0.03 provided strong support for the null 
hypothesis and hence the existence of subliminal perception. 
2.5.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the noun they had been instructed to choose was 
recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the 
conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were 
significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 728 ms, SE = 23) 
than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 851 ms, SE = 35, t(23) = -4.7, p < .001, d = 1.96). 
Participants were similarly quicker in subliminal trials to identify the noun in ‘pick’ 
conditions (M = 834 ms, SE = 45) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 854 ms, SE 
= 43), however, as evidenced in Experiment 2, a paired sample t-test revealed that this 
difference in reaction times was not significant (t(23) = -1.63, p = .12, d = 0.68). The 
mean effect from Experiments 1 and 2 was 48 ms; this was as the standard deviation of 
a half-normal, as before. With a sample mean difference between subliminal ‘pick’ and 
‘not’ conditions of 20 ms (SE of the difference = 13), the Bayes Factor was B = 1.47 
                                                                                                                                               
However, due to the lack of trials in which a stimulus was ‘absent’, or an appropriate equivalent, we were 
unable to apply the SDI in this case. For Type II sensitivity,  Maniscalco  & Lau  (2012) show their meta-
d’ measure is superior in principle to Type II d’ (see also Barret et al, in press, for confirmation with 
detailed analyses); however, meta-d’ is more unstable for small N than Type II d’ in our experience, so 
we have used the latter. 
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indicating data insensitivity and no conclusions should be drawn, with the evidence 
slightly telling against the null hypothesis. 
2.5.3. Discussion 
Using individual subjective thresholds (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984), the 
results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that when presented with a subliminal prime 
instruction to choose a particular noun, unconscious cognition is able to successfully 
choose the correct noun above mere chance performance. Experiment 3 validated the 
threshold-setting procedure used in the previous experiments. The ZCC indicated a 
sensitive confirmation of the null hypothesis of no conscious awareness, ruling out 
partial awareness (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). Note that partial awareness of the 
displayed noun in itself is not sufficient to know in any way which choice to make; a 
participant would need to consciously have partial information of both the noun and the 
instruction (‘not’ versus ‘pick’). Any such awareness should be reflected in confidence 
ratings; the ZCC, by contrast, supports the claim that perception was subliminal. It 
could be argued that maybe participants gave up on using the confidence scale (despite 
clearly using it appropriately on conscious trials). Even this objection cannot be 
plausibly sustained because the Bayes factor which indicated strong evidence for the 
ZCC assumed that the population effect could be indefinitely small. Thus, the 
alternative hypothesis that was rejected is consistent with participants trying to some 
degree but in a noisy way (i.e. “giving up” to some degree). The “giving up” hypothesis, 
to survive this test, would need to assert a priori that participants gave up completely. 
Without any prior basis for asserting complete failure to follow instructions, the “giving 
up” hypothesis can be rejected. 
There were trials on which participants indicated some confidence. The results 
for the ZCC implied that participants used confident responses when they had no better 
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access to information than when they used guess responses. Thus, participants may have 
been driven by a need to vary the response used, and thus sometimes gave a confidence 
greater than 50%. Such a tendency will add noise to measuring the threshold, partly 
explaining the lack of 100% reliability in threshold measurement, and also indicating 
how the apparent threshold drift in some participants in previous experiments could 
have been spurious. 
Because noun pairs were repeated, it might be argued that if a noun pair that 
had been confidently seen was repeated, the subliminal choice effect we observed may 
in fact depend on consciously primed specific stimulus-response links. However, trials 
were not repeated exactly, as noun pairs were only repeated for counter-balancing 
reasons. Thus having once associated a given noun with a left response, there is a higher 
probability that that same noun will be associated with right response on its next 
appearance. Thus, S-R links would induce subjects to make incorrect rather than correct 
responses. Further, the results of the ZCC indicate that “confident” responses may not 
have reflected conscious perception, but rather, for example, a desire to use all response 
options.  
Whilst an effect of ‘not’ versus ‘pick’ remained in Experiment 3, the 
demonstration would be stronger if the accuracy of ‘not’ trials were individually 
significantly above baseline performance. However, research has demonstrated that the 
type of mask used, for example a string of letters or ampersands, can adversely 
influence the processing of stimuli by interfering with phoneme, grapheme and 
semantic interpretation (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; McClelland, 1978; Perfetti & 
Bell, 1991; Walley & Weiden, 1973). Therefore, Experiment 4 aimed to develop a more 
sensitive method of delivering subliminal stimuli.   
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2.6. Experiment 4 
To render a prime unconscious, it is necessary to mask the prime in order to 
avoid conscious perception. The most common method of masking is to use backward 
masks in the form of symbols (e.g. hatch marks or ampersands), or letter strings (Kiesel, 
Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007). However, previous research has highlighted the 
detrimental effect that backward masking can have on the cognitive comprehension of 
subliminal primes (Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; McClelland, 1978; Perfetti & Bell, 
1991; Walley & Weiden, 1973), due to interference during the pattern and letter 
recognition part of processing (Grainger, Diependaele, Spinelli, Ferrand, & Farioli, 
2003). Kouider and Dehaene (2007) state that for a prime to be subliminal, it needs to 
be presented for a sufficiently short duration, and the mask needs to either share 
stimulus features or fit the contours of the prime closely. Therefore, Experiment 4 
attempted to successfully demonstrate subliminal semantic priming using a grey-scale 
contrast masking method established by Lamy, Mudrik, and Deouell (2008). The 
experiment followed the same format as Experiment 3 in that participants viewed the 
list of nouns to be used in subliminal trials to gain the advantage of practice without the 
establishment of S-R links, and continually assessed subliminal subjective thresholds.  
As in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, it was hypothesised that for the subliminal trials, 
participants would correctly identify the noun for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions 
beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in the previous 3 experiments, it was 
predicted that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ conditions would be faster 
than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal trials.    
77 
 
2.6.1. Method 
2.6.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being 
the dependent variable, 22 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants 
took part in Experiments 1, 2, or 3. Sixteen of the participants were female and six 
male, with ages ranging from 18 to 31 years (M = 20.23, SD = 3.44). 
2.6.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
Replicated that used in Experiments 2 and 3. 
2.6.1.3. Procedure 
2.6.1.3.1. Conscious Trials.  
The stimulus instruction was presented within a rectangular box of the same 
size as used for the fixation. From a viewing distance of 60 cm, the dimensions of the 
rectangular box subtended 2.39° of visual angle (height), and 11.31° of visual angle 
(width). As evidenced in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the conscious and subliminal primes 
subtended 1.43° of visual angle (height), and a range of 4.76-6.65° of visual angle 
(width). The contrast between prime and background was measured in terms of 
luminance using a Cambridge Research Systems ColorCal colorimeter defined in terms 
of CIE 1931 coordinates. The luminance of the grey text in conscious trials was Y = 
14.35 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.277, y = 0.216) against a grey background luminance of Y = 61.04 
cd/m
2
 (x = 0.293, y = 0.268) (see figure 3 for an example of the contrast between prime 
and background for conscious trials). The stimulus instruction was presented on the 
screen for 250 ms to ensure conscious perception. The stimulus instruction was 
immediately followed by the two-noun choice (e.g. ‘1. baby’ and ‘2. yard’) presented in 
the centre of the screen.  
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Figure 3: An example of a conscious contrast mask requiring the participant 
to ‘pick’ the noun yard.  
2.6.1.3.2. SOA Setting.  
Using the same background luminance values described for the conscious 
trials, the luminance for the grey text in SOA setting and subliminal trials was Y = 57.89 
cd/m
2
 (x = 0.0.292, y = 0.265) (see figure 4 for an example of a subliminal contrast 
mask).  
 
Figure 4: An example of a subliminal contrast mask requiring the 
participant to ‘pick’ the noun yard. 
2.6.1.3.3. Subliminal Trials.  
The subliminal phase of the experiment contained three blocks of 40 
subliminal trials (with the third block being a replication of the first block). The 
presentation duration of the stimulus instruction was determined by the point at which 
the participant rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials in the SOA 
setting phase. Confidence ratings were taken after each trial. Randomly placed within 
each block of 40 subliminal trials was an additional 10 conscious trials (using the same 
contrasted luminance values described in conscious trials, presented for 300 ms) to 
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prevent rhythmic pressing of the “1” and “2” keys, and to remind participants of the 
task required (cf. Pratte & Rouder, 2009).  
2.6.2. Results 
2.6.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 32 ms to 112 ms, with 
an average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 56 ms (SD = 21).  
2.6.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
The mean number of correct identifications for conscious trials was slightly off 
100% (M = 97%, SE = 1). For the ‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 
97% (SE = 1), whilst for ‘not’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 96% (SE = 
1). For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to 
be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 120 subliminal trials, the 
number of trials upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged 
between 0 and 89 trials (M = 20, SD = 22). Mean percentage correct responses for 
subliminal ‘pick’ (M = 51%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 52%, SE = 1) conditions are 
presented in figure 2, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. On 
subliminal trials, overall d’ values significantly differed from zero (M = .07, SE = .03, 
t(21) = 2.60, p = .02, d = 1.13). Taken individually, neither accuracy on ‘pick’ (t(21) = 
1.84, p = .08, d = 0.80) or ‘not’ (t(21) = 1.89, p = .07, d = 0.82) conditions significantly 
differed from what would be expected by chance. However, when looking at the 
percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun, 
noun identifications significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 51%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ 
(M = 48%, SE = 1, t(21) = 2.6, p = .02, d = 1.13) conditions, indicating the appropriate 
processing of ‘pick’ versus ‘not'. There was a not a significant relationship between 
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SOA and performance accuracy for both subliminal ‘pick’, r = .2, p = .39 and ‘not’, r = 
.1, p = .67 conditions. 
As in Experiment 3, conscious knowledge was assessed by ZCC. The 
difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was 1.11%, which was not 
significant (t(21) = -1.88, p = .07, d = 0.82). A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess 
whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between 
confidence and accuracy. The maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy 
in Experiment 4 when confidence was ignored (3%) divided by the proportion of 
confident responses (.17). Therefore, the maximum slope = 17.65%. Using a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 17.65 (sample M = 1.11, SE = .59) produced a Bayes Factor 
of 0.48, suggesting that the data were insensitive and we are thus unable to say whether 
or not the ZCC is satisfied. Type II d’, another way of measuring the ZCC, did not 
differ significantly from zero (M = .01, SE = .01, t(21) = 1.88, p = .08, d = 0.82). Using 
a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d’ of .07 (sample M = .01, SE = 
.01) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.50, providing only weak evidence for the null 
hypothesis. However, the guessing criterion indicates that there was some unconscious 
knowledge. 
2.6.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the noun the participant had been instructed to 
choose was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For 
the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were 
significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 746 ms, SE = 20) 
than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 920 ms, SE = 34, t(21) = -5.14, p < .001, d = 2.24). 
Similarly, participants were slower in subliminal trials to identify the noun in ‘not’ 
conditions (M = 942 ms, SE = 36) when compared to ‘pick’ conditions (M = 874 ms, SE 
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= 52). However a paired sample t-test revealed that this difference in reaction times 
between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions was not significant (t(21) = 1.69, p = 
.11, d = 0.74). Using the average effect for Experiments 1, 2 and 3, 39 ms, as the 
standard deviation of a half-normal, with a sample mean difference between subliminal 
‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions of 68 ms (SE of the difference = 40), a Bayes Factor of B = 
2.55, indicated insensitive data, but with more support for the experimental hypothesis 
than the null hypothesis. 
2.6.3. Discussion 
For the subliminal trials, the accuracy data suggested that participants chose the 
correct noun beyond chance expectations at an average rate of 51-52%. When analysed 
individually, participants did not significantly choose the correct noun beyond what 
would be expected by chance for either ‘pick’ or ‘not’ conditions, because of data 
insensitivity. Nevertheless, participants did choose the presented noun significantly 
more often in the ‘pick’ rather than the ‘not’ condition, supporting the theory that 
people do process the instructions appropriately. However, the aim of Experiment 4 was 
to develop a more sensitive method of subliminal priming than that used in Experiment 
3 by utilising a grey-scale contrast method of masking (Lamy et al., 2008). Despite 
using the grey-scale contrast method, Experiment 4 failed to demonstrate successful 
priming in subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. 
However, further research has demonstrated the superior priming effects 
achieved when primes are presented repeatedly (Atas, Vermeiren, & Cleeremans, 2012; 
Marcel, 1983b). This superior priming effect was demonstrated by Wentura and Frings 
(2005), who used objective thresholds to compare the effectiveness of a single standard 
masked prime with a masked prime that was presented ten times in quick succession. 
The results indicated that only the repeated masked prime condition produced a 
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significant priming effect. That is, repeatedly presenting a masked prime increased 
subliminal priming without increasing subjective awareness. The issue of repeated 
prime presentation was explored further in Experiment 5. 
2.7. Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 aimed to refine the grey-scale contrast method of masking 
utilised in Experiment 4 whilst taking advantage of the superior effects of repeated 
priming (Marcel, 1983b; Wentura & Frings, 2005). Experiment 5 replicated the 
procedure and format used in Experiment 4, but rather than one presentation of the 
prime, each prime was repeated three times. As in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4, it was 
expected that for the subliminal trials, participants would correctly identify the noun for 
both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions beyond 50% chance expectation. As evidenced in 
Experiment 1, it was predicted that response times to noun identification in ‘pick’ 
conditions would be faster than in ‘not’ conditions for both conscious and subliminal 
trials.    
2.7.1. Method 
2.7.1.1. Design & Participants  
One problem with the previous study was low power. The dz for the accuracy 
on not trials was 0.40. For a power of 80%, a sample size of 51 is needed. In a repeated 
measures design with the number of correct identifications being the dependent 
variable, 51 undergraduate psychology students from the University of Sussex took part 
in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants took part in 
Experiments 1, 2, 3, or 4. Forty four of the participants were female and seven male, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 32 years (M = 19.69, SD = 2.53). 
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2.7.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
Replicated Experiments 2, 3 and 4. 
2.7.1.3. Procedure 
Replicated Experiment 4. However, there were three equal duration 
presentations of the prime for conscious, SOA, and subliminal trials, with a 150 ms 
pause between each presentation.  
2.7.2. Results 
2.7.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations of the single prime presentation ranged from an 
SOA of 16 ms to 192 ms (a cumulative range of 48 ms to 576 ms), with an average 
experimental presentation duration of 64 ms (SD = 35, with a cumulative mean 
presentation duration of 192 ms).  
2.7.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
The mean number of correct noun identifications for conscious trials was 95% 
(SE = 1). For the ‘pick’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = 1), 
whilst for ‘not’ trials, mean correct identification averaged at 95% (SE = 1). For the 
subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% 
(i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 120 subliminal trials, the number of 
trials upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 
and 86 trials (M = 23, SD = 26). Mean percentage correct responses for subliminal 
‘pick’ (M = 53%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 52%, SE = 1) conditions are presented in 
figure 2, with a 50% reference line indicating chance performance. On subliminal trials, 
overall d’ values significantly differed from zero (M = .11, SE = .03, t(23) = 3.59, p = 
.001, d = 1.02). Accuracy on ‘pick’ conditions significantly differed from chance 
expectations (t(50) = 2.43, p = .02, d = 0.69), as well as performance accuracy on ‘not’ 
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(t(50) = 2.37, p = .02, d = 0.67) conditions. In addition, a paired-sample t-test looking at 
the percentage of occasions participants simply chose the subliminally presented noun 
significantly differed between ‘pick’ (M = 53%, SE = 1) and ‘not’ (M = 48%, SE = 1, 
t(50) = 3.6, p = .001, d = 1.02) conditions. There was a not a significant relationship 
between SOA and performance accuracy for both subliminal ‘pick’, r = .2, p = .18 and 
‘not’, r = -.1, p = .59 conditions. 
Conscious knowledge was again assessed in Experiment 5 using the ZCC. The 
difference in accuracy between ‘guess’ and ‘any confidence’ was 5.04%, which was not 
significant (t(50) = -1.72, p = .09, d = 0.49). A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess 
whether the data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between 
confidence and accuracy. The maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy 
in Experiment 5 when confidence was ignored (2%) divided by the proportion of 
confident responses (.19). Therefore, the maximum slope = 10.53%. Using a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 10.53 (sample M = 5.04, SE = 2.93) produced a Bayes Factor 
of 2.84, suggesting that the data were insensitive (albeit providing more evidence for 
there being some rather than no conscious knowledge), and we are thus unable to say 
whether or not the ZCC is satisfied. Type II d’, an alternative measure of the ZCC, also 
did not significantly differ from zero (M = .10, SE = .16, t(50) = 1.15, p = .26, d = 0.33). 
Using a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d’ of .11 (and a sample 
Type II d’ of M = .04, SE = .04) produced a Bayes Factor of 1.15, indicating that the 
data were insensitive and that we are unable to draw conclusions as to whether or not 
there was any conscious perception. However, the guessing criterion indicated that there 
was some unconscious knowledge. Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate the relationship 
between accuracy and all confidence values separately for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials for 
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 collectively. 
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Figure 5: Mean accuracy percentage for ‘Pick’ trials across all confidence. 
Values demonstrate the relationship between accuracy and confidence 
across all ‘pick’ trials from Experiments 3, 4, and 5. 
 
Figure 6: Mean accuracy percentage for ‘Not’ trials across all confidence. 
Values demonstrate the relationship between accuracy and confidence 
across all ‘not’ trials from Experiments 3, 4, and 5. 
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2.7.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the noun the participant had been instructed to 
choose was recorded for both conscious and subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For 
the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, participants were 
significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 711 ms, SE = 15) 
than in ‘not’ conditions (M = 883 ms, SE = 24, t(50) = -9.97, p < .001, d = 2.82). 
Similarly, for the subliminal trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, 
participants were significantly quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ conditions (M = 
866 ms, SE = 29) when compared to ‘not’ conditions (M = 959 ms, SE = 25, t(50) = -
4.46, p < .001, d = 1.26). 
2.7.3. Discussion 
Participants in the subliminal ‘pick’ condition correctly identified the noun at 
an average rate of 53%. Similarly, the results suggest that participants chose the correct 
noun on an average 52% of occasions for subliminal ‘not’ conditions. Experiment 5 
showed that participants could successfully identify the correct noun at above chance 
expectations for both subliminally presented ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. However, the degree 
of priming in Experiment 5 was not significantly greater than in Experiment 4 
(difference in tendency to pick the displayed noun in ‘pick’ versus ‘not’ in Exp 4, M = 
3%, SE = 1; Exp 5, M = 5%, SE = 1, t(71) = -.68, p = .49, d = 0.16), indicating that even 
though repeated presentation boosted sample priming by more than 50%, the data were 
not sensitive enough to discern whether or not this was a real effect.  
As evidenced in Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4, the response time data for 
conscious trials shows the difference in task difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ 
conditions in that it took significantly longer to identify the instructed noun in ‘pick’ 
trials when compared to ‘not’, an average 171 milliseconds longer. Similarly, there was 
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a statistically significant response time difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials in 
subliminal conditions. Therefore, even though confidence ratings ensured that priming 
was below the subjective threshold, participants were still an average 93 milliseconds 
slower to identify the noun in ‘not’ conditions when compared to ‘pick’ conditions. 
2.8.  General Discussion 
The present research investigated the ability of unconscious cognition to 
process the semantic meaning of subliminal stimuli. In a series of five experiments, 
participants were subliminally primed with a two word instruction, instructing the 
individual with which of two subsequent nouns to choose. This prime was in the form 
of an instruction to either pick the accompanying noun (the second word in the 
instruction, e.g., ‘pick yard’), or to not pick the accompanying noun (e.g., ‘not yard’), 
when presented with the accompanying noun and a paired noun (e.g., ‘1. baby, 2. 
yard’). If able to correctly identify the instructed noun, this should demonstrate the 
semantic comprehension of the subliminal instruction.   
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants were able to choose the 
correct noun beyond what would be expected by chance alone for both subliminal ‘pick’ 
and ‘not’ conditions, without this effect being attributed to the retrieval of S-R links 
(Exp 2). To minimise the likelihood of conscious awareness, Experiment 3 measured 
confidence after each trial and excluded trials in which the participant rated any degree 
of confidence in their decision from the analysis. However, the results indicated that 
participants failed to identify the correct noun, beyond chance performance, for ‘not’ 
conditions. The Bayesian analysis conducted on the trial accuracy data indicated support 
for the experimental hypothesis that participants would choose the correct noun 
depending on subliminal instruction. Experiments 4 and 5 aimed to develop a more 
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sensitive method of subliminal priming by adopting a grey-scale contrast method of 
masking employed by Lamy et al. (2008). The results of Experiment 5 additionally 
adopted a method of repeated priming and demonstrated that participants identified the 
correct noun beyond chance for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions.  
In addition to looking at above chance accuracy, we also looked at the 
percentage of occasions that participants chose the noun based on the primed noun. That 
is, if the participant chose the primed noun, this would lead to a correct response for 
‘pick’ trials, but an incorrect response for ‘not’ trials. Therefore, if the participant 
merely chose the primed noun, there would not be a significant difference in accuracy 
between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. However, the results suggested that there was a 
significant difference in choosing the primed noun for ‘pick’ and ‘not’ in each of the 
five experiments (including Experiments 3 and 4 where accuracy for each instruction 
separately did not significantly exceed chance expectations), indicating appropriate 
processing of the presented instruction. 
Response time data for the conscious trials in Experiments 1-5 demonstrated 
the difference in cognitive task difficulty between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ conditions. For the 
‘pick’ instruction, the reader is informed that the accompanying noun is the correct noun 
to choose. So when subsequently presented with the noun-pair choice, the participant 
needed to first match the noun they had just been presented with, with the two nouns on 
the screen, and then indicate which noun they had been instructed to choose. For the 
‘not’ trials, the reader is informed that the accompanying noun is the incorrect noun to 
choose. When presented with the noun-pair choice, the participant has two tasks. The 
first is to identify the noun they had just been presented with, and the second is to 
indicate the other noun in order to fulfil task instructions. This relative difficulty in task 
expectations was reflected in the response time difference between conscious ‘pick’ and 
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‘not’ trials, as participants were on average quicker to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials 
in each of the five experiments. Perhaps more interestingly, this response time 
difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials was similarly evidenced in subliminal 
conditions. Although this response time difference was only statistically significant in 
Experiments 1 and 5, the Bayes Factor in Experiments 2 and 4 indicated that the non-
significant results were not evidence for the null hypothesis. Furthermore, a meta-
analysis indicated an overall significant result for the response time difference over all 
subliminal conditions (p < .001)
4
. These response time data lend further support to the 
argument that participants were able to comprehend the logical function of both 
subliminal pick and not, demonstrating unconscious cognitive control.  
The series of experiments presented here demonstrate that unconscious 
processing of two-word primes is feasible, a controversial idea in current literature. 
Whilst there exists numerous studies demonstrating the ability of unconscious 
processing to semantically analyse single and even multiple word strings (e.g., Abad, 
Noguera, & Ortells, 2003; Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; 
Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Marcel, 1983b; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Sklar et 
al., 2012; Waller & Barter, 2005), still other studies doubt the ability of subliminal 
perception and the cognitive unconscious to complete more complex analyses than 
pattern and feature recognition (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Condon & Allen, 
1980; Greenwald, 1992). One argument attempting to explain the inability of many 
studies to find unconscious semantic activation involves the use of objective thresholds, 
which not only test unconscious cognition, but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 
2008), or the use of limited processing time resulting in degraded unconscious cognition 
(Sklar et al., 2012). Conversely, subjective methods of assessing subliminal perception 
                                                 
4
 A meta-analysis conducted on all response time differences between subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ 
conditions (M = 37, SE = 8) revealed a significant relationship, t(142) = 4.51, p < .001, d = 0.76. 
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assume that if an individual possesses knowledge, yet is unaware that they possess this 
knowledge, then there is evidence of unconscious knowledge (Ziori & Dienes, 2006). 
Experiments 3-5 here only included trials in which confidence was rated to be at 50% 
(i.e., guessing), thereby indicating a lack of conscious knowledge according to 
subjective measures of subliminality. Whilst confident responses on a number of trials 
may indicate partial conscious awareness, participants may also sometimes give 
confidence ratings above 50% just because they think they should, or because they 
hallucinate (see figures 5 and 6). A meta-analysis of the overall ZCC indicated an 
overall non-significant relation between confidence and accuracy (p > .05)
5
, whilst a 
Bayes Factor of B = 0.36
6
 suggested that the data were not quite sensitive enough by 
conventional standards (i.e., less than 0.33) but more strongly supports the claim of no 
conscious knowledge rather than partial conscious knowledge. 
Figure 2 indicates that when changing the paradigm from pure back masking to 
contrast masking, the proportion of times the displayed noun was chosen changed.  The 
tendency to pick the displayed noun in experiments 1/2/3 combined was 53% overall 
(SE = .4), significantly different from the tendency in experiments 4/5 combined (50%, 
SE = .54=), t(145) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.83. If a subject had awareness of just the 
displayed noun, nothing follows about whether they should pick it. If a subject had 
awareness of just the instruction (pick or not) nothing follows about which noun to 
choose. But if the subject had awareness of the whole phrase, they should pick the 
displayed noun to an equal extent above 50% on PICK trials as they reject it below 50% 
on NOT trials. Thus awareness has the tendency to move displayed noun choice 
                                                 
5
 The meta-analysis conducted on all of the ZCC data revealed that the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy was non-significant, t(94) = -0.52, p > .05, d = 0.11.   
6
 The maximum slope was determined by the mean overall accuracy in Experiments 3, 4 & 5 when 
confidence was ignored (3%) divided by the mean proportion of confident responses (.15). Therefore, the 
maximum slope = 20%. Using a uniform distribution between 0 and 20 (sample M = 1.87, SE = 3.6) 
produced a Bayes Factor of B = 0.36. 
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towards 50%. Therefore, although correlational results may indicate a possible 
systematic relationship between higher SOAs and performance accuracy in Experiments 
1 and 2, the finding of a bias above 50% in the earlier rather than latter experiments thus 
argues against any claim that participants had more awareness in the first three 
experiments than in the last two. Given we tightened up the measurement of awareness 
in the last experiments, this is an important point. 
Jacoby (1991) developed the process-dissociation procedure to demonstrate the 
separate contributions of both conscious and unconscious knowledge using stem 
completion tasks (cf. Marcel, 1983b, who showed a failure to exclude in subliminal 
conditions). Inclusion tasks require the participant to complete the stem with a word that 
has been presented outside of conscious awareness. Exclusion tasks require the 
participant to complete the stem with a different word to the unconsciously primed 
word. If knowledge of the primed word is conscious, this should lead to a below 
baseline performance, however evidence suggests that participants continue to complete 
the stem with the primed word above baseline performance (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; 
Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). Jacoby argues that it is this inability to exclude 
primed words that is evidence of unconscious knowledge. Therefore, conscious equates 
to cognitive control, whilst unconscious equates to a lack of cognitive control. From a 
higher order perspective (e.g., Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), the ability to exclude an item 
indicates conscious perception only if the instruction is, or is taken to be, to exclude if 
you think you saw the stimulus, that is if there was an appropriate higher order thought 
of seeing. In these experiments, exclusion instructions were not conditional on higher 
order thoughts: participants were simply instructed to exclude a particular item. Thus, 
on a higher order perspective, there is no reason why exclusion could not occur 
unconsciously. We argue that the series of experiments presented here provides 
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evidence of unconscious knowledge precisely because participants were able to 
demonstrate unconscious cognitive control by following the subliminal instruction to 
not choose the presented word (in contrast to Draine and Greenwald, 1996, who failed 
to demonstrate subliminal priming of negation at an objective threshold). Additional 
research using subjective measures of unconscious have similarly demonstrated 
unconscious cognitive control in grammar studies (Dienes et al., 1995; Norman, Price, 
& Jones, 2011; Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 2008), the serial reaction time task (Fu, Dienes, & 
Fu, 2010), and in hypnosis (Dienes & Perner, 2007). In the current case, not only could 
participants exclude a specified item when the item was subliminal, they could exclude 
it when the instruction to exclude was itself subliminal, which is the novel feature of the 
experiments reported here. 
We used subjective measures to establish the conscious status of perception. 
Some researchers believe objective measures most sensitively determine the conscious 
status of perceptual states (see e.g. Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004; Snodgrass & 
Shevrin, 2006). To some extent, which measure one prefers depends on which theory of 
consciousness one subscribes to (Dienes & Seth, 2010a): On higher order and global 
workspace theories, conscious knowledge either entails or disposes awareness of the 
perception, which would be reflected in confidence ratings (consistent with the current 
methodology); on the other hand, according to Wordly Discrimination Theory (Dienes 
& Seth, 2010d), the very fact that participants chose the correct word at above chance 
levels entails that the perception of the word was conscious, whatever the confidence 
rating. Holders of the latter sort of theory may say that while participants may sincerely 
and earnestly believe they saw nothing of relevance, that just goes to show they lacked 
higher-order or reflective awareness, but the perception itself was still conscious. We do 
not wish to quibble over words. We have shown that the sort of awareness picked out by 
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higher order thoughts is not necessary for the processing of linguistic negation, whether 
one calls it “unconscious perception” (as seems natural to us) or “reflectively 
unconscious perception”, or some other name.  
A second line of criticism over our methods may accept the logic of subjective 
methods in principle (e.g., Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012), but 
deny we used the best subjective method.  Methods involving gambling may motivate 
careful and honest reports of awareness, and future research could use, for example, the 
“no loss gambling” of Dienes and Seth (2010b; see also Mealor & Dienes, 2012). 
Another approach is to ask subjects to report not on their accuracy, which is something 
ultimately unknowable to a subject (cf. Dienes & Perner, 2004), but on the quality of 
the visual experience itself, quite apart from its unknown mapping to the world 
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004).  The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) of Ramsøy and 
Overgaard asks subjects to distinguish four degrees of visual clarity, from no visual 
experience (1), to a glimpse (but no idea of what) (2), to almost clear image (3) to clear 
image (4). Sandberg et al., (2010) compared confidence ratings and PAS for measuring 
conscious perception of shapes, and argued PAS was more exhaustive. People can be 
aware of seeing something before knowing that they have seen something relevant. 
Dienes and Seth (2010c) argued that as perception is defined in part by its contents, 
having some conscious experience is consistent with other perceptual contents 
remaining unconscious, which PAS would miss out on, but confidence ratings would be 
sensitive to.  Further, Szczepanowski, Traczyk, Wierzchoń, and Cleeremans, (2013) 
argued that confidence ratings were more sensitive than PAS for emotional facial 
expression; maybe this is true in general for stimuli more complex than shapes. But 
what constitutes the best subjective measure of perceptual awareness is still a matter of 
debate. Future research should determine the replicability of the current results when 
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PAS and other scales are used. Additionally, whilst the current work was motivated on 
the grounds that subjective measures are more sensitive than objective measures, this 
still remains a conjecture in the current case. Future studies may benefit from a direct 
comparison of subjective and objective measures in the case of unconscious negation. 
Furthermore, due to the limitations in subliminal presentation using computers (i.e., 
presentation speeds using a 60Hz computer monitor being limited to 16 ms screen 
refresh rates), a tachistoscope allowing millisecond manipulation would be optimal so 
that there is an accurate estimate of both subjective and objective thresholds (cf. Masters 
et al., 2009). 
In his study investigating the limitations of unconscious cognition, Greenwald 
(1992) concludes that unconscious processing is not able to complete more 
sophisticated analyses than letter recognition and partial word detection. In summing 
up, Greenwald issues a two-word challenge in which the investigations into multiple-
word subliminal primes need to ensure that each word needs to be processed in unison, 
that no single word should be sufficient to impart sentence-meaning. The studies 
presented here attempted to meet this challenge by using two-word subliminal primes as 
instructions to choose a subsequent word. Whilst the ‘not’ conditions in this study 
appear compelling in their need to require semantic comprehension of not in order to 
inhibit recognition, the semantic analysis of the second word is not necessarily vital in 
choosing the correct word; recognition is all that is required to discriminate between the 
two words. Further research into this arena may benefit from adapting the study to make 
semantic interpretation of the second word vital.   
Future research into the unconscious processing of subliminally presented 
multiple word-strings may also benefit from developing a more sensitive method of 
delivering subliminal stimuli. Experiments 4 and 5 presented here aimed to address this 
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issue by employing a grey-scale contrast method of masking established by Lamy et al., 
(2008). Although Experiment 5 produced some positive results, participants were 
indicating the correct noun at an average rate of 52%, only 2% above a baseline of 50% 
performance. Therefore, whilst it was expected that the longer presentation durations 
afforded by contrast masking would result in greater semantic processing, this was not 
necessarily the case. However, Lamy and colleagues (2008) successfully demonstrated 
unconscious processing by reducing the contrast between prime and background whilst 
keeping presentation speed constant until subjective thresholds were reached. In 
Experiments 4 and 5 presented here, prime and background contrasts were held constant 
whilst presentation durations were reduced. It is possible that reducing the contrast 
rather than reducing duration may have resulted in a greater depth of processing and 
thus higher accuracy. Furthermore, Wentura and Frings (2005) indicated that maximum 
priming effects were evidenced when subliminal primes were presented 10 times in 
quick succession, whilst Marcel (1983) found an increasing priming effect up to 20 
prime repetitions. Therefore, further research may improve subliminal priming effects 
by investigating the benefits of contrast masking and repeated priming.  
The current study makes a start towards showing processing of syntax under 
subliminal conditions in showing people can process a linguistic “not”, and extract 
meaning from the combination of words. Nonetheless, a stronger case for subliminal 
syntax would be made if the effect was stronger for “not baby” rather than “baby not”, 
which would indicate that syntactically correct word order is also important for 
processing word combinations. Armstrong and Dienes (in press) provide further support 
for the syntactic processing of subliminal phrases by showing that when active (e.g., the 
boy hits the girl) and passive (e.g. the boy is hit by the girl) sentences are presented 
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below the subjective threshold, participants can nonetheless pick an appropriate picture 
at above chance levels. 
2.9. Conclusion 
To conclude, we present a series of experiments that utilised subjective 
thresholds of subliminal priming to demonstrate a significant priming effect that cannot 
be attributed to partial conscious awareness or the retrieval of S-R links. Previous 
research into the effects of priming has often demonstrated at best the semantic 
comprehension of single-word primes, and at worst simple letter and pattern recognition 
processes. However, our results suggest that far from simple and unsophisticated 
analyses, unconscious cognition is capable of processing the logical function of 
negation when instructed to choose between two nouns.   
97 
 
3. Article II - Subliminal Understanding of Active vs. Passive 
Sentences 
3.1. Abstract 
Three experiments attempted to demonstrate the unconscious processing of 
active versus passive sentences. Using subjective measures to assess individual 
thresholds of subliminal perception, participants were presented with a prime sentence 
that denoted whether one of two characters was either active or passive within the 
sentence (e.g., ‘A is injecting B’, ‘A is injected by B’). When subsequently required to 
choose between two pictorial representations (i.e., character A as active, character B as 
active), participants were overall able to identify the correct image for both active and 
passive conditions beyond chance expectations (when averaged over all experiments). 
As expected, participants also took longer to respond to passive rather than active 
sentences.  In sum, the present research demonstrates that people are able to process the 
meaning of word combinations that they are not consciously aware of seeing.    
3.2. Introduction 
In a typical subliminal priming experiment, a briefly presented prime is 
prevented from entering conscious perception through the use of either a forward 
(before the presentation of the prime) or backward (following the presentation of the 
prime) mask (Perfetti & Bell, 1991). This mask is typically in the form of either a 
pattern mask (i.e., a distribution of target fragments, random letters, or symbols), or 
noise mask (i.e., a mask composed of a set of random dots or squares) (Delord, 1998). 
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Short presentation durations in combination with the mask then render the prime 
unconscious by interfering with conscious visual processing and analysis of the prime. 
When subsequently presented with a test stimulus, successful subliminal priming is 
assumed to have occurred if the prime has in some way influenced the processing of the 
test stimulus (Johnston & Dark, 1986). Whilst studies demonstrating simple analyses of 
subliminal primes are commonly accepted within psychological research (Abrams & 
Greenwald, 2000), there nevertheless exists a considerable debate regarding whether or 
not the semantic processing of subliminal stimuli is possible (Naccache & Dehaene, 
2001).     
An enduring question within the literature is just how intelligent unconscious 
cognition can be (e.g., Greenwald, 1992; Loftus & Klinger, 1992; Marcel, 1980; Peirce 
& Jastrow, 1884; Sklar et al., 2012). Many studies indicate that the presentation of a 
subliminally presented word subsequently facilitates lexical and semantic access (e.g., 
Abad et al., 2003; Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998; Forster & Davis, 1984; Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; 
Gaillard et al., 2006; Marcel, 1983a). However, controversy regarding the extent of 
unconscious priming remains (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Hutchison 
et al., 2004; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004); with Greenwald (1992) arguing that the effects 
of subliminal perception are far less sophisticated than is often reported. For example, 
rather than semantic access to subliminal primes, many researchers have instead 
attributed the effects of subliminal perception to the retrieval of stimulus-response (S-R) 
links (i.e., conscious rehearsal of prime-target combinations lead to the creation of an 
episodic memory trace between stimulus and response that is reactivated upon 
subliminal presentation, leading to the illusion of priming effects, e.g., Damian, 2001; 
Kunde etal., 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004), sublexical priming (i.e., processing of 
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subliminal words or sentences being limited to the processing of subword elements, 
e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000), or partial conscious awareness (Kouider & Dupoux, 
2004). 
An explanation that has been offered in an attempt to account for the failure of 
many studies to demonstrate successful subliminal semantic priming of single and even 
multiple words focuses on the use of objective thresholds when measuring 
subliminality. When assessing unconscious cognition, objective methods presume that 
any trial accuracy above chance level performance indicates conscious knowledge (Seth 
et al., 2010). For example, in the Greenwald and Liu (1985) study investigating multiple 
word priming, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA - the time interval between the 
onset of one stimulus to the onset of the next) for subliminal trials was determined by 
the point at which performance accuracy in determining whether the words LEFT or 
RIGHT appeared at the left or right hand side of the screen fell below chance level 
performance. As a consequence, it is not then surprising that participants were unable to 
unconsciously analyse the semantic function of a two word prime. The use of objective 
thresholds in assessing subliminal perception do not just test for unconscious cognition, 
but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2008; Lau & Passingham, 2006).  
It was Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1986) that first distinguished between 
objective and subjective thresholds, with the subjective threshold referring to the point 
at which participants believed they were performing at chance, and the objective 
threshold referring to the point at which they were performing at chance. Their results 
indicated that the unconscious analysis of subliminal primes occurs below the subjective 
threshold, but that unconscious cognition below the objective threshold is limited. (cf. 
e.g., Masters, Maxwell, and Eves, 2009) The subjective threshold, whose function is to 
measure the point at which participants are not aware of seeing, allows a fuller 
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investigation into the limits of the unconscious when compared to the objective 
threshold, which degrades not only conscious seeing, but also seeing itself (cf. Dienes & 
Seth, 2010). 
Sklar et al. (2012) similarly argued that back masking with objective thresholds 
unnecessarily confounds processing time with whether processing is subliminal versus 
supra-liminal. That is, as the subliminal condition has typically involved very rapid 
presentation of the stimulus, it is not then surprising that the level of processing can be 
low compared to conscious processing over extended times. Thus, Sklar et al. used 
continuous flash suppression (CFS; the presentation of a rapidly changing stimulus to 
one eye to prevent the conscious perception of a further static stimulus presented to the 
other eye, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005), which allowed presentation of stimuli over 
hundreds of milliseconds (rather than e.g., 16-32 ms for backward masking at objective 
thresholds). They argued that using CFS, participants could be shown to semantically 
process word and number combinations subliminally. Specifically, they found that 
coherent sentences (e.g., “I made coffee”, “I ironed clothes”) broke through suppression 
slower than incoherent sentences (e.g., “I ironed coffee”). These results are intriguing, 
though somewhat different individual words were presented in the congruent and 
incongruent conditions (e.g., “made” versus “ironed”). In another series of experiments, 
three-term subtractions (e.g., “9 - 4 - 5”) primed processing of their solutions (e.g., time 
to pronounce “0”).  These results raise the question of what sort of novel combinations 
can be processed subliminally, and also under which conditions subliminal processing 
can fully express itself. Thus, we will explore processing of word combinations using 
backward masking or contrast degraded stimuli, and to promote rich unconscious 
processing, we will use subjective rather than objective thresholds.  
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Whereas mental arithmetic (cf. Sklar et al, 2012) appears to involve executive 
resources even for single digit problems (DeStefano  & LeFevre, 2004), the resources 
needed for processing syntax is less clear. The processing of the syntax of single simple 
clauses appears automatic and unconscious (see e.g., Li et al, 2013; Rebuschat & 
Williams, 2009; Williams, 2009, for the implicit learning of syntactic structures), and it 
has been argued that such syntactic processing does not take up executive resources 
(Caplan & Waters, 1999, though see accompanying commentary).  If a three term 
subtraction can be performed subliminally, parsing simple syntax for a few words 
should be possible. Armstrong and Dienes (2013) used backward masking at subjective 
thresholds to investigate subliminal processing of word combinations involving 
negation. Participants were subliminally primed with either e.g., “pick dog” or “not 
dog” then asked to select from two words, e.g., “dog” or “cat”.  The pick instruction 
was associated with picking the noun at above baseline levels, and the “not” instruction 
with picking the noun at below baseline levels. Thus, participants must have 
subliminally processed word combinations.  
We will use a similar methodology but explore the processing of active versus 
passive syntax. The present research consists of presenting participants with textual 
primes that depict one of two characters (either character A who was always female, or 
character B who was always male) as either active or passive within the sentence (e.g., 
‘A is attacking B’, ‘A is attacked by B’, ‘B is attacking A’ or ‘B is attacked by A’). 
When subsequently presented with two schematic images, one in which character A is 
active whilst character B is passive, and the other in which character A is passive whilst 
character B is active, the participant was required to choose the picture that best 
represented the prime. 
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Conscious comprehension during reading involves a set of processes that range 
from the recognition of certain patterns in the printed material, such as letters and 
words, to the construction of an abstract representation of the text (Cain, Carreiras, 
Garnham & Oakhill, 1996). This representation of the situation described in the text is 
known as a mental model. If it is possible to correctly identify the schematic image 
representing the sentence prime, beyond chance expectations, this may suggest that the 
participant was able to draw sufficient semantic information from the subliminal prime 
to allow for the creation of a mental model. This mental model would then enable the 
individual to map this model onto the most appropriate schematic representation 
available. To our knowledge, whether or not unconscious cognition is sophisticated 
enough to differentiate between activity and passivity remains an unexplored avenue of 
research. Therefore, using individual subjective thresholds for novel stimuli, if 
identification of the correct schematic image is above chance expectations, this would 
indicate that unconscious cognition is capable of carrying out more complex analyses 
than previously assumed (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Greenwald, 1992), and 
consistent with the arguments by Sklar et al (2012) and Armstrong and Dienes (2013) 
that word combinations can be subliminally processed. 
3.3. Experiment 1 
Although practiced stimuli have often been shown to produce superior priming 
effects when compared with unpractised novel stimuli (Draine & Greenwald, 1998), 
criticisms have arisen due to the likelihood that successful subliminal priming merely 
relies on the retrieval of S-R links established during conscious rehearsal (Forster & 
Davis, 1984). Therefore, in Experiment 1, participants first completed a set of conscious 
trials to accustom themselves to the task required, which differed from the content of 
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subliminal trials. However, to achieve maximum likelihood of successful subliminal 
priming whilst controlling for S-R links, participants consciously viewed the list of 
verbs (in their simple present form, e.g., injects, washes etc.) to be used in subliminal 
trials in an attempt to activate schematic representations but in isolation from a given 
motoric response, thereby preventing the formation of S-R links. 
It was expected that for the conscious trials, participants would identify the 
correct schematic image on close to 100% of the trials for both active and passive 
conditions. For the subliminal trials, using subjective thresholds of conscious 
awareness, it was hypothesised that participants would identify the correct schematic 
image for both active and passive conditions beyond chance expectations (that is, 
beyond 50%). In addition to trial accuracy, response times would be measured with the 
expectation that identification of the image in the active condition would be faster than 
in the passive condition. 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct schematic image 
identifications being the dependent variable, 31 undergraduate psychology students 
from the University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. 
Twenty three of the participants were female and eight male, with ages ranging from 18 
to 35 years (M = 22.93, SD = 5.6). 
3.3.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
The experiment was created using E-Prime version 2.0 and presented on a Dell 
laptop with a 60Hz screen refresh rate, limiting minimum stimulus presentation to 16 
ms, with 16 ms increments. Each textual screen display was centrally presented in 
lower-case, black, bold Courier New font, and point size 18 on a white background. 
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Conscious trials were created from a set of four verbs (e.g., pokes, burns), whilst 
subliminal trials were created from a set of twelve verbs (e.g., injects, films) (see 
Appendix C for a list of verbs used in practice, conscious, SOA, and subliminal trials). 
All verbs in conscious and subliminal trials were chosen on their ability to be suitably 
represented in a pictorial format. Examples of the type of schematic image used can be 
seen in figures 7 and 8 (see Appendix D for a list of images used in practice, conscious, 
SOA, and subliminal trials). From a viewing distance of 60 cm, the conscious and 
subliminal primes subtended 1.43° of visual angle (height), and a range of 6.18-8.06° of 
visual angle (width). The dimensions of the pictorial stimuli ranged from 11.4-12.59° of 
visual angle (height), and from 9.28-10.02° of visual angle (width).  
 
 
Figure 7: An image depicting the verb ‘injects’. In the first image B is 
active, and in the second image A is active 
 
 
Figure 8: An image depicting the verb ‘burns’. In the first image A is 
active, and in the second image B is active 
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The arrangement of sentence-image trials were counterbalanced to ensure 
participants viewed each of the eight prime-image permutations for each verb (e.g., 1. 
‘A is injecting B’, first image A injecting B, and second image B injecting A; 2. ‘A is 
injecting B’ first B injecting A, second A injecting B; 3. ‘A is injected by B’ first A 
injecting B, second B injecting A; 4. ‘A is injected by B’ first B injecting A, second A 
injecting B; 5. ‘B is injecting A’ first A injecting B, second B injecting A; 6. ‘B is 
injecting A’ first B injecting A, second A injecting B; 7. ‘B is injected by A’ first A 
injecting B, second B injecting A; 8. ‘B is injected by A’ first B injecting A, second B 
injecting A), creating a total of 32 conscious trials and 96 subliminal trials. Therefore, 
each verb created four trials in which A was the active protagonist whilst B was passive, 
and an additional four trials in which B was the active protagonist and A passive.  
3.3.1.3. Procedure  
Participants were individually tested in a small quiet room. Once it had been 
explained to the participant that they would be taking part in an unconscious processing 
study, they were left alone to complete the experiment, thereby minimizing the potential 
role of experimenter demand characteristics. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and English was the first language for all participants. Each of the 
conscious and subliminal trials consisted of four separate components: a fixation cross 
presented at the centre of the screen for 350 ms, the prime sentence (e.g., ‘A is injecting 
B’ or ‘A is injected by B’), a backward mask in the form of a series of ampersands (i.e., 
&&&&&&&&) designed to exceed the length of the sentences (and were the same 
length for active and passive trials) presented for 150 ms, and the final component 
consisting of the two image choice depicting both A and B as active protagonists. 
Participants were required to indicate the number with a key press (either number 1 or 
2) corresponding to the image that best represented the sentence prime. The experiment 
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was divided into three continuous phases; a set of conscious trials, an SOA setting stage 
to establish subjective thresholds, and a set of subliminal trials. Practice and SOA 
setting trials used three verbs and schematic images that were separate to those used in 
conscious and subliminal trials (see Appendix C and D for the verbs and schematic 
images used in practice and SOA trials). 
3.3.1.3.1. Conscious Trials.  
Once the participant had read the presented instructions, the procedure for the 
conscious trials began with a set of six practice trials. The verbs and schematic images 
used in all practice trials were different from those used in experimental conscious and 
subliminal phases. Following the presentation of the fixation cross, the active or passive 
sentences were presented on the screen for 350 ms to ensure conscious visual 
perception. Programming in E-Prime ensured that the offset of the stimulus sentence 
was immediately followed by the onset of the backward mask in all experimental trials, 
with this being especially important in preventing conscious perception in subliminal 
trials. With the offset of the mask, participants were presented with the two image 
choice, in which one image depicted A as active, and the other depicted B as active. The 
participant was expected to press either the ‘1’ or ‘2’ key on the keyboard, depending on 
whether the first or second image best represented the sentence prime. The two images 
remained on the screen until the image choice had been made, at which point the next 
trial proceeded after a 250 ms pause. Having completed the set of six practice trials, 
participants were instructed to continue on to the experimental conscious trials with the 
conscious trials replicating the exact procedure used in practice trials. Participants 
completed one block of 32 randomly presented trials, with an emphasis on accuracy as 
opposed to speed. Participants were not informed whether their image choice was 
correct or incorrect. Having completed the conscious trials, participants viewed the list 
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of 12 verbs to be used in subliminal trials. Each verb was presented on the centre of the 
screen for 1500 ms, with a 100 ms pause between each verb, with the list of verbs being 
presented twice. 
3.3.1.3.2. SOA Setting.  
The SOA of each participant was tested to ensure individual subjective 
thresholds for subliminal perception. Once the conscious trials were completed, the 
participants moved on to the SOA setting phase. The task format replicated that used in 
conscious trials; participants were presented with a fixation cross, prime sentence, a 
backward mask and then the two image choice. Once the participant had chosen the 
image they believed represented the prime sentence, they were required to rate, on a 
scale of 50-100%, how confident they were that they had chosen the correct image; 
100% would suggest that the participant knew which image to choose, whilst 50% 
would suggest that they were purely guessing. If during the SOA setting phase a 
participant rated confidence to be anything above 50%, stimulus duration was reduced 
by 16 ms after each trial from a starting presentation duration of approximately 140 ms. 
Once a participant had rated confidence to be at 50% (just guessing), the SOA remained 
at that same presentation duration for the following trials. Once confidence had been 
rated at 50% (chance performance) for five successive trials, the SOA setting phase 
finished and the participant moved on to the subliminal phase of the experiment. If 
during any of those five trials participants rated anything above 50%, the SOA was 
again reduced until the participant rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive 
trials. If a participant reached minimum stimulus presentation duration (16 ms) whilst 
still rating confidence to be above 50%, they were excused from the experiment
7
. 
                                                 
7
 One participant reached minimum stimulus presentation of 16 ms whilst still rating confidence to be 
above 50% during the SOA setting phase. The participant was excused from the experiment before 
reaching the subliminal phase and their data on the initial phases of the experiment were removed from 
further analysis. 
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Before the SOA setting phase began, participants completed a set of 6 practice trials to 
accustom themselves to the confidence procedure. For these practice trials, stimulus 
presentation was held at 140 ms. As with all phases, practice stimuli differed from 
experimental stimuli.     
3.3.1.3.3. Subliminal Trials.  
After participants completed the SOA setting phase, subliminal trials 
commenced with no further practice trials. The 96 subliminal trials were divided into 
two blocks of 48 trials, allowing the participant to pause between blocks. For the 
subliminal trials, prime sentence duration was determined by the point at which 
participants had rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive trials. As research has 
suggested that individual visual thresholds for subliminal stimuli may vary from initial 
threshold setting to experimental testing, or even on a trial by trial basis as a result of 
illumination levels and dark adaptation (Holender, 1986), confidence ratings for image 
choice were again required after each subliminal trial (an improvement on the block by 
block confidence ratings of e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986). To prevent 
rhythmic pressing of the ‘1’ and ‘2’ keys, and to remind participants of the task 
required, each block of 48 subliminal trials additionally contained 10 randomly placed 
conscious trials (at a presentation duration of 350 ms) using different stimuli from the 
subliminal trials (cf. Pratte & Rouder, 2009), creating two blocks of 58 trials. After 
completion of the experiment, participants were thanked and fully debriefed. Each 
participant received an information sheet giving some background information on the 
study as well as providing experimenter details. 
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3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 16 ms to 80 ms, with an 
average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 48 ms (SD = 15.24).  
3.3.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
It was expected that for the conscious phase of the experiment, participants 
would choose the correct schematic image on close to 100% of trials for both active and 
passive sentences. The mean number of correct identifications for conscious trials was 
slightly off 100% (M = 93%, SE = 1). For the sentence primes in which A or B was 
active, mean correct identification averaged at 94% (SE = 1), whilst correct 
identification in passive sentence primes averaged at 93% (SE = 1, see figure 9 for an 
illustration of subliminal active and passive accuracy across all experiments). For the 
subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% 
(i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 96 subliminal trials, the number 
upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 and 20 
trials (M = 10, SD = 6). For all statistical tests, we used an alpha level of .05 to 
determine significance. Accuracy on subliminal trials (M = 51%, SE = .8) did not 
significantly differ from what would be expected by chance alone (t(29) = 1.49, p = .15, 
d = 0.55). When the accuracy of active (M = 52%, SE = 1) and passive (M = 51%, SE = 
1) subliminal sentences were analysed individually, neither active (t(29) = 1.59, p = .12, 
d = 0.59) nor passive (t(29) = .49, p = .63, d = 0.18) conditions significantly differed 
from chance performance. Discrimination was also assessed in terms of (logistic) d’, 
which did not significantly differ from zero, M = .05, SE = .04, t(29) = 1.49, p = .15, d = 
0.55. 
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Figure 9: Mean percentage values for correct identification of the image in 
subliminal active and passive conditions for Experiments 1, 2 and 3 with a 
50% reference line indicating chance performance. 
However, we were unable to determine from this non-significant trial accuracy 
result whether this implied that there was evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., that trial 
accuracy was at chance performance), or that there was no evidence of any conclusion 
(Dienes, 2011). To determine whether there was evidence for the experimental 
hypothesis (i.e., that trial accuracy would be above chance performance), we instead 
used a Bayes Factor. Whilst values under 1/3 are considered as evidence in support of 
the null hypothesis, values of 3 and over are considered as substantial evidence in 
support of the experimental hypothesis, and values in between 1/3 and 3 indicate that 
the data are insensitive (Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961). Armstrong and Dienes (2013; 
Experiment 3) used the same presentation conditions and showed a 5% effect of 
processing subliminal negation. That task should have roughly the same difficulty as the 
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current task. Thus, to represent the plausibility of different possible population effects, 
we used a half-normal with a standard deviation of 5% (following the recommendation 
of Dienes, 2011, Appendix). A sample mean of 1% above baseline (SE = .8), led to a 
Bayes Factor of B = 0.60, indicating the data were insensitive and did not discriminate 
between the hypothesis of a subliminal effect and the null hypothesis.  
3.3.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the schematic image that best represents the sentence 
prime was recorded for both conscious and subliminal active and passive conditions. 
For the conscious trials, a paired sample t-test suggested that on average, participants 
were significantly quicker to identify the schematic image in active conditions (M = 
2272 ms, SE = 281) when compared to passive conditions (M = 2764 ms, SE = 279, 
t(29) = -3.42, p = .002, d = 1.27). For the subliminal trials, participants were also 
significantly quicker to identify the schematic image for active conditions (M = 2118 
ms, SE = 251) when compared to the passive condition (M = 2346 ms, SE = 277, t(29) = 
-2.68, p = .02, d = 0.99). 
3.3.3. Discussion 
For the conscious trials, correct identification of the image averaged at 93-
94%. When required to choose the correct image in subliminal conditions, correct 
identification averaged at 52% for active sentence primes, and 51% for passive sentence 
primes, with this image identification not being significantly above chance expectations. 
A Bayes Factor indicated that the data were insensitive and cannot be taken as providing 
strong support for the null hypothesis.  
However, support for the unconscious processing of subliminal verb voice was 
provided by the response time data. Although the participants were told that emphasis 
was placed on accuracy as opposed to speed, it was nevertheless interesting to analyse 
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reaction times. According to Miller (1962) and Chomsky (1965), passive sentences 
require more time consuming processing than do active sentences. In order to arrive at 
the semantic representation of the sentence, the passive form needs to be transformed 
into its basic structure, or ‘kernel’, to determine who or what is the agent. Here, the 
basic kernel sentences are the active forms (e.g., A is injecting B), with the passive 
forms (e.g., B is injected by A) being a derivative of these kernel sentences. 
Understanding of these passive sentences is then gained through the use of a passive 
transformation. The average 492 ms response time difference evidenced in conscious 
trials supports this and additional research demonstrating the difference in cognitive 
difficulty between understanding active versus passive sentences (e.g., Gough, 1965, 
1966). More interestingly, this response time difference between active and passive 
primes was similarly evidenced in subliminal conditions, with participants being on 
average 228 ms faster to identify the image in active conditions when compared to 
passive conditions.   
The use of the guessing criterion for establishing subliminal perception could 
be criticized on the grounds that participants came with different interpretations as to 
what “guess” means. However, in the instructions, and on each screen shot when 
participants were required to rate confidence, they were given a definition of what 
‘guessing’ (and ‘know’) means. The participants were told to give a value of 50% if 
they believe that they were purely guessing; that they had no idea which word to choose 
and that they may as well have tossed a coin. They were also told that if they had any 
confidence at all, if they believed they saw anything of potential relevance at all, they 
were to give a value above 50.  Poorly defined end points on a confidence scale can 
render the guessing criterion meaningless; thus, the instructions precisely defined the 
required concept of “guess”. 
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Therefore, using individual subjective thresholds of measuring subliminal 
perception (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984), the results of Experiment 1 do not indicate 
one way or another whether people are able to correctly identify the image for active 
and passive primes beyond chance performance. However, the significant results 
evidenced in the response time data suggests that the subliminal priming of active 
versus passive sentences warrants further investigation. Since research has demonstrated 
that the type of mask used, more specifically the use of letter strings or symbols (e.g., 
ampersands and hatch marks), can negatively influence the cognitive processing of 
subliminal stimuli due to phoneme, grapheme and sematic interference (Di Lollo, Enns, 
& Rensink, 2000; McClelland, 1978; Perfetti & Bell, 1991; Walley & Weiden, 1973), 
Experiment 2 aimed to develop a more sensitive method of presenting subliminal 
stimuli. 
3.4. Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 adopted a grey-scale contrast method of masking established by 
Lamy, Mudrik, and Deouell (2008). This method uses a prime that is presented in grey, 
within a background of grey at a slightly different contrast level. This method allows a 
considerably longer exposure of the prime without the use of backward masking. As in 
Experiment 1, it was expected that for the conscious trials, participants would identify 
the correct schematic image on close to 100% of the trials for both active and passive 
conditions. In addition, it was hypothesised that participants would identify the correct 
schematic image for both active and passive conditions beyond chance expectations 
(that is, beyond 50%) for the subliminal trials. Furthermore, it was predicted that 
identification of the correct image in the active condition would be faster than in the 
passive condition for both conscious and subliminal trials. 
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3.4.1. Method 
3.4.1.1. Design & Participants  
In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications being 
the dependent variable, 28 undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the participants 
took part in Experiment 1.Twenty one of the participants were female and seven male, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 24 years (M = 19.43, SD = 1.55). 
3.4.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
The experiment was presented on a Dell laptop with a 60Hz screen refresh rate, 
and the study was created using E-Prime version 2.0. All materials, sentence primes and 
verb-lists used in Experiment 2 replicated those used in Experiment 1. 
3.4.1.3. Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a private room. All participants had 
normal or corrected to normal vision, and English was the first language for all 
participants. The experiment followed the same format as used in Experiment 1 in that 
all participants completed a set of conscious trials, viewed a list of the verbs to be used 
in subliminal trials, an SOA setting phase, and a subliminal phase. 
3.4.1.3.1. Conscious Trials.  
The conscious phase contained the same six practice trials and 32 randomly 
placed experimental trials used in Experiment 1. The fixation was in the form of a cross 
presented within a rectangular box which was centrally presented on the screen for 350 
ms. From a viewing distance of 60 cm, the dimensions of the rectangular box subtended 
2.39° of visual angle (height), and 11.31° of visual angle (width). The conscious and 
subliminal primes subtended 1.43° of visual angle (height), and a range of 6.18-8.06° of 
visual angle (width). The fixation was immediately followed by either the active or 
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passive sentence. This sentence was presented within a rectangular box of the same size 
as used for the fixation. The contrast between prime and background was measured in 
terms of luminance using a Cambridge Research Systems ColorCal colorimeter defined 
in terms of CIE 1931 coordinates. The luminance of the grey text in conscious trials was 
Y = 14.35 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.277, y = 0.216) against a grey background luminance of Y = 
61.04 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.293, y = 0.268) (see figure 10 for an example of the contrast mask 
used). The prime sentence was presented for 300 ms to ensure conscious perception, 
and the sentence was immediately followed by the two images centrally presented on 
the screen. 
 
Figure 10: Example of an active conscious contrast prime using the verb 
‘injects’. 
 
Figure 11: Example of an active subliminal contrast prime using the verb 
‘injects’. 
3.4.1.3.2. SOA Setting.  
For the SOA setting phase, the trials followed the same format used in 
Experiment 1. Using the same background luminance described for conscious trials, the 
luminance values for the prime sentences in SOA setting and subliminal trials was Y = 
57.89 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.292, y = 0.265) (see figure 11 for an example). Once the participant 
had chosen the image that best represented the prime sentence, they were again required 
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to rate how confident they were that they had chosen the correct image on a scale of 50-
100%. From a starting presentation duration of 500 ms, stimulus duration was reduced 
by 16 ms each time a participant indicated any confidence in their image choice.  
3.4.1.3.3. Subliminal Trials.  
The subliminal phase of the experiment contained the same two blocks of 48 
subliminal trials used in Experiment 1, with the presentation duration of the prime being 
determined by the point at which the participant rated confidence to be at 50% for five 
successive trials in the threshold setting phase. Confidence ratings were again taken 
after each trial. Randomly placed within each block of 48 subliminal trials was an 
additional 10 conscious trials (using the same luminance values described in conscious 
trials, presented for 300 ms). After completing the subliminal trials, participants were 
fully debriefed and received an information sheet giving some background to the study 
as well as experimenter details.  
3.4.2. Results 
3.4.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations ranged from an SOA of 32 ms to 176 ms, with 
an average experimental subliminal presentation duration of 80 ms (SD = 37).  
3.4.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
As in Experiment 1, it was expected that participants would choose the correct 
image on approximately 100% of the trials for both active and passive sentences for the 
conscious phase of the experiment. The mean number of correct identifications for 
conscious trials was slightly off 100% (M = 93%, SE = 2). For the sentence primes in 
which A or B was active, mean correct identification averaged at 93% (SE = 2), whilst 
correct identification in passive sentence primes averaged at 94% (SE = 2). For the 
subliminal trials, only those trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% 
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(i.e., guessing) were included in the analysis. Of the 96 subliminal trials, the number 
upon which each participant rated confidence to be above 50% ranged between 0 and 57 
trials (M = 18, SD = 12). Accuracy on subliminal trials significantly differed from what 
would be expected by chance alone (M = 53%, SE = 1, t(27) = 2.73, p = .01, d = 1.05). 
Analysed individually, accuracy on active conditions (M = 54%, SE = 2) significantly 
differed from chance expectations (t(27) = 2.24, p = .03, d = 0.86), whilst accuracy on 
passive conditions (M = 51%, SE = 1) did not significantly differ from what would be 
expected by chance alone (t(27) = 1.62, p = .12, d = 0.62). A Bayes Factor was 
determined to assess whether there was evidence within the data to support the 
experimental hypothesis that accuracy on passive conditions would be above chance 
level. We used the same half normal with a standard deviation of 5% as in the last 
experiment. A sample mean of 1% above baseline (SE = 1), lead to a Bayes Factor of B 
= 0.53, indicating that the data were insensitive and did not in fact provide strong 
support for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011).  
However, a paired sample t-test compared the percentage of occasions that 
participants simply chose the picture based on the assumption that the lead-in character 
was active for both active (M = 54%, SE = 2) and passive (M = 49%, SE = 1) 
conditions. This difference in accuracy was significant (t(27) = 2.73, p = .01, d = 1.05). 
This result indicates not only knowledge of the lead-in (or final) character, but also the 
unconscious processing of verb voice in active and passive conditions, as only if the 
verb within the sentences was appropriately processed should there be a difference in 
choice of the lead character. Furthermore, overall subliminal d’ values differed 
significantly from zero (M = .12, SE = .04, t(27) = 2.72, p = .01, d = 1.05). 
As well as utilising the guessing criterion to assess subliminal perception, 
evidence of conscious knowledge was also assessed using the zero correlation criterion 
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(ZCC) to determine whether there was a relation between confidence and accuracy on 
trials when the participant rated confidence to be at versus above 50% (the divide 
between complete guessing and some confidence being the theoretically relevant one 
for determining the conscious status of knowledge; Dienes, 2004). The difference in 
accuracy between trials in which the participants were guessing and trials in which 
confidence was ignored was 0.42%, which was not significant (t(27) = -1.57, p = .13, d 
= 0.60). In addition, a Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the data supported 
the null hypothesis of no relationship between confidence and accuracy or were just 
insensitive. Firstly, the range of effect sizes expected if there were conscious knowledge 
needs to be specified. The maximum slope was determined by a method used previously 
by Armstrong and Dienes (2013), Guo et al., (2013) and Li et al., (2013). The maximum 
slope was determined by the overall accuracy in Experiment 2 when confidence was 
ignored (3%) divided by the proportion of confident responses (.19). Therefore, the 
maximum slope = 16% (see Armstrong and Dienes, 2013, for this method applied in 
past subliminal perception research and its detailed justification). Using a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 16 (sample M = 0.42, SE = .27) produced a Bayes Factor of 
0.13, providing substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no relation 
between confidence and accuracy
8
. That is, there was substantial evidence against even 
partial awareness. The correlation between confidence and accuracy was additionally 
measured using Type II d’. Type II d’ did not significantly differ from zero (M = .01, SE 
= .01, t(27) = 1.55, p = .13, d = 0.60. A Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether 
the Type II data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between 
confidence and accuracy. Given plausible assumptions, Type II d’ does not exceed Type 
I (Barrett, Dienes & Seth, in press). Thus, the alternative hypothesis that there existed 
                                                 
8
 The Kanai et al (2010) index of awareness (the zero correlation criterion applied just to stimulus absent 
trials), which discriminates between perceptual and attentional blindness is a useful addition to subjective 
measures but cannot be applied in this case because of the lack of trials in which a stimulus was absent. 
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some relation between confidence and accuracy (i.e., some conscious perception) was 
modelled as a uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d’ of .12. The Bayes 
Factor of 0.29 also provided substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. 
3.4.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the schematic image that best represented the 
sentence prime was recorded for both conscious and subliminal active and passive 
conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, 
participants were significantly quicker to identify the image in active conditions (M = 
2244 ms, SE = 280) when compared to passive conditions (M = 3092 ms, SE = 247, 
t(27) = -4.53, p < .001, d = 1.74). Furthermore, for the subliminal trials, participants 
were similarly significantly quicker to identify the image for active conditions (M = 
2023 ms, SE = 114) when compared to passive conditions (M = 2367 ms, SE = 140, 
t(27) = -2.76, p = .01, d = 1.06). 
3.4.3. Discussion 
For the subliminal primes, the average identification of the correct image 
averaged at 54% for the active condition, and 51% for passive conditions. Therefore, as 
hypothesised, participants successfully identified the correct image for active conditions 
beyond what would be expected by chance alone. For the passive conditions, the data 
were insensitive. However, when the accuracy was compared for the occasions which 
participants simply choose the image corresponding to the lead-in character (i.e., 
ignoring the active and passive verb form), correct identification was significantly 
different. That is, if the participant merely ‘knew’ which character was the protagonist 
based on which character came first without having processed the voice of the verb, 
there should not be a significant difference between active and passive conditions. 
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Therefore, only if the active versus passive voice of the verb was appropriately 
processed should there be a significant difference between conditions.  
Furthermore, as found in Experiment 1, participants were significantly faster to 
identify the image in active conditions when compared to passive conditions. In the 
conscious phase of this experiment, participants were on average 848 ms quicker to 
identify the image for active trials when compared to passive trials, and an average 344 
ms quicker for subliminal trials. These response time differences reflect the difference 
in cognitive difficulty in understanding active and passive sentences, with the 
understanding of passive sentences relying on a passive transformation to make sense.  
The aim of Experiment 2 was to develop a more sensitive method of presenting 
subliminal stimuli than used in Experiment 1 by using a grey-scale contrast method of 
masking established by Lamy et al., (2008). Whilst we have demonstrated potential 
successful subliminal priming of active sentences, Experiment 2 has failed to 
demonstrate successful subliminal priming of passive sentences. However, superior 
priming effects can be produced through the use of multiple prime presentations (Atas, 
Vermeiren, & Cleeremans, submitted; Marcel, 1983b). For example, Wentura and 
Frings (2005) used objective thresholds of measuring awareness and compared the 
effectiveness of a single masked prime to a prime that was repeatedly presented ten 
times in quick succession. The results suggested that only the repeated presentation of 
the prime produced a significant priming effect. Therefore, this issue of repeated 
priming was explored further in Experiment 3.   
3.5. Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aimed to expand on the results evidenced in Experiment 2 by 
attempting to develop a more sophisticated method of priming to increase the possibility 
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of successful priming of passive sentences. Wentura and Frings (2005) found a superior 
priming effect when a prime was presented 10 times in quick succession. Atas et al., 
(submitted) and Marcel (1983b) demonstrated an increasing priming effect when using 
up to 20 prime repetitions. It is believed that the multiple exposure of the prime has a 
cumulative effect of strengthening the prime by increasing the total prime duration yet 
still remaining out of conscious awareness (Wentura & Frings, 2005). Therefore, 
Experiment 3 continued to utilise the grey-scale contrast method of masking evidenced 
in Experiment 2 but increased prime exposure to 3 presentations. Armstrong and Dienes 
(2013) found that an increase from one to three repetitions with the same grey-scale 
masking as used here may increase subliminal priming by more than 50%.  
As evidenced in Experiment 2, it was expected that participants would identify 
the correct image, beyond chance expectations, for active sentence primes. Furthermore, 
it was expected that participants would also choose the correct image for passive 
conditions beyond chance level performance. In addition, it was predicted that 
identification of the correct image in the active condition would be faster than in the 
passive condition for both conscious and subliminal trials. 
3.5.1. Method 
3.5.1.1. Design & Participants  
One of the problems with the previous study was low power. The dz for the 
accuracy on passive trails was 0.3 in the previous experiment. Given that repeating the 
prime may increase the effect by 50% (Armstrong & Dienes, 2013), we would be 
attempting to pick up an effect size of dz = 0.45. For a power of 80%, a sample size of 
40 is needed. In a repeated measures design with the number of correct identifications 
being the dependent variable, 40 undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of Sussex took part in this study in exchange for course credits. None of the 
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participants took part in Experiments 1 or 2. Twenty nine of the participants were 
female and eleven male, with ages ranging from 18 to 39 years (M = 20.75, SD = 4.95). 
3.5.1.2. Apparatus and Materials  
The experiment was presented on a Dell laptop with a 60Hz screen refresh rate, 
and the study was created using E-Prime version 2.0. All materials, sentence primes and 
verb-lists used in Experiment 3 replicated those used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
3.5.1.3. Procedure 
Experimental procedure replicated that of Experiments 1 and 2; with a 
conscious phase, an SOA setting phase, and the subliminal trials. For the conscious 
trials, the prime sentences were presented three times, with each presentation remaining 
on the screen for 250 ms with a 150 ms pause between each presentation. For the SOA 
setting phase, each of the three presentations of the prime started at a presentation 
duration of 500 ms, with a 150 ms pause between each presentation. When a participant 
rated confidence to be above 50%, each of the three prime presentations reduced by one 
screen refresh (16 ms). For the subliminal trials, prime duration was determined by the 
point at which participants rated confidence to be at 50% in the SOA setting phase and 
consisted of the same two blocks of 48 trials, with the additional 10 conscious trials in 
each block (with each of the three presentations at 300 ms).  
3.5.2. Results 
3.5.2.1. SOA Setting.  
Subjective threshold durations of the single prime presentation ranged from an 
SOA of 32 ms to 176 ms (a cumulative range of 96 ms to 528 ms), with an average 
experimental presentation duration of 64 ms (SD = 37.05, with a cumulative mean 
presentation duration of 192 ms).  
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3.5.2.2. Trial Accuracy.  
The mean number of correct image identifications for conscious trials was 94% 
(SE = 1). For the sentence primes in which either A or B was active, mean correct image 
identification averaged at 95% (SE = 2). Correct image identification for passive 
sentences averaged at 94% (SE = 2). For the subliminal trials, only those trials in which 
participants rated confidence to be at 50% (i.e. guessing) were included in the analysis. 
Of the 96 subliminal trials, the number upon which each participant rated confidence to 
be above 50% ranged between 0 and 50 trials (M = 13, SD = 14). Accuracy on the 
subliminal trials overall significantly differed from what would be expected by chance 
alone (M = 53%, SE = 1, t(39) = 3.47, p = .001, d = 1.11). Similarly, on subliminal 
trials, overall d’ values significantly differed from zero (M = .13, SE = .04, t(39) = 3.47, 
p = .001, d = 1.11). When analysed individually, accuracy on active prime sentences (M 
= 54%, SE = 1) significantly differed from chance expectations (t(39) = 3.12, p = .003, 
d = 1.00), whilst accuracy on passive sentence primes (M = 52%, SE = 1) did not 
significantly differ from what would be expected by chance alone (t(39) = 1.86, p = .07, 
d = 0.60). However, a Bayes Factor was determined to assess whether there was 
evidence within the data to support the experimental hypothesis that accuracy on 
passive conditions would be above chance level. We used the same half normal with an 
SD of 5% as before. A sample mean of 2% above baseline (SE = 1), lead to a Bayes 
Factor of B = 2.61, providing weak evidence to support the experimental hypothesis that 
accuracy in passive conditions was above chance performance. 
  In addition, a paired sample t-test compared the percentage of occasions 
that participants simply chose the picture based on the assumption that the lead-in 
character was active for both active (M = 54%, SE = 1) and passive (M = 48%, SE = 1) 
conditions. This difference in accuracy was significant (t(39) = 3.47, p = .001, d = 1.11). 
124 
 
As evidenced in Experiment 2, this result indicates the unconscious processing of verb 
voice in active and passive conditions, as only if the sentence was appropriately 
processed should there be a difference in accuracy of image choice. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, conscious knowledge was again assessed by ZCC. 
The difference in accuracy between trials in which the participants were guessing and 
trials in which confidence was ignored was 0.27%, which was not significant (t(39) = -
1.14, p = .26, d = 0.37). In addition, a Bayes Factor was conducted to assess whether the 
data supported the null hypothesis that there was no relation between confidence and 
accuracy in Experiment 3. The maximum slope was determined by the overall accuracy 
in Experiment 3 when confidence was ignored (3%) divided by the proportion of 
confident responses (.13). Therefore, the maximum slope = 23%. Using a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 23 (sample M = 0.27, SE = .24) produced a Bayes Factor of 
0.04, providing substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that there was no relation 
between confidence and accuracy. That is, the knowledge was entirely unconscious by 
subjective measures. Type II d’, another way of measuring the ZCC, did not differ 
significantly from zero (M = .01, SE = .01, t(39) = 1.04, p = .31, d = 0.33). Using a 
uniform distribution between 0 and the mean Type I d’ of .13 (sample M = .01, SE = 
.01) produced a Bayes Factor of 0.27, also providing substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis. 
3.5.2.3. Response Time.  
The time taken to identify the schematic image that best represented the 
sentence prime was recorded for both conscious and subliminal active and passive 
conditions. For the conscious trials, a paired-sample t-test suggested that on average, 
participants were significantly quicker to identify the image in active conditions (M = 
2307 ms, SE = 130) when compared to passive conditions (M = 2797 ms, SE = 116, 
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t(39) = -3.42, p = .001, d = 1.10). Furthermore, for the subliminal trials, participants 
were similarly significantly quicker to identify the image for active conditions (M = 
2075 ms, SE = 95) when compared to passive conditions (M = 2390 ms, SE = 142, t(39) 
= -2.14, p = .04, d = 0.69). 
3.5.3. Discussion 
The average accuracy rate for the correct image identification in subliminal 
trials was 54% for the active condition and 52% on passive conditions. As expected, 
participants identified the correct image beyond chance expectations for active 
conditions. Whilst the 2% above baseline performance for subliminal passive trials was 
an improvement on the performance rate evidenced in Experiments 1 and 2, this was not 
significant. However, as evidenced in Experiment 2, there was a significant difference 
between active and passive conditions when the verb form was ignored. Hence if the 
participant merely saw the lead-in character letter and choose the image accordingly, 
there should not be a difference in accuracy between active and passive conditions. 
Furthermore, participants were significantly faster to identify the image in active 
conditions when compared to passive conditions for both conscious and subliminal 
trials. During the conscious phase, participants were an average 490 ms faster to 
identify the image in active conditions. For the subliminal trials, participants were on 
average 315 ms faster. Therefore, despite awareness of the prime sentence being outside 
of subjective conscious perception, the response time difference nevertheless reflected 
the difference in cognitive difficulty in understanding active versus passive sentences.  
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3.6. General Discussion 
The present research aimed to investigate the extent of subliminal perception 
by attempting to determine whether unconscious processing was able to distinguish 
between active and passive sentences. In a series of three experiments, participants were 
subliminally presented with a textual sentence in which the verb form denoted whether 
one of two characters (i.e., either character A or B) was active or passive. Participants 
were subsequently presented with two schematic images, one image of which depicted 
character A as active and the other depicting character B as active, and asked to judge 
which image best represented the sentence prime. If the correct image was chosen 
beyond chance expectations, this would provide evidence to demonstrate the cognitive 
processing of verb voice outside of subjective conscious awareness. 
Experiment 1 attempted to demonstrate successful subliminal priming using 
the traditional method of backward masking to render the prime sentence subliminal. 
Using this method, the prime sentence was followed by a string of ampersands to block 
conscious perception of the prime. The results of Experiment 1 did not provide sensitive 
data to determine if people were able to identify the correct image beyond chance 
expectations for either active or passive subliminal conditions. As prior research has 
suggested that the use of letter strings or symbols such as the ampersands used in 
Experiment 1 can adversely affect the cognitive processing of textual primes due to 
interference during phoneme and grapheme interpretation (Di Lollo et al., 2000), 
Experiment 2 aimed to develop a more sensitive method of masking the subliminal 
primes. This was achieved by adapting the grey-scale contrast method of masking 
employed by Lamy et al. (2008). The results suggested that participants were able to 
correctly identify the image representing the prime sentence beyond chance 
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expectations for active conditions, and that participants could distinguish active from 
passive conditions. In addition, this knowledge was shown to be entirely unconscious 
by the zero correlation criterion (Dienes, 2004), so partial awareness was not 
responsible for the effect (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). 
Both Wentura and Frings (2005) and Marcel (1983b) have provided evidence 
to suggest that the multiple presentation of a subliminal prime is more effective than the 
standard single prime presentation due to cumulative exposure. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, methodological procedure replicated that evidenced in Experiment 2 with 
the exception that the participant was presented with 3 repetitions of the prime sentence 
in quick succession. The results of Experiment 3 suggested that, as evidenced in 
Experiment 2, participants were able to correctly identify the image representing the 
prime sentence beyond chance expectations for active conditions; further, participants 
could once again distinguish active from passive conditions. Furthermore, a Bayes 
Factor using the ZCC provided strong evidence in support of the null hypothesis that 
there was no relation between confidence and accuracy: All knowledge appeared 
unconscious.  
Whilst we argue that the accuracy results evidenced in Experiments 2 and 3 
demonstrate the potential for unconscious cognition to comprehend verb voice, it could 
be argued that success was instead determined by simple processing of prime length or 
the presence or absence of ‘by’. That is, shorter primes (e.g., ‘A is injecting B’ vs. ‘A is 
injected by B’) indicated active conditions in the same way that the absence of ‘by’ 
indicated active. However, without at least an awareness of the lead-in character (or 
indeed the final character), knowledge of prime length or identification of ‘by’ would 
have been insufficient to correctly identify the schematic image when presented with a 
choice of images depicting characters A and B as both active and passive. It is possible 
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that participants learned to attend to the final letters of the prime (i.e., ‘by B’ vs. ‘¬B’) 
which would inform them of which image to choose. However, whilst not as 
sophisticated as the full unconscious analysis of verb voice, this would nevertheless 
demonstrate the processing of the syntactic functioning of two word primes (lead-in 
character/final character, and ‘by’).  
 Similarly, it could be argued that successful priming evidenced in active 
conditions could indicate simple priming of the lead-in character. That is, processing the 
first word (i.e., character) and indicating the corresponding picture in which the lead-in 
character was active would allow success on the active trials without actually 
necessitating the processing of verb voice. However, if this were the case, there would 
be no differences between active and passive conditions in the percentage of occasions 
that participants choose the image depending on simply which character came first. Yet, 
the results of both Experiments 2 and 3 found a significant difference in image choice 
between active and passive conditions, therefore indicating differential processing of 
verb voice. 
Nonetheless, it could still be argued that the performance in the active 
condition was produced by word priming from the first position (which subjects had 
learned to attend to from conscious trials) and the greater complexity in the passive 
condition disrupted even word priming and participants performed at chance.  Such a 
theory needs to explain why e.g., “is injecting” is less complicated than “is injected by” 
without postulating the semantic or syntactic processing of word combinations as such.  
The simplest answer could be the relevance of the number of words. That is, the first 
noun can be processed when there are 4 words displayed but not 5 (cf. the decrement in 
priming by additional words found by Kahneman & Henik, 1981). One way of testing 
this theory is to compare “is injecting” with “injected by” in the same paradigm that we 
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have otherwise used. If it is a matter of simple word priming then by making the display 
more simple, participants should classify below chance levels in the passive condition. 
If subjects process the voice of the verb, they should classify at above chance levels. 
However, we need not run this further experiment to settle the question; we can provide 
evidence with the existing data by a meta-analysis over the three experiments. The 
overall mean accuracy for the passive condition was 51% with a standard error of 0.4, 
which is significantly above baseline, t(97) = 2.26, p = .03, d = 0.46 (and a meta-
analysis for the active condition revealed a mean performance level of 53.2% with a 
standard error of .77, t(97) = 4.14, p < .001, d = 0.84).  Both of these tests remain 
significant after applying Hochberg’s (1988) sequential Bonferroni correction. Thus, 
taken as a whole, the set of three experiments provides compelling evidence for the 
subliminal processing of active versus passive verb voice. 
Further evidence to support the argument that participants were able to 
cognitively process verb voice outside of conscious awareness was provided by the 
response time data. Miller (1962) and Chomsky (1965) have argued that passive 
sentences are more difficult to comprehend when compared to active sentences as they 
require more extensive processing. This processing results from the need to participate 
in a passive transformation in order to return the sentence to its basic structure, of which 
the passive sentence is a derivative. The response time difference evidenced in 
conscious trials in all experiments supports this and other research (e.g., Gough, 1965, 
1966) by demonstrating that participants were significantly quicker to choose the image 
when the sentence prime was active compared to passive for conscious trials. Over all 
three experiments, participants were on average 610 ms faster. More interestingly, this 
difference in response time was also evidenced in subliminal trials. Across all three 
experiments, participants were on average 274 ms faster to identify the image in active 
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conditions when compared to passive conditions. Similarly, a meta-analysis indicated 
an overall significant result for the response time difference in all subliminal conditions 
(p < .001)
9
. This significant result lends further support to the unconscious processing of 
verb voice in subliminal active and passive conditions.  
We used subjective methods (the guessing criterion; and the zero correlation 
criterion supported by Bayes Factors to interpret non-significant results) to establish the 
subliminal nature of the stimuli. The use of the guessing criterion in measuring 
subliminal perception is often criticised on the grounds that participants may have 
differing interpretations as to what ‘guess’ means. Poorly defined end points on a scale 
of confidence can render the guessing criterion meaningless; thus, the instructions 
precisely defined the required concept of “guess”. Therefore, when instructed to rate 
confidence, participants were told to give a value of 50% if they believed they were 
guessing, and they were told that if they had any confidence at all, if they believed that 
they saw anything of potential relevance, then they were to give a value of above 50%. 
If we had used objective measures, i.e., the ability of the participant to 
discriminate the content of what was displayed, the perception would be declared 
conscious, because that is exactly what participants did: they could pick the right 
picture. On the one hand, these results illustrate the usefulness of subjective rather than 
objective measures in determining the full richness of unconscious processing. On the 
other hand, our argument could be turned on its head, and the sceptics declare that we 
had not established subliminality rigorously enough, because it is only objective 
measures that convince the sceptic. As objective rather than subjective measures pick 
out fewer cases as being genuinely subliminal, using objective measures is more 
convincing. In other words, we should aim to minimise the rate at which we make Type 
                                                 
9
 A meta-analysis conducted on all response time differences between subliminal active and passive 
conditions (M = 274, SE = 63) revealed a significant relationship, t(95) = 4.33, p < .001, d = 0.89. 
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I errors (false alarms concerning subliminal perception). The problem with the strategy 
of minimizing Type I errors is that it requires indefinitely strong evidence to make a 
case, combined with a 100% miss rate no matter what the evidence is. While sometimes 
it may be scientifically useful to seek to minimise one error type, a useful general 
strategy is to try to minimise total errors by balancing the two error types. That is, the 
goal may not be to convince the sceptic no matter what, but to get the most unbiased 
measure of a phenomenon (in order to determine its properties so as to develop and test 
models).   
Objective measures, to be unbiased, presume the “Worldly Discrimination” 
theory of consciousness, namely that, the content directly expressed in any behaviour 
(e.g., pointing to where a dog is) is the content of a conscious mental state (e.g., 
consciously knowing ‘‘There is the dog!’’) (Dienes & Seth, 2010a). Thus, according to 
worldly discrimination theory a person shows that they are consciously aware of a 
feature in the world when they can discriminate it with choice behaviour. By contrast, 
the more common theories of consciousness that are variants of higher order theories or 
global workspace/integration theories would not endorse the claim that simple 
discrimination implies conscious awareness (e.g., Baars, 2002; Lau & Rosenthal, 2012; 
Seth et al, 2008; Timmermans et al, 2012). Rather, according to both these latter classes 
of theory, a person who consciously sees would be able to indicate they see specific 
content rather than guess it when probed about whether they are seeing it; i.e., the 
conscious status of the seeing would be revealed by appropriate subjective measures. 
According to these theories, the measures we used were at least the right sort of measure 
to use.   
According to yet another class of theory, brain activity in specific local areas 
(perhaps with local recurrence) generates phenomenal consciousness. Thus, conscious 
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perception can co-occur with the sincere and earnest denial of perceiving - and even 
perhaps when a person cannot discriminate what was there (e.g., Block, 2009). 
According to such theories, in the current studies we have not measured whether 
perception was conscious or unconscious per se, but whether perception involved 
reflective or introspective consciousness.  But on all accounts, we have measured the 
sort of consciousness that comes with the accurate expression of higher order thoughts 
when a person is probed. We have explored the limits of unconscious perception when 
unconscious seeing means not being aware that one saw anything relevant. Investigating 
the limits of processing with and without this metacognitive capacity is an interesting 
empirical question, no matter what labels are used. 
Rather than asking participants if they saw anything relevant, one can ask if 
they had any visual experience of the stimulus whatsoever (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 
2004; Sandberg et al., 2010). For example, what is the extent of subliminal processing 
when people do not believe they even saw a flash?  Using our confidence ratings, 
people may have been aware of seeing a flash of the prime; they just had no conscious 
experience of content relevant to the judgment.  If so, the relevant content used in the 
judgment was unconscious (Dienes & Seth, 2010b). Nonetheless, future studies could 
explore the relation between different conscious visual contents (e.g., “a flash”) and the 
complexity of subliminal processing allowed. 
We made use of both the guessing and zero correlation criteria of unconscious 
knowledge.  The guessing criterion allows the conclusion that some knowledge was 
unconscious but leaves open whether in addition there was some conscious knowledge. 
The zero correlation criterion tests whether there was any conscious knowledge, with 
the absence of conscious knowledge resulting in a non-significant relation between 
confidence and accuracy (where that relation can be expressed as a correlation, slope, 
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difference or Type II or meta d’, see e.g., Dienes, 2008; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Mealor & Dienes, 2010). However a non-significant result in itself does not distinguish 
between (a) insensitive data and (b) evidence in support of the null hypothesis. 
Obviously, the zero correlation criterion, in order to legitimate the conclusion of 
unconscious knowledge, requires evidence in favour of the null hypothesis – not 
insensitive data. A Bayes factor is required to make the distinction between insensitive 
data and evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. Thus, wherever we obtained non-
significant zero correlation criteria, we analysed with a Bayes factor, using methods 
employed previously by Armstrong and Dienes (2013), Guo et al., (2013), and Li et al., 
(2013). 
Naccache and Dehaene (2001) have argued that whilst the majority of priming 
studies have focused on the ability to derive semantic understanding from subliminal 
stimuli, the possibility of manipulating this semantic comprehension has largely been 
ignored. Therefore, the current research attempted to determine whether the information 
contained in a short subliminal sentence could be translated to a schematic 
representation. If successful, this would demonstrate not only the semantic 
understanding of active and passive verb form, but also the ability to manipulate this 
information and translate it into a pictorial image. The trial accuracy data suggested that 
participants were indeed able to translate the prime sentence into a schematic image for 
active conditions. Furthermore, both the difference evidenced between the percentage of 
occasions participants choose the image corresponding to the lead-in character and the 
response time data similarly suggests that participants were able to at least process the 
distinction in verb voice between active and passive sentences. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
To conclude, we presented a series of three experiments that attempted to 
subliminally prime active versus passive sentences using individual subjective 
thresholds of conscious awareness. Past research investigating the extent of subliminal 
priming has tended to focus on the ability to derive semantic understanding from 
subliminal stimuli. We hoped to demonstrate that in addition to semantic 
comprehension of activity versus passivity, participants would be able to successfully 
manipulate that comprehension by translating into a visual schematic representation. 
Our results indicated that under subliminal conditions, participants were able to identify 
the correct image for both active and passive verb forms beyond mere chance 
expectations. In sum, despite the passivity some have claimed for the unconscious, it 
can be as active as it is passive. 
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4. Article III – Supraliminal and Subliminal Priming of 
Specific Relationship Anxiety 
4.1. Abstract 
This paper explored whether supraliminal and subliminal priming is 
sophisticated enough to activate anxieties with specific contents (namely, the fear of 
being close, far, controlled or controlling in a relationship). Participants were primed 
with emotive words during a neutral classification task and then required to classify 
words as either congruent with the primed anxiety, or incongruent. The results from 
supraliminal and subliminal conditions were then compared with a control group that 
received no priming. The results suggested that participants were faster to categorise 
anxiety-congruent and incongruent items in the supraliminal group than they were in the 
control group. In addition, participants in the control condition made significantly more 
errors in categorising anxiety-congruent items than either supraliminal or subliminal 
groups. However, whilst the supraliminal priming effects were clear, the data were 
insensitive for indicating whether or not there was subliminal priming of specific 
relationship anxieties.  
4.2. Introduction 
Anxiety is an unpleasant psychological state that develops in order to allow us 
to effectively perform in difficult situations (Davey, 2008). As well as a number of 
somatic symptoms, anxiety often involves a number of significant cognitive 
characteristics including a lack of concentration, intrusive thoughts, affective fear 
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experienced as a result of threat anticipation, and excessive worry and concern 
regarding the negative consequences connected to the perceived threat. In addition to 
these cognitive characteristics of anxiety, highly anxious individuals often go on to 
develop cognitive biases which aid in the identification of possible threats (Mathews, 
Mackintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). These cognitive biases 
involve the rapid detection of, and diversion of attention to, perceptual cues that may be 
related to the associated threat. Moreover, the cognitive resources required to rapidly 
detect and divert attention to potential threats often inhibits the cognitive processing of 
additional and less vital information. 
A modified version of the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935) is perhaps the most 
common approach to demonstrating the cognitive biases that can develop as a result of 
anxiety activation (Mathews et al., 1997). The Emotional Stroop task employs both 
emotive and neutral words presented in differing ink colours and requires the individual 
to respond to the ink colour. Research has often shown that individuals high in anxiety 
respond quicker to the ink colour of neutral words as opposed to threatening or 
unpleasant words (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; De Ruiter & Brosschot, 
1994; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). It is proposed that the anxiety that is 
elicited upon presentation of the threatening words initially prevents cognitive resources 
from focusing on the required task, which subsequently delays the response to ink 
colour of the emotive words. Interestingly, evidence suggests that these anxiety driven 
cognitive bias effects evidenced in the Emotional Stroop task are similarly exhibited 
even when the threatening stimuli is presented outside of conscious awareness (Fox, 
1996; Li, Zinbarg & Paller, 2007; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Manguno-Mire, Constans, 
& Geer, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & 
Matthews, 1993; Öhman, 1999; Van Honk, Peper, & Schutter, 2005). Despite a lack of 
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conscious access to the semantic content of the words, response times indicate that 
individuals scoring highly on a trait anxiety scale nevertheless continue to display the 
attentional bias to threatening and unpleasant words when compared to neutral words. 
Therefore, this delay in response to threatening words suggests that anxiety can be 
induced through subliminal priming. 
Further corroboration for the claim that anxiety can be elicited outside of 
conscious awareness is provided by a number of empirical studies. For example, Tyrer, 
Lewis, and Lee (1978) presented participants with a series of anxiety inducing words 
such as ‘hatred’, ‘cruel’, and ‘mutilate’ under either subliminal or supraliminal 
conditions. The results indicated that following priming, subjective ratings of anxiety 
significantly increased under both subliminal and supraliminal conditions. Similarly, 
Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (1987) subliminally presented a group of participants with a set 
of emotionally unpleasant words, and a control group with a set of emotionally neutral 
words. When measured across a series of psychological and physiological variables 
relating to stress, the results indicated that the group that had been subliminally 
presented with emotionally unpleasant words rated subjective levels of sweating, 
anxiety, perceived shaking and muscular tensions as higher when compared to the 
control group. Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) subliminally presented participants with 
a series of words that connoted hostility. Their results indicated that when subsequently 
required to pass judgment on an individual engaging in neutral behaviours, hostile and 
negative judgements were directly related to the number of hostile words the participant 
had been subliminally exposed to. 
Using imagery to demonstrate the activation of anxiety, Yiend and Mathews 
(2001) supraliminally presented high and low anxious participants with pairs of images, 
one portraying a threatening image and the other a non-threatening image, before asking 
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the participant to respond to target locations. The results suggested that participants 
scoring high in anxiety were faster to respond to targets replacing the location of 
threatening images compared to targets replacing non-threatening images when 
compared to the responses of participants scoring low in anxiety. These results further 
support the contention that the activation of anxiety leads to a preferential attention to 
threat related stimuli. Furthermore, the activation of anxiety has similarly been 
demonstrated using images presented subliminally. For example, Robles, Smith, Carver, 
and Wellens (1987) embedded positive, negative or neutral images into a two-minute 
video of a woman walking through a forest. Despite being presented at a speed that 
rendered the image unconscious, subjective anxiety ratings following presentation were 
highest for those in the negative condition, followed by neutral and positive conditions 
respectively.  
Whilst many of the above studies appear to have successfully induced anxiety 
on a general or global level through supraliminal or subliminal presentation, very few 
studies have attempted to prime specific anxieties. For example, whilst Kemp-Wheeler 
and Hill (1987) measured psychological and psychical variables to demonstrate 
successful anxiety activation, the anxiety induced was a generalised state-type anxiety 
rather than the activation of a specific anxiety or fear. One such area regarding the 
priming of more specific anxieties relates to adult attachment. Adult attachment can be 
conceptualised as a continuum with anxious attachment at one end of the scale and 
avoidant attachment at the other, with secure attachment being somewhere in the middle 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). Wilkinson, Rowe, and Heath (2013) supraliminally 
primed participants with either attachment anxiety or attachment security and measured 
the participants’ subsequent consumption of food. Their results indicated that 
participants consumed more food following the anxiety prime than they did following 
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the secure prime, with the authors concluding that the food served the purpose of 
comforting and alleviating the attachment anxiety activated. 
With regards to subliminal priming and adult attachment, Barabi, Mikulincer, 
and Shaver (2006, as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010) investigated the differential 
effects of subliminal sexual imagery on secure and insecure adult attachment. After 
measuring independent adult attachment styles, Barabi et al. subliminally presented a 
group of male participants with erotic oedipal and control images and subsequently 
required them to rate the sexual attractiveness and allure of a series of female targets. As 
adult attachment insecurity is believed to impede upon sexual maturity, it was 
hypothesised that the oedipal imagery would interact with the immature sexuality and 
anxiety regarding child-mother relationships of anxiously attached males leading to an 
increase in their perception of target women as attractive when compared to the control 
images. Conversely, it was hypothesised that oedipal imagery would lead to disgust and 
distaste in securely attached males and thus lead to lower ratings of attractiveness when 
compared to control images. The results supported these hypotheses in that males 
scoring highly in anxious attachment rated target females as more attractive and alluring 
following oedipal images when compared to erotic control images, whilst securely 
attached males rated target females as more attractive following control images when 
compared to oedipal. Interestingly, males scoring highly in avoidant attachment also 
rated females as more attractive following oedipal images when compared to control 
images. 
As a result of the success of studies presented here and elsewhere, it has been 
argued that it is possible to affectively and cognitively alter the emotional state of an 
individual through the emotive content of supraliminal and subliminal primes. 
However, many researchers have found that the emotional effects and anxiety induced 
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through subliminal priming are both limited and minimal (Mayer & Merckelbach, 
1999a, 1999b; Smith, 1993). In fact, there still remains a considerable controversy 
regarding whether or not the semantic comprehension of stimuli presented subliminally 
even occurs (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001; Hutchison et al., 2004; 
Kouider & Dupoux, 2004; Loftus & Klinger, 1992), with successful priming often being 
attributed to factors such as the retrieval of stimulus-response links, sublexical 
processing, or partial conscious awareness. However, the adherence to strict objective 
thresholds (i.e., that any response accuracy above chance performance is indicative of 
conscious knowledge) may account for the failure of many of these studies to 
demonstrate successful subliminal priming effects (Dienes, 2004, 2008). On the other 
hand, subjective methods provide a more sensitive method of measuring subliminal 
perception (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986). That is, subjective methods assume 
that if a participant believes themselves to be guessing and yet accuracy exceeds chance 
performance, then this should be considered evidence of unconscious knowledge (cf. 
Dienes, 2008). Indeed, Armstrong and Dienes (2013) showed that using subjective 
thresholds, a subliminal two word prime to either pick or not pick a certain word 
influenced word choices. 
In addition to supraliminal priming, the current study aimed to utilise 
subjective methods of assessing subliminal perception to explore the full extent of 
prime processing by attempting to prime relationship anxieties. More specifically, we 
investigated whether it was possible to induce very specific relationship anxieties using 
both supraliminal and subliminal primes relating to one of four specific relationship 
threats; the fear of being close, far, controlled or controlling. Birtchnell’s (1996) relating 
theory suggests that within a relationship, there are four important and necessary states 
of relatedness that all individuals endeavour to balance with their partners, and these are 
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closeness, distance, upperness and lowerness (Birtchnell, Voortman, DeJong, & 
Gordon, 2006). The concept of closeness refers to the degree to which an individual is 
involved and committed to a relationship, whilst distance refers to the degree to which 
an individual is separate and detached from the relationship. Within the relationship 
context, upperness and lowerness refer to the notion of power and control; whilst 
upperness refers to the level of control an individual exerts over their partner, lowerness 
refers to the level of control and power exerted over them. According to relating theory, 
romantic relationship anxiety will ensue if disparity exists within any of these four 
relationship states (Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Holmes & Johnson, 2009; Tucker & 
Anders, 1999). 
4.2.1. Current study  
This study attempted to induce one of the following four specific relationship 
anxiety types; a) the fear of being close to a partner, b) the fear of being far from a 
partner, c) the fear of being controlled by a partner, or d) the fear of being controlling 
with a partner. To prime relationship anxiety, participants were continuously presented 
either supraliminally or subliminally with a series of three emotive adjectives relating to 
the specific relationship threat whilst participating in a neutral classification task. Once 
the participant had been primed with one of the four anxieties, they were required to 
read a short passage about a fictitious character named ‘Joanna’, who was experiencing 
a relationship anxiety congruent with the primed anxiety. Having read the passage, 
participants completed a single category implicit association test (IAT) which required 
the participant to classify a series of emotional adjectives as something that Joanna 
would be fearful of or not fearful of. In addition to these emotive items, there were a 
series of items relating to the concept of ‘self’ (i.e., me, myself, and I), which the 
participants were required to classify with the same response as something Joanna 
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would be fearful of on 50% of occasions, and non-fearful on the other 50% of 
occasions. After completing the IAT classification task, participants were required to 
rate their current levels of anxiety relating to the fear of being close, far, controlled, and 
controlling. Lastly, participants completed the Experience in Close Relationships Scale 
(ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) to measure adult attachment levels across two 
dimensions; avoidant attachment and attachment anxiety. The responses of those 
participants that had been supraliminally and subliminally primed were then compared 
to the responses of a control group that had received no priming. 
4.2.1.1. Predictions based on the IAT emotive items 
As indicated previously, past research suggests that anxiety can increase 
response time to threat related items (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; MacLeod & Mathews, 
1988; Muris, Merckelbach, & Damsma, 2000). Therefore, our first prediction proposed 
that the participants that had been supraliminally and subliminally primed with anxiety 
would be quicker to classify the emotive/anxiety items that were congruent with the 
anxiety induced when compared to the response times of the control group. In addition 
to anxiety increasing the response time to threat related items, research also suggests 
that increased levels of anxiety are associated with preferential attention to cues relating 
to threat (Mathews et al., 1997; Neumann, Seibt, & Strack, 2001). Therefore, our 
second prediction regarding the anxiety items proposed that participants in supraliminal 
and subliminal conditions would make fewer errors in classifying congruent and 
incongruent anxiety items when compared to the errors made by the control group.  
Further support for these predictions is provided by Bower’s (1981) network 
theory, which suggests that external emotional stimuli activates emotion nodes within 
memory upon entering perception. This activation of an emotional node then leads to an 
increase in activation with associated emotional nodes through the spreading activation 
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phenomenon. That is, the inducement of a specific anxiety state through priming should 
then increase the salience of information congruent with that anxiety state (De Ruiter & 
Brosschot, 1994), leading to a quicker response to congruent anxiety items and fewer 
errors in classifying congruent and incongruent items when compared to the control 
group that had received no such priming. 
4.2.1.2. Predictions based on the IAT self-related items 
The purpose of including self-related items within the IAT was in an attempt to 
measure the strength of association between the anxiety induced and concepts of the 
‘self’. For example, past research has demonstrated that anxiety may speed up 
responding to self-related items when required to categorise the items into anxiety and 
calmness categories (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). We attempted to extend this finding by 
investigating whether the activation of anxiety would speed up responding to self-
related items when required to classify ‘self’ items as something to be fearful of when 
compared with classifying ‘self’ items as something not to be fearful of. More 
specifically, we hypothesised that the inducement of anxiety would lead to an 
association between the specific anxiety induced and the concept of the ‘self’. 
Therefore, our third prediction was that this association between the anxiety and the 
‘self’ in supraliminal and subliminal conditions would lead to a quicker response time 
when required to classify self-related items as fearful when compared to non-fearful. 
Furthermore, our fourth prediction was that participants in supraliminal and subliminal 
conditions would make fewer errors in classifying self-related items as fearful when 
compared with non-fearful. If correct in these predictions, this may provide an implicit 
measure of the self being related to a particular anxiety. Whilst we propose that the self-
related items within the current framework of the IAT would measure the extent to 
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which the participant feels the anxiety, alternative possibilities remain open and are 
explored in more detail in the discussion. 
4.2.1.3. Predictions based on current anxiety ratings  
Our predictions regarding self-reported anxiety levels remain open. On the one 
hand, traditionally, psychologists have argued that the conscious experience of affect is 
a necessary and vital component of emotion, whether that emotion is pleasure, guilt, or 
anxiety (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003). According to this perspective, participants in 
supraliminal and subliminal conditions should rate higher levels of anxiety congruent 
with the anxiety induced when compared to participants in the control condition. On the 
other hand, Winkielman and Berridge (2004) propose that under certain conditions, the 
processing of emotion which can effect both behavioural and physiological reactions 
can remain entirely unconscious.  According to this unconscious emotion perspective, 
the lack of a participant’s conscious experience of anxiety does not mean that the 
anxiety does not exist. The mode of information processing may be globally changed 
such that it is sensitive and focused on threat without the person being aware of the 
change. Thus, an interesting dissociation would be if the IAT showed threat-relevant 
speeded information processed without corresponding changes in self-reported anxiety; 
such a pattern would constitute evidence for the induction of unconscious anxiety. 
4.2.1.4. Predictions based on the ECR Scale 
As well as attachment style impeding sexual maturity as previously mentioned 
(Barabi et al., 2006, as cited in Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010), research also suggests that 
the quality of parent-child relationships in childhood can have a direct influence on the 
quality of romantic relationships in adulthood (Brennan & Shaver, 1995; Collins & 
Read, 1990; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). Whilst avoidant 
attachment refers to individuals that prefer to distance themselves from close romantic 
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relationships and prefer to view themselves as independent (i.e., fear being close to 
partner), attachment anxiety refers to individuals who seek closeness in a relationship 
and tend to depend on their partners’ for personal validation (i.e., fear being far from 
partner) (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). Therefore, we predict that primes relating to the 
fear of being far from their partner may have a stronger effect on participants scoring 
highly on anxious attachment rather than participants low in anxious attachment. 
Conversely, primes relating to the fear of being close to their partner may have a 
stronger effect on participants scoring highly on avoidant attachment. This prediction is 
supported by a study by Birnbaum, Svitelman, Bar-Shalom, and Porat (2008), who 
found an interaction effect between specific relationship threats and attachment styles. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Participants  
One hundred and twenty undergraduate and Masters students studying 
psychology at the University of Sussex voluntarily took part in this study in exchange 
for course credits. Ninety nine of the participants were female and twenty one male, 
with ages ranging from 18 to 50 years (M = 22.03, SD = 5.16). Participants were told 
that the study looked at the influence of anxiety on classifying emotional adjectives but 
did not mention anything regarding priming, either subliminal or supraliminal.  
4.3.2. Design 
In a mixed design, the between subjects variables were condition (3 levels; 
supraliminal, subliminal, control) and anxiety group (4 levels; the fear of being close, 
far, controlled, controlling). The within subjects variables were anxiety congruence (2 
levels; whether the anxiety items classified were congruent with the induced anxiety, or 
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incongruent), self-related fear (2 levels; whether the self-related items were to be rated 
as fearful, or non-fearful), current ratings of subjective anxiety consistency (2 levels; 
whether the anxiety ratings were consistent with the anxiety induced, or inconsistent), 
and attachment style (2 levels; anxious attachment, avoidant attachment). Of the 120 
participants that took part in this study, 40 participants took part in the supraliminal 
condition, 40 participants took part in the subliminal condition, and 40 participants took 
part in the control condition. Within each condition, 10 participants completed the fear 
of being close experiment, 10 participants completed the fear of being far, 10 
participants completed the fear of being controlled, and 10 completed the fear of being 
controlling experiments. 
4.3.3. Apparatus and Materials  
The experiment was created using E-Prime version 2.0. The study used a grey 
scale contrast method of masking established by Lamy et al., (2008) to render the prime 
subliminal. This involved presenting the prime in grey lettering within a rectangular box 
filled in grey at a differing contrast level to the prime. The experiment was presented on 
a Dell laptop with a 60Hz screen refresh rate, limiting minimum stimulus presentation 
speed to 16 ms. The format for subliminal, supraliminal and control conditions followed 
the same structure and included the same word lists, passages and materials. 
4.3.4. IAT Emotional Adjective Norming 
Within each experiment, there were 36 IAT emotional adjective items; nine 
relating to the fear of being close (e.g., intimate, clingy), nine relating to the fear of 
being far (e.g., neglected, deserted), nine relating to the fear of being controlled (e.g., 
hampered, submissive), and nine relating to the fear of being controlling (e.g., forceful, 
assertive) (all IAT items can be found in Appendix E). Subliminal and supraliminal 
conditions contained an additional 12 items designed to elicit anxiety (three items 
147 
 
relating to the ‘close’ anxiety group, etc.) (the anxiety inducing items can be found in 
Appendix F).  
Ten participants that did not take part in the subliminal, supraliminal or control 
conditions were required to rate the extent to which each of the 48 items related to the 
fear of being close, far, controlled, and controlling on a Likert scale from 1(‘not at all 
related’) to 7 (‘very related’). These relatedness ratings were consequently grouped into 
anxiety consistent (e.g., ‘close’ anxiety items rated as relating to close, ‘far’ anxiety 
items rated as relating to far, etc.) and anxiety inconsistent (e.g., ‘far’, ‘controlled’ and 
‘controlling’ anxiety items rated as relating to close, etc.) ratings. Paired sample t-tests 
comparing close, far, controlled and controlling anxiety consistent and inconsistent 
ratings were significant (all ps < .001), indicating that anxiety items were more strongly 
related to their consistent anxiety than they were to inconsistent anxieties (means and t 
values can be found in Appendix G). 
As well as rating relatedness, the same ten participants were asked to rate the 
48 items on the extent to which each word positively or negatively related to being 
close, far, controlled and controlling on a Likert scale from 1 (very positive) to 7 (very 
negative). As with the relatedness scores, the emotional valence ratings were grouped 
into anxiety consistent and inconsistent. The valence ratings confirmed that, as 
expected, participants rated anxiety consistent items as negative. Furthermore, paired 
sample t-tests comparing close, far, controlled and controlling anxiety consistent and 
inconsistent valence ratings were significant (all ps < .001), indicating that anxiety 
consistent items were more strongly rated as negative when compared to anxiety 
inconsistent items (means and t values can be found in Appendix G). 
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4.3.5. Experimental Conditions 
4.3.5.1. Subliminal Condition  
The subliminal experiment consisted of eight sections: a stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) setting phase to achieve individual thresholds for subliminal 
presentation, an objective threshold test, an anxiety priming phase, passage reading, an 
IAT task, a measure of current anxiety, an adult attachment measure (the ECR Scale), 
and an anxiety eliminating task.  
4.3.5.1.1. SOA Setting: For the SOA setting, participants were presented with a masked 
word and required to indicate which of two subsequent words had been presented (word 
pairs used in the SOA setting were either illuminate and highlight, or decorated and 
patterned, see figure 12 for an example of the contrast between prime and background). 
The contrast between prime and background was measured in terms of luminance using 
a Cambridge Research Systems ColorCal colorimeter defined in terms of CIE 1931 
coordinates. The luminance of the grey text in SOA setting and subliminal trials was Y 
= 57.89 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.292, y = 0.265) against a grey background luminance of Y = 61.04 
cd/m
2
 (x = 0.293, y = 0.268). From a viewing distance of 60 cm, the dimensions of the 
rectangular box subtended 2.39° of visual angle (height), and 11.31° of visual angle 
(width). The primes used in the SOA setting stage ranged from 1.43° of visual angle 
(height), and a range of 4.67-5.33° of visual angle (width). Each trial began with a 
fixation cross at the centre of the rectangular box, presented on the screen for 350 ms. 
Immediately after the fixation followed the prime, which consisted of one word (e.g., 
illuminate or highlight). On each trial, the prime was presented three times, with a 150 
ms pause between each presentation. Participants were then presented with the word 
pair (e.g. both illuminate and highlight) and were required to indicate which of the two 
words had just been presented.  
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Figure 12: Example of a masked prime used in the SOA setting phase, 
contains the word ‘illuminate’ 
Once the participant had made their word choice, they were required to rate, on 
a scale of 50-100%, how confident they were that they had chosen the correct word. The 
participants were instructed that they could choose any value between 50-100%, with 
100% indicating that they absolutely knew which word to choose, and 50% indicating 
that they were purely guessing. During this part of the experiment, stimulus duration 
was reduced by 16 ms (one screen refresh for each of the three presentations) after each 
trial, from a starting point of approximately 500 ms. Once a participant had rated 
confidence to be at 50%, the SOA remained at that same presentation duration for 
subsequent presentations. Once a participant had rated confidence to be at 50% (chance 
performance) for five successive trials, the SOA phase of the experiment concluded. If 
during any of these five trials participants rated confidence to be above 50%, SOA was 
again reduced until five successive trials at 50% confidence had been completed. If a 
participant were to reach minimum stimulus presentation duration (16 ms) whilst still 
rating confidence to be above 50%, they would be excused from the experiment and 
their data removed from further analysis. The two pairs of words used in the SOA 
setting phase were of both similar length and semantic meaning. 
4.3.5.1.2. Objective Threshold Test: An objective threshold test aimed to measure 
whether participants were performing above the objective threshold whilst still below 
the subjective threshold (for a review see Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986). Using the 
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same two word pairs used in the SOA setting phase to create an additional 24 trials, the 
trial format mirrored that of the SOA task. Prime presentation duration was determined 
by the point at which participants rated confidence to be at 50% for five successive 
trials. Confidence ratings were taken after each trial. 
4.3.5.1.3. Anxiety Priming Phase: Participants were required to complete an 
animal/shape categorisation task to mask the real purpose of this phase, which was to 
subliminally prime the participant with a specific relationship anxiety. At the top left 
hand corner of the screen appeared the word ‘Animal’, and at the top right hand corner 
of the screen appeared the word ‘Shape’. Participants then viewed a centrally presented 
word (either an animal or shape) and were required to press the ‘1’ key on the keyboard 
if the word was an animal and ‘0’ if the word was a shape. A total of five animal words 
(monkey, horse, antelope, koala, and elephant) and five shape words (rhombus, square, 
triangle, hexagon, and rectangle) were used, with each word appearing three times to 
create a total of 30 trials. Once the participant had categorised the word as either shape 
or animal, a new word would appear. Before each animal or shape word was presented, 
a contrast masked prime was flashed up three times in succession at a duration 
determined by the point at which participants rated confidence to be at 50% for five 
successive trials during the SOA setting phase. The contrast masked primes each 
contained one of three words designed to induce anxiety relating to either the fear of 
being close (e.g., suffocated), the fear of being far (e.g., abandoned), the fear of being 
controlled (e.g., weak) or the fear of being controlling (e.g., dominating). From a 
viewing distance of 60 cm, the primes used in the priming task ranged from 1.43° of 
visual angle (height), and a range of 3.91-4.86° of visual angle (width). Each of the 
three words was presented ten times in random order so that each participant viewed a 
subliminal prime 30 times.    
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4.3.5.1.4. Passage Reading: Once the anxiety priming phase had concluded, 
participants were required to read a passage about two fictitious characters; ‘Joanna’ 
and ‘David’. The passage described a situation in which Joanna was experiencing 
relationship problems relating to the anxiety induced (i.e., the passage the participant 
read depended upon whether they were in the close, far, controlled or controlling 
anxiety groups; all four passages can be found in Appendix H). For example, 
participants in the fear of being close anxiety group read the following passage: 
 
“Joanna has been in a romantic relationship with David for just 
over six months. They live in different towns and Joanna is happy 
with the way the relationship works. She sees David at weekends, and 
the rest of the time she can see her friends or do whatever she likes. 
Recently, David has been calling on the phone more often, wanting to 
spend more time together, and has begun to suggest that they move in 
together. The idea of living together and spending so much time with 
each other scares Joanna. She likes the current situation; that she can 
see David when she wants but gets to keep her own identity and have 
her own space, she doesn’t want to have to give up her independence 
and answer to someone else. Joanna is going to have to come up with 
a way of keeping David at arm’s length or she is going to have to 
finish the relationship.” 
 
4.3.5.1.5. IAT Task: Once the participant had read the passage, they were told that they 
would see a series of words appear on the screen and that their task was to decide 
whether these words would make Joanna fearful or not (e.g., in the fear of being close 
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anxiety group, Joanna would be fearful of being confined and intimate but not fearful of 
being apart or single, whereas the opposite would be true for the fear of being far 
anxiety group). There were 240 trials, divided into four blocks of 60 trials. Within each 
block, there were nine randomly placed items relating to the fear of being close, nine 
relating to far, nine relating to controlled, and nine relating to controlling. In addition to 
these 36 items, there were 24 randomly placed trial items relating to the self; eight 
instances of ‘I’, eight instances of ‘me’, and eight instances of ‘myself, creating a total of 
60 trials within each block. The items the participants were required to classify were the 
same in close, far, controlled and controlling conditions. Emphasis was placed on speed 
as opposed to accuracy. 
Block 1: In block 1, ‘Fears’ appeared at the top left of the screen and ‘Doesn’t fear’ 
appeared at the top right. In the centre of the screen appeared the words ‘Afraid of 
being...’ followed by one of the 60 instances of experimental items. Participants were 
required to press ‘1’ if the item represented something that Joanna would be fearful of, 
and ‘0’ if it represented something she would not be fearful of. Participants were told 
that when an item relating to the self appeared, they were to press the ‘1’ key (i.e., 
‘fears’) as quickly as possible. 
Block 2: In block 2, ‘Fears’ again appeared at the top left of the screen and ‘Doesn’t 
fear’ on the right. When an item relating to the self appeared, participants were required 
to press the ‘0’ key (i.e., ‘doesn’t fear’) as quickly as possible. 
Block 3: In block 3, ‘Doesn’t fear’ then appeared at the top left of the screen and 
‘Fears’ appeared at the top right. Participants were required to press ‘1’ if the item did 
not represent something that Joanna would be fearful of and ‘0’ if it did represent 
something she would be fearful of. When an item relating to the self appeared, 
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participants were required to press the ‘1’ key (i.e., ‘doesn’t fear’) as quickly as 
possible. 
Block 4: In block 4, ‘Doesn’t fear’ again appeared at the top left of the screen and 
‘Fears’ on the right. When an item relating to the self appeared, participants were 
required to press the ‘0’ key (i.e., ‘fears’) as quickly as possible. 
4.3.5.1.6. Current Anxiety Measure: Following the IAT task, participants were given 16 
statements that aimed to measure current anxiety levels, four statements related to the 
fear of being close (e.g., I am afraid of getting close to my partner) (α = .13), four 
related to the fear of being far (e.g., I enjoy having a separate identity from my partner) 
(α = .52), four related to the fear of being controlled (e.g., I am afraid of being owned by 
my partner) (α = .42), and four related to the fear of being controlling (e.g., I am afraid 
that my partner is weak and can’t stand up to me) (α = .27) (The full set of questions to 
measure current levels of anxiety can be found in Appendix I). Participants were 
required to rate the degree to which they agreed with the statements on a 7 point Likert 
scale, with 1 indicating that they completely disagreed with the statement, and 7 
indicating that they completely agreed with the statement. Therefore, high scores would 
indicate higher levels of subjective anxiety. For each of the four anxiety groups, two of 
the statements were reverse phrased. 
4.3.5.1.7. Adult Attachment Measure (the ECR Scale): Participants were given 36 
statements relating to adult attachment, 18 of which measured anxious attachment (e.g., 
‘When I don't have close others around, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure’) (α = 
.90), and 18 of which measured avoidant attachment (e.g., ‘Just when someone starts 
getting close to me, I find myself pulling away’) (α = .87) (the ECR-Scale items can be 
found in Appendix J). Participants were again required to rate the degree to which they 
agreed with the statements on a scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).  
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4.3.5.1.8. Anxiety Eliminating Task: In an attempt to eliminate any primed anxiety, the 
same categorisation task used in the anxiety priming phase was used, with participants 
categorising words as animal or shape. During the anxiety eliminating phase, the 
contrast masked primes contained words designed to alleviate the anxiety induced. For 
example, if the participant had been primed with the fear of being close, three positive 
words relating to being close to a partner were used (e.g., liberated, carefree and 
independent) (anxiety eliminating words can be found in Appendix K). Each of the 
three words were presented ten times so that each participant viewed a subliminal prime 
30 times. The stimulus presentation duration replicated that used in the anxiety priming 
phase. 
4.3.5.2. Supraliminal Condition  
The supraliminal experiment consisted of six sections: An anxiety priming 
phase, passage reading, an IAT task, a measure of current anxiety, an adult attachment 
measure (the ECR Scale), and an anxiety eliminating task.  
4.3.5.2.1. Anxiety Priming Phase: The supraliminal anxiety phase used the same 
animal/shape categorisation task and materials used in the subliminal condition, 
participants were required to categorise the same 30 trials as either an animal or a shape. 
In addition, the anxiety inducing words for all four anxiety groups matched those used 
in the subliminal experiment. However, the luminance values for the grey text in the 
supraliminal condition was Y = 14.35 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.277, y = 0.216) against a grey 
background luminance of Y = 61.04 cd/m
2
 (x = 0.293, y = 0.268) (see figure 13 for an 
example). Each of the three prime presentation durations were held at 150 ms.  
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Figure 13: Example of a prime to induce anxiety in supraliminal conditions; 
‘Confined’ aimed to induce the fear of being close to partner. 
4.3.5.2.2. Passage Reading, IAT Task, Current Anxiety Measure & Adult Attachment 
Measure (the ECR Scale): The passages for close, far, controlled and controlling 
experiments replicated those used in subliminal conditions. Similarly, the IAT task, the 
measure of current anxiety and the adult attachment measure (ECR) replicated the same 
format and materials as that used in the subliminal condition. 
4.3.5.2.3. Anxiety Eliminating Task: Using the same prime/background luminance 
levels and presentation durations described in the current categorisation task, the 
supraliminal anxiety eliminating task replicated that used in the subliminal condition. 
4.3.5.3. Control Condition 
The control experiment consisted of five sections: A categorisation task, 
passage reading, an IAT task, a measure of current anxiety, and an adult attachment 
measure (ECR Scale). 
4.3.5.3.1. Categorisation Task: The categorisation task used in the control condition 
replicated the anxiety priming phase used in the subliminal and supraliminal conditions, 
with participants categorising the same set of 30 words as either animal or shape. 
However, before each word appeared, participants were exposed to three presentations 
of a blank grey rectangular box of the same background luminance described in 
subliminal and supraliminal conditions. Each of the three presentation durations of the 
blank mask were presented for 150 ms. 
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4.3.5.3.2. Passage Reading, IAT Task, Current Anxiety Measure & Adult Attachment 
Measure (ECR Scale): The passage the participants read for close, far, controlled and 
controlling experiments replicated those used in subliminal and supraliminal conditions. 
Furthermore, the IAT task, the measure of current anxiety and the adult attachment 
measure (ECR) replicated the same format and materials as that used in the subliminal 
and supraliminal conditions.  
4.3.6. Procedure: 
Participants were randomly assigned to either subliminal, supraliminal, or 
control conditions and anxiety groups. All participants were tested individually in a 
private room in which they sat before a laptop such that their eyes were approximately 
60 cm from the monitor screen. All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision, and English was the first language for all participants. Once the participant had 
followed the instructions presented on the screen and had completed all sections of the 
experiment, they were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. Each 
participant received an information sheet providing some background information on 
the study, which condition and anxiety group they took part in, and experimenter 
contact details. 
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4.4. Results 
4.4.1. SOA setting phase for subliminal condition: 
For those in the subliminal condition, subjective threshold durations ranged 
from an SOA of 32 ms to 528 ms, with an average experimental subliminal presentation 
duration  of 240 ms (SD = 219.51). 
4.4.2. Objective threshold test for subliminal condition:   
The objective identification threshold test aimed to assess whether participant 
performance was above the objective threshold whilst remaining below the subjective 
(cf. Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986). Correct responses ranged between 29% and 
67%, with a mean of 50% correct (SE = 1). For all statistical tests, we used an alpha 
level of .05 to determine significance. Using chance level as the test value (50%), a one-
sample t-test confirmed that participants did not perform significantly above chance 
level performance (t(39) = 0.14, p = .89, d = 0.04). Thus it may be that not only was the 
subjective threshold reached, but unfortunately also the objective threshold. To 
determine whether there was evidence for the objective threshold (i.e., in this case, that 
accuracy was at chance performance), we used a Bayes Factor. Whilst values over 3 are 
seen as substantial evidence in support of the experimental hypothesis (that objective 
performance was above chance), values under 1/3 are seen as substantial evidence in 
support of the null hypothesis (i.e., in this case, that the objective threshold was 
reached) (Dienes, 2011). A Bayes Factor of 1 indicates the evidence is exactly neutral 
between the two theories, values between 1/3 and 3 indicate data insensitivity and no 
conclusions should be drawn. Armstrong and Dienes (2013; experiment 5) used a 
procedure under the same presentation conditions that involved objective classification 
and produced a reliable effect 3% above baseline performance. Thus, to represent the 
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plausibility of different possible population effects, we used a half-normal with a 
standard deviation of 3% (following the recommendation of Dienes, 2011, Appendix). 
A sample mean of .21% above baseline (SE = 1.4), led to a Bayes Factor of B = 0.47, 
indicating that the data were insensitive and did not provide strong support for the null 
hypothesis that performance was at chance. It remains open as to whether or not the 
objective threshold was reached. 
4.4.3. IAT anxiety and non-anxiety related item reaction times:  
A 2 (congruence) × 3 (condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare 
the overall effect of condition on the reaction time (RT) to classifying anxiety congruent 
and incongruent items. The anxiety congruence of an item was determined by anxiety 
group. For example, the congruent items in the close groups related to the anxiety close 
whilst the incongruent items related to the anxieties far, controlled and controlling, and 
so on. Table 1 provides the mean RTs for anxiety congruent and incongruent items 
across all conditions. There were significant main effects of congruence on RTs to 
classifying IAT items (F(1, 117) = 18.38, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .136), and of condition (F(2, 
117) = 8.85, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .131). Importantly, these effects were moderated by a 
significant interaction effect between congruence and condition (F(2, 117) = 5.28, p = 
.006, ηp
2
 = .083).  
This 2-df interaction was broken into two 1-df interactions, one to test for 
supraliminal and the other for subliminal priming. When comparing supraliminal and 
control conditions, there was a significant interaction between congruence and condition 
(F(1, 78) = 7.16, p = .01, ηp
2
 = .084)
10
. However, when the main interaction effect was 
                                                 
10
 When this interaction was explored separately for each anxiety group, the interaction effect was only 
significant for participants in the controlled anxiety group (F(1, 18) = 14.13, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .440), and not 
for close (F(1, 18) = .03, p = .87, ηp
2
 = .002), far (F(1, 18) = 3.31, p = .09, ηp
2
 = .155) or controlling (F(1, 
18) = .33, p = .57, ηp
2
 = .018) anxiety groups. The latter non-significant results were interpreted with a 
Bayes Factor, calculated for each anxiety group using a half-normal with a standard deviation equal to the 
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explored further using paired sample t-tests, there was a significant difference between 
RTs to classifying congruent and incongruent items, with participants being faster to 
classify anxiety congruent items in supraliminal conditions (t(39) = -5.38, p < .001, d = 
1.72), but not for the control conditions (t(39) = -1.1, p = .28, d = 0.35). When 
comparing subliminal and control conditions, there was a non-significant interaction 
between congruence and condition (F(1, 78) = .01, p = .93, ηp
2
 = .000).  
Was there any subliminal priming? The subliminal priming effect (difference 
in congruency effect between primed and control groups) was 33 ms (SE = 53 ms). The 
sort of priming effect that could be expected is provided by the supraliminal priming 
effect (87 ms).  A Bayes factor with the hypothesis of subliminal priming modelled as a 
half-normal with an SD of 87 ms was 0.84, indicating that the data were insensitive and 
so we were unable to draw any conclusions as to whether or not there was subliminal 
priming.  
 
Table 1: Reaction time means with standard error for classifying both anxiety 
congruent and incongruent items across subliminal, supraliminal and control conditions. 
 
Classification Condition Mean RT (ms) SE 
Anxiety Congruent 
 
 
 
 
Anxiety Incongruent 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
1716 
1479 
1790 
1877 
 
1829 
1549 
2025 
1933 
51 
65 
81 
103 
 
49 
73 
87 
79 
 
                                                                                                                                               
interaction effect evidenced in the controlled anxiety group (423 ms). For close (M = 18 ms, SE = 103 
ms) B = 0.27; for  far (M = 210 ms, SE =116 ms) B = 2.33; and for controlling (M = 101 ms, SE = 176 
ms) B = 0.62, Bayes factors indicated that the data were insensitive for these specific anxieties taken 
separately. However, when sensitivity is increased by averaging over anxieties, the overall interaction 
effect indicates an overall match between priming and the specific anxiety elicited. 
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4.4.4. IAT anxiety and non-anxiety related item errors: 
A 2 (congruence) × 3 (condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare 
the overall effect of condition on the error rates (ER) in classifying anxiety congruent 
and incongruent items. All subliminal, supraliminal, and control experiments consisted 
of 240 trials; 96 of these trials were self-related items, 36 of these trials were anxiety 
congruent items, and 108 trials were anxiety incongruent items. Therefore, ERs were 
converted to percentages to make them directly comparable. Table 2 provides the mean 
ERs for classifying anxiety congruent and incongruent items for supraliminal, 
subliminal and control conditions. There was a significant main effect of congruence on 
ER in classifying IAT items (F(1, 117) = 18.37, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .136). That is, across all 
conditions, participants made significantly more errors when classifying anxiety 
incongruent items (M = 29%, SE = 1) when compared to anxiety congruent items (M = 
20%, SE = 2). Whilst there was a significant main effect of condition on classification 
ERs (F(2, 117) = 3.47, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .056), post hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni 
adjustment indicated that ER differences between supraliminal, subliminal, and control 
conditions were non-significant (ps > .05). The interaction between congruence and 
condition was non-significant (F(2, 117) = 1.31, p = .27, ηp
2
 = .022).  
As before, supraliminal and subliminal priming effects were analysed 
separately. When comparing supraliminal and control conditions, there was a significant 
main effect of condition (F(1, 78) = 5.26, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .063), with participants making 
approximately 8% (SE = 4) fewer errors in supraliminal conditions (M = 22%, SE = 3) 
when compared to the control condition. There was a non-significant interaction 
between congruence and condition (F(1, 78) = 3.40, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .042). Looking at 
subliminal and control conditions, there was a significant main effect of condition (F(1, 
78) = 4.50, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .055), with participants making approximately 8% (SE = 4) 
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fewer errors in subliminal conditions (M = 22%, SE = 3) when compared to the control 
(M = 29%, SE = 3) condition. Thus, there is evidence for some subliminal processing, 
but not for subliminal processing of the precise anxiety content: There was a non-
significant interaction between congruence and condition (F(1, 78) = .70, p = .41, ηp
2
 = 
.009).  
 
Table 2: Mean percentage of errors with standard error made in classifying anxiety 
congruent and anxiety incongruent items across subliminal, supraliminal, and control 
conditions. 
 
 Classification Condition Mean ER (%) SE 
Anxiety Congruent 
 
 
 
 
Anxiety Incongruent 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
20 
17 
15 
27 
 
29 
26 
28 
32 
1 
2 
2 
3 
 
2 
4 
3 
3 
 
4.4.5.  IAT self-related items as fearful and non-fearful reaction times:  
A 2 (fear) × 3 (condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare the 
overall effect of condition on the RTs of classifying self-related items as fearful and 
non-fearful. Table 3 provides the mean RTs for classifying self-related items as fearful 
and non-fearful for supraliminal, subliminal and control conditions. There was a 
significant main effect of fear on RTs to classifying self-related items (F(1, 117) = 5.73, 
p = .02, ηp
2
 = .047), with participants across all conditions being significantly quicker to 
categorise self-related items as non-fearful (M = 902 ms, SE = 25) when compared to 
fearful (M = 947 ms, SE = 32, p = .02). However, there was a non-significant main 
effect of condition on RTs to classifying self-related items (F(2, 117) = .19, p = .83, ηp
2
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= .003), and a non-significant interaction between fear and condition (F(2,  117) = 2.09, 
p = .13, ηp
2
 = .034).  
Despite the non-significant omnibus interaction, we tested specifically for 
supraliminal priming and for subliminal priming as in the last section. When comparing 
supraliminal and control conditions, there was a significant interaction between fear and 
condition (F(1, 78) = 3.96, p = .05, ηp
2
 = .048). However, when the main interaction 
effect was explored further using paired sample t-tests, there was a significant 
difference in RTs to classifying self-related items as fearful and non-fearful in that 
participants were significantly faster to classify self-related items as non-fearful in the 
control condition (t(39) = 2.3, p = .03, d = 0.74). Whilst participants in the supraliminal 
condition were faster to categorise self-related items as fearful, this RT difference was 
not significant (t(39) = -.34, p = .73, d = 0.11). However, when comparing subliminal 
and control conditions, there was a non-significant interaction between fear and 
condition (F(1, 78) = .25, p = .62, ηp
2
 = .003).   
A Bayes Factor was conducted to determine whether there was evidence of a 
subliminal priming effect. The subliminal priming effect (difference in categorising 
self-related items as fearful and non-fearful effect between primed and control groups) 
was 26 ms (SE = 53 ms). Again, the sort of priming effect that could be expected is 
provided by the supraliminal priming effect (66 ms).  A Bayes factor with the 
hypothesis of subliminal priming modelled as a half-normal with an SD of 66 ms was 
0.88, indicating that the data were insensitive and so we were unable to draw any 
conclusions as to whether or not there was subliminal priming. 
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Table 3: Reaction time means and standard error for classifying self-related items as 
fearful and non-fearful across subliminal, supraliminal, and control conditions 
 
Classification Condition Mean RT (ms) SE 
Self as Fearful 
 
 
 
 
Self as Non-Fearful 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
947 
984 
926 
932 
 
902 
899 
933 
873 
32 
79 
38 
37 
 
25 
52 
40 
35 
 
4.4.6. IAT self-related items as fearful and non-fearful errors:  
A 2 (fear) × 3 (condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare the 
overall effect of condition on the ERs in classifying self-related items as fearful and 
non-fearful. Supraliminal, subliminal, and control experiments each contained 96 trials 
containing self-related items. Of these 96 items, participants were required to classify 48 
of these items as fearful, and 48 as non-fearful. Again, ERs were converted to 
percentages and Table 4 provides the mean ERs for classifying self-related items as 
fearful and non-fearful for supraliminal, subliminal and control conditions. There was a 
non-significant main effect of fear (F(1, 117) = .49, p = .49, ηp
2
 = .004) or condition 
(F(2, 117) = 1.04, p = .36, ηp
2
 = .017) on the ERs for classifying self-related items. 
However, there was a significant interaction between fear and condition (F(2, 117) = 
3.37, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .054).  
Two 1-df interactions explored this effect further. When comparing 
supraliminal and control conditions, there were non-significant main effects of fear 
(F(1, 78) = 3.33, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .041) and condition (F(1, 78) = .59, p = .45, ηp
2
 = .007), 
and a non-significant interaction between fear and condition (F(1, 78) = 3.19, p = .08, 
ηp
2
 = .039). When comparing subliminal and control conditions, there were non-
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significant main effects of fear (F(1, 78) = .60, p = .44, ηp
2
 = .008) and condition (F(1, 
78) = .46, p = .50, ηp
2
 = .006) on classifying self-related items, and a non-significant 
interaction between fear and condition (F(1, 78) = .65, p = .42, ηp
2
 = .008). However, as 
demonstrated in Table 4, participants made significantly more mistakes in classifying 
self-related items as fearful when they were meant to classify as non-fearful in 
supraliminal conditions (M = 10%, SE = 3, t(39) = -3.0, p = .01, d = 0.96), but not for 
subliminal (M = 5%, SE = 5, t(39) = 1.1, p = .28, d = 0.35) or control (M = 0%, SE = 4, 
t(39) = -.02, p = .98, d = 0.01) conditions.  
A Bayes Factor was again conducted to determine whether there was evidence 
of a subliminal priming effect. The subliminal priming effect (difference in fearful and 
non-fearful ERs between primed and control groups) was 5% (SE = 6). Again, the sort 
of priming effect that could be expected is provided by the supraliminal priming effect 
(10%).  A Bayes factor with the hypothesis of subliminal priming modelled as a half-
normal with an SD of 10% was 1.01, indicating that the data were insensitive and so we 
were unable to draw any conclusions as to whether or not there was subliminal priming. 
  
Table 4: Mean percentage of errors with standard error made in classifying self-related 
items as fearful or non-fearful across subliminal, supraliminal, and control conditions. 
 
Classification Condition Mean ER (%) SE 
Self as Fearful 
 
 
 
 
Self as Non-Fearful 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
11 
16 
4 
12 
 
12 
11 
14 
12 
 
2 
4 
1 
4 
 
2 
3 
3 
3 
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4.4.7. Current anxiety measure:  
Current relationship anxiety levels for the fear of being close, far, controlled 
and controlling were measured on a 7 point Likert scale, with higher values indicating 
higher levels of anxiety. Relationship anxiety ratings were divided into those consistent 
with the anxiety manipulated in the group (and also measured by IAT in that group) or 
inconsistent. For example, in the Far groups, the rating of far anxiety was consistent, 
and all other anxieties (close, controlled, controlling) inconsistent. Figure 14 shows the 
summary data for all explicit ratings in each cell. A 2 (consistency: consistent, 
inconsistent) × 3 (condition: supraliminal vs. subliminal vs. control) mixed ANOVA 
indicated a non-significant main effect of consistency (F(1, 117) = .06, p = .81, ηp
2
 = 
.001) (ratings of consistent (M = 3.40, SE = .09) and inconsistent (M = 3.38, SE = .06) 
anxiety), and of condition (F(2, 117) = .09, p = .92, ηp
2
 = .002). In addition, there was a 
non-significant interaction between consistency and condition (F(2, 117) = 1.71, p = 
.19, ηp
2
 = .028). Again, the individual effects of supraliminal and subliminal priming 
were analysed individually. For supraliminal priming, there was a non-significant 
interaction between consistency and condition (F(1, 78) = 1.27, p = .26, ηp
2
 = .016) on 
supraliminal consistent (M = 3.39, SE = .17) and inconsistent (M = 3.33, SE = .12), 
control consistent (M = 3.26, SE = .17), and inconsistent (M = 3.50, SE = .12) anxiety 
ratings. Similarly, in terms of subliminal priming, there was a non-significant 
interaction between consistency and condition (F(1, 78) = 3.40, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .042) on 
subliminal consistent (M = 3.55, SE = .17) and inconsistent (M = 3.30, SE = .11), 
control consistent (M = 3.26, SE = .17), and inconsistent (M = 3.50, SE = .11) anxiety 
ratings. 
On the face of it there appears to have been implicit priming of anxiety on the 
IAT, but not on explicit anxiety ratings. But are the anxiety ratings just insensitive? It is 
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hard to directly compare the implicit and explicit priming effects because they are 
measured on different scales.  Nonetheless, the standardized effect sizes can be 
compared.  The F for the supraliminal priming effect for congruent versus incongruent 
RTs was F(1, 78) = 7.16, giving a standardized effect size r of sqrt(7.16/(7.16 + 78)) = 
0.29 (Fisher’s z also 0.29, SE = 0.11). The corresponding standardized effect for 
supraliminal priming for explicit anxiety ratings is sqrt(1.27/(1.27 + 78)) = .13 (Fisher’s 
z also 0.13, SE = 0.11).  These effects are not significantly different (z = 1.13), so we 
cannot claim that the implicit measure was more sensitive than the explicit.  Further, a 
Bayes Factor testing the hypothesis that there was explicit priming using a half-normal 
with an SD of 0.29 is 1.13, indicating no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there 
was or was not explicit priming. 
 
Figure 14: Mean close far, controlled and controlling current subjective anxiety ratings 
on a scale of 0-7 (7 indicating high anxiety) for supraliminal, subliminal and control 
conditions and close, far, controlled and controlling anxiety groups. 
 
167 
 
 
4.4.8. Adult Attachment levels and the ECR Scale: 
The ECR scale measured levels of adult attachment on a 7 point Likert scale, 
with higher values indicating higher levels of attachment. From this scale, an 
attachment anxiety and avoidant attachment score was computed for each participant. A 
4 (anxiety group; close, far, controlled, controlling) × 3 (condition; supraliminal, 
subliminal, control) × 2 (attachment; attachment anxiety, avoidant attachment) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted to compare whether the fear of being close, the fear of being 
far, the fear of being controlled, or the fear of being controlling anxiety groups and 
subliminal, supraliminal, or control conditions had an effect on attachment anxiety and 
avoidant attachment.  Table 5 provides the mean attachment scores across anxiety group 
and condition. There was a significant main effect of attachment (F(1, 108) = 41.18, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .276) in that participants scored significantly higher in anxious attachment 
(M = 4.1, SE = .1) than they did for avoidant attachment (M = 3.3, SE = .1). There were 
no other significant effects, consistent with the random assignment of participants to 
groups.  
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Table 5: Mean and standard error for avoidant attachment and attachment anxiety 
scores across anxiety group and condition. 
 
Anxiety  
Group 
Condition Anxious 
Mean  
SE Avoidant 
Mean 
SE 
Close 
 
 
 
 
Far 
 
 
 
 
Controlled 
 
 
 
 
Controlling 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
 
 
Subliminal 
Supraliminal 
Control 
3.8 
3.7 
3.6 
4.1 
 
4.3 
4.2 
4.5 
4.4 
 
4.4 
4.0 
4.6 
4.5 
 
4.0 
3.9 
3.7 
4.4 
.2 
.4 
.2 
.4 
 
.2 
.3 
.3 
.3 
 
.2 
.3 
.2 
.4 
 
.2 
.3 
.4 
.4 
3.3 
3.5 
3.5 
2.9 
 
3.1 
2.9 
3.2 
3.3 
 
3.6 
3.8 
3.6 
3.3 
 
3.3 
3.3 
3.4 
3.3 
.2 
.4 
.3 
.2 
 
.2 
.3 
.4 
.3 
 
.2 
.4 
.3 
.2 
 
.2 
.3 
.3 
.3 
 
A set of multiple regressions were conducted on the subliminal and control 
data to determine whether priming (primed versus control group), anxious attachment 
and avoidant attachment variables predicted the reaction time difference between 
responding to anxiety congruent and incongruent items. Regressions were conducted 
separately for close, far, controlled and controlling groups. The results indicated no 
significant overall regressions for the close (F(3, 19) = .51, p = .68, f
2
 = .10), far (F(3, 
19) = .48, p = .70, f
2
 = .10), controlled (F(3, 19) = 1.1, p = .38, f
2
 = .02) or controlling 
(F(3, 19) = .02, p = .99, f
2
 = .00) anxiety groups. The values of individual predictors are 
presented in Table 6. A further set of multiple regressions were conducted using the 
same predictor variables and included an interaction between priming and anxious 
attachment variable and an interaction between priming and avoidant attachment 
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variable. No interactions were significant; values of the new variables are presented in 
Table 6. 
  
Table 6: Standardized betas, their associated standard errors, and unstandardized betas 
for the close, far, controlled and controlling multiple regressions. 
 
Anxiety  
Group 
Predictors B SE B   ß 
Close 
 
 
 
 
 
Far 
 
 
 
 
 
Controlled 
 
 
 
 
 
Controlling 
Priming 
Anxious 
Avoidant 
Anxint 
Avoidint 
 
Priming 
Anxious 
Avoidant 
Anxint 
Avoidint 
 
Priming 
Anxious 
Avoidant 
Anxint 
Avoidint 
 
Priming 
Anxious 
Avoidant 
Anxint 
Avoidint 
 
57.90 
.16 
-51.14 
-140.29 
145.51 
 
-103.37 
77.80 
-2.89 
239.37 
-145.29 
 
-19.70 
31.76 
-22.46 
31.06 
88.75 
 
5.68 
13.02 
-9.51 
-89.94 
104.23 
88.84 
38.14 
48.80 
81.09 
134.55 
 
161.51 
82.38 
92.34 
178.12 
208.36 
 
58.10 
25.89 
33.18 
68.48 
86.06 
 
117.25 
62.60 
69.48 
135.61 
146.65 
.17 
.00 
-.30 
-.76 
.72 
 
-.16 
.23 
-.01 
.53 
-.25 
 
-.08 
.30 
-.17 
.18 
.57 
 
.01 
.06 
-.04 
-.24 
.26 
Note; All ps > .05. Close first regression R2 = .09, second regression R2 = .25; Far first R2 = .08, second R2 = .19; 
Controlled first R2 = .02 second R2 = .23; Controlling first R2 = .00, second R2 = .05. 
4.5. Discussion 
The current research aimed to extend upon previous work on the supraliminal 
and subliminal priming of anxiety by investigating whether it is possible to 
supraliminally and subliminally prime specific relationship anxieties relating to the fear 
of being close to partner, far, controlled and controlling with partner.  
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Past research has suggested that an increased level of anxiety leads to a 
preferential attention to cues relating to threat and threatening stimuli (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997; Neumann, Seibt, & Strack, 2001). Therefore, 
we predicted that participants that had been supraliminally and subliminally primed 
with anxiety would be quicker and make fewer errors in classifying items that were 
congruent with the anxiety induced when compared to a control group that had not been 
primed. In regards to reaction times, we found evidence only for a supraliminal priming 
effect. Although, participants in the subliminal condition were approximately 398 ms 
quicker to classify anxiety congruent items when compared to the control condition, and 
approximately 384 ms quicker to classify anxiety items that were incongruent with the 
anxiety induced when compared to the control. In regards to error rates, priming effects 
were evidenced for both supraliminal and subliminal priming conditions in that 
participants in the control condition made more errors in classifying congruent and 
incongruent items. However, whilst this result does indeed indicate a degree of anxiety 
inducement activated through subliminal priming, the anxiety induced need not 
necessarily have been a content-specific one. That is, this result may instead indicate the 
activation of a generalised relationship anxiety as opposed to, for example, the specific 
activation of the fear of being close to a partner. 
In relation to the classification of self-related items, it was proposed that the 
priming of relationship anxieties would lead to the anxiety activated and self concepts 
becoming more cognitively salient. It was further believed that this salience would in 
turn lead to a quicker reaction time when required to classify self-related items as 
fearful when compared to the occasions participants were required to classify self-
related items as non-fearful. However, contrary to this prediction, the results indicated 
that participants across all conditions were significantly slower to classify self-related 
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items as fearful when compared to classifying self items as non-fearful. We further 
predicted that participants in supraliminal and subliminal priming conditions would be 
more likely to make errors when required to classify self-related items as non-fearful 
when compared to the control condition. Again, we found evidence only for a 
supraliminal priming effect in that participants that had been supraliminally primed 
made more mistakes in classifying self-related items as fearful when they were meant to 
classify as non-fearful when compared to subliminal and control conditions. Whilst we 
propose that the self-related items would measure the extent to which the participant felt 
the induced anxiety, other possibilities remain open. For example, it could be argued 
that the self-related items would actually measure the extent to which the participant 
was afraid of themselves, or had affect-neutral beliefs concerning the relation between 
that anxiety and the self. 
Current research focusing on the supraliminal priming of anxiety has tended to 
concentrate on the inducement of anxiety on a global level (e.g., Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). That is, the anxiety induced is generalised 
as opposed to being directly related to a specific concept. However, very little research 
has attempted to investigate whether it is possible to consciously prime content-specific 
anxieties. Therefore, we attempted to extend research in this area by demonstrating the 
activation of four very specific anxieties relating to relationships. The supraliminal 
reaction time and error rate results for anxiety congruency and self-related items 
provides support for the possibility of priming more specific anxieties than previously 
demonstrated. 
Whilst the supraliminal priming effects are relatively clear, the current research 
has thus far demonstrated insensitive evidence regarding the subliminal priming of 
specific anxieties in the form of reaction times and error rates to classifying anxiety 
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congruent and incongruent items, and self-related items. Did the priming produce 
conscious or unconscious anxiety? The explicit anxiety ratings for the specific anxiety 
induced were compared with the ratings of the relationship anxieties that were 
inconsistent with the anxiety induced. Whilst the implicit results demonstrated a degree 
of successful supraliminal and subliminal priming of relationship anxiety, explicit 
ratings of current anxiety were insensitive in indicating a priming effect (despite 
running 120 participants). It would be interesting to collect more data to make this result 
sensitive. What could be concluded if we sensitively show no priming of explicit 
anxiety? 
Many researchers believe that emotion, of which anxiety is an example, is a 
necessarily conscious experience (e.g., Clore, 1994; Hatzimoysis, 2007; James, 1884); 
that an emotion without a degree of conscious awareness of how one feels does not 
exist. Scherer’s (2005) component processing definition of emotion consists of five 
elements that must be present for an emotion to qualify as an emotion; these 
components include a cognitive component, a neurophysiological component, a 
motivational component, a motor expression component, and a conscious subjective 
feeling component. Therefore, by Scherer’s definition, the current research has failed to 
elicit any demonstrative anxiety as evidenced by the lack of a subjective feeling 
component. In accordance with the emotion as a conscious experience point of view, 
there may be a number of reasons why subjective ratings of anxiety have failed to 
demonstrate an anxious priming effect. For example, the anxiety manipulation in this 
study was subtle; it may be that the manipulation was too subtle to have influenced 
conscious appraisals of emotion. It may be that using short sentences or emotive 
pictures that require a greater depth of cognitive processing may in turn have had more 
of an effect on conscious perceptions of anxiety. In addition, it may be that our measure 
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of subjective anxiety was not sensitive enough to have detected any differences between 
primed and no priming conditions. Furthermore, although the lack of pre-experimental 
anxiety ratings was a deliberate effort to avoid demand characteristics, it may have been 
interesting to have had these ratings in order to compare self-reported pre- and post-
experimental anxiety levels. 
However, whilst the small subliminal anxiety priming effects evidenced may 
be accurately reflected in the subjective anxiety ratings, the implicit anxiety measures 
have clearly demonstrated a supraliminal priming effect of anxiety and yet not on the 
subjective experience of anxiety. Therefore, the lack of a measurable difference in 
explicit anxiety between primed and control conditions may instead be indicative of 
unconscious emotion (e.g., Berridge & Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman & Berridge, 
2004). Proponents of the unconscious emotion perspective believe that not only can an 
individual be unconscious as to the underlying cause of a specific emotion, but that they 
can also be unconscious of their own emotional reaction. Winkielman and Berridge 
(2004) argue that evolutionary reasons may account for unconscious emotions in that 
the primary function of an emotion is to enable an individual to react accordingly to an 
external event. Therefore, to be conscious of that emotion is neither necessary nor 
functionally or cognitively efficient. An example of a study demonstrating the existence 
of emotion in the absence of conscious introspection is provided by Winkielman, 
Berridge, and Wilbarger (2005). In their study, the authors investigated the influence of 
subliminally primed happy or angry faces on mood and the pouring and consumption of 
a beverage. Despite there being a lack of difference in self-reported mood and thirst 
measures, participants that had been primed with happy faces both poured more and 
consumed more beverages than those primed with angry faces. Thus, although 
participants failed to report changes in conscious mood, the effects of subliminal 
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priming were nevertheless able to alter subsequent behaviours. Therefore, in relation to 
the current research, the lack of a statistical difference between subjective anxiety 
ratings for primed and non-primed conditions does not necessarily negate anxiety 
activation, as demonstrated by the supraliminal priming effects. Instead, the priming 
results evidenced in IAT classification are consistent with the existence of unconscious 
emotion (e.g., Bornemann, Winkielman, & van der Meer, 2012). 
The IAT has often been criticised as a poor measurement of the strength of 
implicit associations between concepts. However, many criticisms of the IAT appear to 
revolve around its use as a diagnostic tool. That is, the IAT is often used to confer 
personality characteristics, or to measure implicit biases that are subsequently used to 
demonstrate subtle discrimination or prejudice. Therefore, many researchers have 
questioned what it is the IAT is actually measuring. Fiedler, Messner, and Bluemke 
(2006) claim that the need to conform to social desirability leads individuals to fake 
their responses by adopting strategies that make themselves look good. However, in the 
current research, it is unlikely that participants felt the need to fake their responses. Our 
implicit measure was designed to measure the strength of associations between the 
anxiety activated and concepts relating to the anxiety induced, and also the association 
between the anxiety induced and concepts of the ‘self’, therefore lacking an element of 
social desirability. Furthermore, similarly using the IAT to measure implicit anxiety, 
Egloff and Schmukle (2002) found that giving participants a faking instruction led to 
very small and non-significant implicit effects whilst having a greater effect on explicit 
measures. The IAT has also been criticised for measuring salience as opposed to 
associations. Rothermund and Wentura (2004) claim that a faster response to pairs of 
concepts merely measures the similarity in salience between the two concepts rather 
than pairs of concepts having stronger associations with the individual. In the current 
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research, whether the IAT is measuring the strength of associations or salience, a faster 
response time to congruent items in priming conditions when compared to the control 
indicates a degree of anxiety activation, and semantic processing of the prime in 
subliminal conditions.  
In addition to looking at current levels of explicit relationship anxiety, we also 
measured adult attachment styles using the Experience in Close Relationships Scale 
(ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) to measure levels of anxious and avoidant 
attachment. In the same way that Barabi, Mikulincer, and Shaver (2006, as cited in 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010) demonstrated a differential subliminal priming effect 
between attachment styles, we investigated whether anxious and avoidant attachment 
variables would predict reaction time differences in responding to anxiety congruent 
and incongruent items. Avoidant attachment refers to individuals that prefer to distance 
themselves from close romantic relationships and view themselves as independent and 
individual, and so it seemed likely that this attachment style would have some relation 
with the primed fear of being close to a partner. Conversely, anxious attachment refers 
to individuals who seek closeness in a romantic relationship and tend to depend upon 
their partners’ for personal validation, and so it seemed likely that this would have some 
relation with the fear of being far from their partner. The results demonstrated that there 
was an overall effect of attachment in that scores on anxious attachment were 
significantly higher than for scores on avoidant attachment. However, we did not detect 
a moderating effect of attachment insecurity on relationship anxiety priming. 
There are some criticisms to this study. For example, we would have benefitted 
from tailoring the specific anxiety priming experiments to the fears of specific 
individuals. That is, it would have been beneficial to have pre-selected for participants 
who had specific relationship anxieties relating to the fear of being close and so on, and 
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also for extreme scores on the attachment questionnaire. This would have likely resulted 
in stronger subliminal priming effects than those evidenced here. In addition, whilst the 
current research utilised a method of multiple prime presentation, Wentura and Frings 
(2005) found maximum priming effects when a prime was presented 10 times in quick 
succession. Furthermore, Marcel (1983b) found an increasing priming effect with up to 
20 prime presentations. Therefore, whilst the current method of three prime 
presentations may have taken advantage of the increase in prime presentation duration 
without increasing prime awareness, this advantage could have been maximised with 
further repeated presentations (as found by Armstrong & Dienes, 2013, using a similar 
subliminal methodology as used here). 
In addition, for the subliminal condition, the objective threshold data indicated 
that whilst we were successful in priming below the subjective threshold of awareness, 
we were also at, or at least very near to, the objective threshold. Previous research has 
frequently demonstrated that being below the subjective threshold whilst also being 
above the objective threshold is vital in achieving maximum likelihood of 
demonstrating subliminal priming effects (for a review, see Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 
1986; Dienes, 2004, 2008; contrast Snodgrass, Bernat, and Shevrin, 2004). In relation to 
subjective thresholds, the current research was also hampered by the necessity of being 
presented on a 60 Hz laptop with a screen refresh rate of 16 ms, limiting presentation 
duration decrements during the SOA setting phase of the experiment to intervals of 16 
ms. Therefore, the likelihood of bypassing the necessary spot between subjective and 
objective thresholds was relatively high. Whilst the IAT measures have demonstrated 
small subliminal priming effects, future research would benefit from investigating 
subliminal anxiety activation using more subtle and sophisticated methods of subliminal 
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presentation, such as through the use of a tachistoscope or by using continuous flash 
suppression. 
4.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, we present a study that attempted to supraliminally and 
subliminally prime content-specific anxieties. Previous research demonstrating the 
priming of anxiety has predominantly focused on the activation of a generalised or 
global level of anxiety. Instead, we demonstrated the supraliminal priming of very 
specific relationship anxieties relating to the fear of being close, far, controlled or 
controlling with a partner. However, the evidence regarding whether or not there existed 
subliminal priming effects remains insensitive.     
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1. Theoretical Basis of Research 
The current research set out to investigate the power of subliminal priming and 
the extent of unconscious cognitive processing. The status of existing empirical research 
regarding subliminal perception remains varied and controversial: Whilst many 
researchers have demonstrated successful subliminal priming of some fairly complex 
unconscious analyses, including the comprehension of sentences (e.g., Palumbo & 
Gillman, 1984; Silverman et al., 1978; Sklar et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 1991) and 
arithmetic computations (e.g., García-Orza et al., 2009; Sklar et al., 2012; Sklar & 
Hassin, 2011), further research presents evidence demonstrating a far more limited and 
unsophisticated interpretation of unconscious cognition (e.g., Damian, 2001; 
Greenwald, 1992; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). However, the lack of empirical parity 
regarding what can and cannot be subliminally primed is in part due to individual 
interpretations as to what constitutes ‘unconscious’, and consequent measurements of 
subliminality.  
In relation to measuring thresholds of subliminal perception, objective methods 
assume that any trial accuracy beyond chance level performance is indicative of 
conscious knowledge (Seth et al., 2008). However, there are currently two broad 
approaches to explaining the conscious status of mental states, namely 
integration/global access theories and higher order theories (Dienes & Seth, 2010d), and 
neither would accept classification accuracy as indicative of the perception being 
conscious. Most global access theories claim that conscious seeing involves extensive 
integration of information in higher frontal areas, implying a flexible ability to use the 
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information for arbitrary purposes – and that would include reporting awareness of 
seeing, if probed. (Other integration theories, like Lamme’s, 2010, do not have this 
feature, but then Lamme’s theory has no special connection to any behavioural measure, 
subjective or objective, because it states the necessary and sufficient condition for 
mental state consciousness is recurrent feedback at a local neural level, whatever the 
behavioural consequences.)  The other approach to consciousness, the higher order one, 
makes awareness of seeing definitional of the seeing being conscious. That is, the two 
main approaches to consciousness both motivate subjective measures: On both 
accounts, if seeing is conscious, a relevant higher order thought (HOT) should be 
elicited when probed. For integration theories, the HOT is contingent yet still diagnostic 
of the mental state being conscious; for HOT theories the presence of the HOT, at least 
when probed, constitutes the mental state being conscious. 
The current research adopted subjective methods as a measure of individual 
subliminality thresholds. With this in mind, the current series of three articles attempted 
to address a number of issues identified in the literature to demonstrate an intelligent 
interpretation of unconscious cognition. The next section will briefly summarise the 
objectives and main findings of each study before moving on to look at the particular 
research questions the studies have addressed, as well as providing a review of the 
limitations and recommendations for further research. 
5.2. Objectives and Empirical Findings 
5.2.1. Article I - Subliminal Understanding of Negation: Unconscious Control by 
Subliminal Processing of Word Pairs 
In Article I, a series of five experiments aimed to determine whether 
participants that had been primed with a subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick 
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an accompanying noun (e.g., ‘pick yard’ and ‘not yard’) would identify the correct word 
when presented with a choice of two nouns (e.g., ‘1. yard, 2. baby’). Participants first 
completed a set of conscious trials, which were then followed by a subjective threshold 
setting phase and a set of subliminal trials. In each of the five experiments, it was 
predicted that participants would identify the correct noun beyond chance level 
expectations for both subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions. It was further predicted 
that a response time difference between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials would reflect the relative 
differences in cognitive task difficulty for both conscious and subliminal trials. That is, 
it was predicted that participants would be faster to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials 
when compared to ‘not’ trials under both conscious and subliminal conditions.  
Experiment 1 aimed to maximise the likelihood of priming by taking advantage 
of research demonstrating the superior subliminal priming effects of items that have 
been previously rehearsed as conscious items by using the same prime-target noun pairs 
in conscious and subliminal trials. Subliminal stimuli were masked using backward 
masks in the form of a series of ampersands. The results revealed a significant 
subliminal priming effect in that participants identified the correct noun beyond chance 
performance for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. In addition, when compared to ‘not’ trials, 
participants were significantly faster to identify the noun in both conscious and 
subliminal ‘pick’ trials. 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 in terms of prime masking and 
procedure, but aimed to avoid the assumption that the results could be attributable to the 
retrieval of S-R links, as opposed to successful priming, by using separate noun pairs in 
conscious and subliminal conditions. As evidenced in Experiment 1, the results 
demonstrated a significant subliminal priming effect in that participants identified the 
correct noun beyond chance performance for both ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. Whilst 
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participants were again faster to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials when compared to 
‘not’ for both conscious and subliminal conditions, this response time difference was 
only significant for the conscious condition. 
Experiment 3 attempted to avoid the assumption that the positive subliminal 
priming effects evidenced in Experiments 1 and 2 could be attributable to conscious 
awareness by taking subjective confidence ratings after each experimental subliminal 
trial. In Experiment 3, masking and materials replicated those used in Experiment 2, 
however only trials in which participants rated confidence to be at 50% (i.e., guessing) 
were included in the analysis. Whilst the results indicated that participants did not 
perform significantly above chance expectations for subliminal ‘not’ trials, there was a 
significant difference between the number of occasions a participant simply chose the 
primed noun between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials.  That is, only if pick and not instructions 
were differentially and appropriately processed would there be a difference between 
‘pick’ and ‘not’ trial accuracy. As evidenced in Experiment 2, although participants 
were faster to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials when compared to ‘not’ for conscious 
and subliminal trials, this response time difference was only significant for the 
conscious condition.  
Experiment 4 attempted to demonstrate successful priming of negation by 
employing a more sensitive method of delivering subliminal stimuli in the form of a 
grey scale contrast method of masking. Materials and procedure replicated those used in 
Experiment 3, with confidence ratings again taken after each subliminal trial. The 
results indicated that participants did not perform significantly above chance 
expectations for either subliminal ‘pick’ or ‘not’ trials. However, as evidenced in 
Experiment 3, there was a significant difference between the number of occasions 
participants chose the primed noun between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials, again demonstrating 
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appropriate processing of the subliminal prime instruction. As similarly evidenced in 
Experiments 2 and 3, participants were faster to identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials when 
compared to ‘not’ for both conscious and subliminal conditions, with this response time 
difference being significant only for the conscious condition.  
Experiment 5 attempted to improve upon the priming results evidenced in 
Experiment 4 by adopting a repeated presentation method of subliminal priming. 
Therefore, materials and procedure replicated that of Experiment 4: However, rather 
than one presentation of the conscious and subliminal prime, each trial consisted of 
three presentations, with each presentation lasting for the same duration. The results 
indicated that participants performed significantly above chance performance for both 
subliminal ‘pick’ and ‘not’ trials. In addition, participants were significantly faster to 
identify the noun in ‘pick’ trials when compared to ‘not’ for both conscious and 
subliminal conditions.   
Therefore, Article I demonstrated unconscious processing of the logical 
function of negation in two-word primes in the form of performance accuracy and 
reaction times. Furthermore, this subliminal priming effect was evidenced in the 
absence of partial awareness and without this effect being attributed to S-R links. 
5.2.2. Article II - Subliminal Understanding of Active vs. Passive Sentences 
In Article II, a series of three experiments subliminally primed participants 
with short sentences that informed the participant which of two characters were active 
or passive within the sentence (e.g., ‘A is injecting B’, ‘A is injected by B’ etc.). When 
subsequently presented with two schematic images (one depicting character A as the 
active agent whilst B is passive, and the other depicting character B as the active agent 
whilst A is passive), the participants’ task was to indicate which of the two images best 
represented the prime sentence. Participants first completed a set of conscious trials, 
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which were then followed by a subjective threshold setting phase and finally a set of 
subliminal trials. It was predicted, in each of the three experiments, that participants 
would identify the correct schematic image beyond chance performance for both 
subliminal active and passive sentences. It was further predicted that a response time 
difference in image identification would be evidenced between active and passive trials, 
with participants being significantly faster to identify the image for active trials when 
compared to passive in both conscious and subliminal conditions. 
Experiment 1 attempted to demonstrate subliminal priming effects in the 
absence of partial conscious awareness and without any effects being attributable to the 
retrieval of S-R links. As such, confidence ratings were recorded after each trial and 
separate lists of verbs were used in conscious and subliminal conditions. Subliminal 
stimuli were masked using backward masks in the form of a series of ampersands, and 
only trials in which the participant rated confidence to be at 50% were included in the 
analyses. The results indicated that participants did not correctly identify the image 
beyond chance expectations for either subliminal active or passive sentences. However, 
participants were significantly faster to identify the image for active trials when 
compared to passive trials in both conscious and subliminal conditions. 
Experiment 2 employed the same grey scale contrast method of masking 
subliminal stimuli utilised in Experiments 4 and 5 of Article 1. Materials and procedure 
replicated that of Experiment 1, with confidence ratings recorded after each subliminal 
trial. The results indicated that performance on subliminal active trials was significantly 
above chance level performance, but not for subliminal passive trials. However, when 
performance on active and passive trials was directly compared according to image 
identification based on the lead in character, there was a significant difference in 
accuracy between trials. That is, only if verb voice was appropriately processed would 
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there be a difference in active and passive trial accuracy. As evidenced in Experiment 1, 
participants were significantly faster to identify the image in active conditions when 
compared to passive in both conscious and subliminal conditions. 
Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 but included three presentations of the 
prime sentences. The results again indicated that participants performed significantly 
above chance expectations for subliminal active trials but not for passive trials. 
However, a meta-analysis over all three experiments revealed an overall significant 
priming effect for accuracy in passive trials. Furthermore, when active and passive trial 
accuracy was compared according to image identification based on the lead in character, 
there was a significant difference in accuracy between trials suggesting differential 
processing of verb voice. As evidenced in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were 
significantly faster to identify the image in active conditions when compared to passive 
in both conscious and subliminal conditions. 
Therefore, Article II demonstrated unconscious processing of verb voice in 
multiple-word primes in the form of performance accuracy and reaction times. 
Furthermore, Article II demonstrated that participants were able to draw sufficient 
semantic information from a textual prime to translate into a pictorial representation. As 
demonstrated in Article I, this subliminal priming effect was evidenced in the absence 
of partial awareness and without the effect being attributable to S-R links. 
5.2.3. Article III – Supraliminal and Subliminal Priming of Specific Relationship 
Anxieties  
In Article III, participants were supraliminally and subliminally primed (using 
the grey scale contrast method of masking employed in Articles I and II) with a set of 
emotive words that were designed to activate one of four specific relationship anxieties 
(i.e., the fear of being close to partner, far, controlled or controlling) whilst being 
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engaged in a neutral classification task. Participants were subsequently required to 
classify two sets of items; a set of emotive items to be classified as either congruent or 
incongruent with the specific anxiety induced, or a set of self-related items in which the 
participant was instructed to classify as either fearful or non-fearful. These classification 
response times and error rates were then compared to a control group that had received 
no anxiety priming. 
It was predicted that participants in priming conditions would be faster to 
classify emotive items that were congruent with the anxiety induced when compared to 
the control condition, and that participants in priming conditions would make fewer 
errors in classifying congruent and incongruent emotive items than the control. It was 
further predicted that participants in priming conditions would be faster to classify self-
related items as fearful, and make fewer errors in classifying self-related items as 
fearful, when compared to the control condition.  
The results indicated that participants in both priming conditions were faster to 
classify anxiety congruent and incongruent items when compared to the control group, 
but that this response time difference was only significant for supraliminal priming. In 
regards to error rates, we found evidence for supraliminal and subliminal priming 
effects in that priming lead to fewer errors in classifying anxiety congruent and 
incongruent items when compared to the control group. In regards to the self-related 
items, it was revealed that participants in all conditions were actually faster to categorise 
items as non-fearful when compared to fearful. Furthermore, participants in priming 
conditions did not make significantly fewer errors in classifying self-related items as 
fearful when compared to the control condition. Post experimental self-reported anxiety 
ratings failed to demonstrate a measurable difference in conscious anxiety levels 
congruent with the primed anxiety between primed and control conditions. 
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Therefore, Article III demonstrated the activation of specific relationship 
anxieties through supraliminal priming, but not through subliminal priming. Whilst the 
subliminal priming effects demonstrated the activation of a generalized level of anxiety, 
we were unable to conclude whether the anxiety activation evidenced specifically 
related to the fear of being close to a partner, far from a partner, controlled by a partner, 
or controlling with a partner. In addition, these supraliminal and subliminal priming 
effects were evidenced in the possible absence of subjective anxiety, indicating that an 
emotion (i.e., anxiety) can potentially be unconscious, though this remains to be 
confirmed.  
5.3. Current Research in Context 
In the past, successful subliminal priming effects have often been attributed to 
the retrieval of S-R links, established during conscious rehearsal of prime-target 
combinations to be later presented as subliminal primes, as opposed to the semantic 
activation of subliminal stimuli (e.g., Damian, 2001; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Eimer 
& Schlaghecken, 1998). These S-R links then remain in short term memory and lead to 
an accelerated response when they are later reactivated upon encountering the prime and 
target on a further occasion. Therefore, subliminal primes that have previously been 
consciously practiced merely rely on the retrieval of these mappings without 
necessitating the semantic analysis of subliminal stimuli. However, the current research 
supports additional empirical evidence demonstrating successful priming using 
unpractised and novel stimuli (e.g., Klauer, Eder, Greenwald, & Abrams, 2007; Kunde 
et al., 2003; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001). The final experiments in both Articles I and II 
demonstrated a level of subliminal priming in which the prime and target combinations 
never appeared as conscious targets. Therefore, a link between the stimulus and its 
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associated motoric response could not have been formed, thereby negating S-R 
mappings as an appropriate criticism in the current case and instead indicating semantic 
processing of subliminal stimuli. 
In addition to S-R links, further research has attributed subliminal priming 
effects to letter or sublexical level processing (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2001; 
Greenwald & Abrams, 2002; Hutchison et al., 2004). Whilst not directly investigated 
here, it is difficult to attribute the current priming effects evidenced to a sublexical 
processing explanation. In Article I, to have chosen the correct noun, following the 
subliminal instruction to either pick or not pick a given noun, indicates successful 
semantic processing of the instructional word. In Article II, participants were required to 
identify the image that best represented the subliminal prime sentence. Due to the 
inability to derive phonological form from an image (Dell’Acqua & Grainger, 1999), a 
semantic interpretation of subliminal stimuli can more appropriately account for 
successful priming as opposed to a sublexical interpretation. That is, the participant 
needed to extract sufficient information from the prime sentence to translate this 
knowledge into a pictorial representation in order to identify which character was active 
or passive. Although the results failed to demonstrate a significant above chance 
priming effect for passive sentences in individual experiments, a significant difference 
between active and passive accuracy according to the lead in character further indicated 
differential processing of verb voice as opposed to word fragments. Furthermore, in 
Article III, the IAT classification task demonstrated subliminal priming effects of a 
generalised level of anxiety. This in turn indicates semantic activation of subliminal 
stimuli at the whole-word level as opposed to sublexical processing, as it is unlikely that 
processing word fragments would have led to the activation of anxiety. 
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A further significant criticism often directed at subliminal priming studies 
revolves around the issue of partial conscious awareness of stimuli designed to be 
subliminal (cf. Holender, 1986). Issues regarding partial conscious awareness were 
addressed throughout the current research. As mentioned previously, much of the 
controversy regarding subliminal perception appears to revolve around individual 
interpretations of the term ‘unconscious’. In accordance with higher order thought 
theory (cf. Rosenthal, 2005), we defined consciousness as the presence of higher order 
thoughts (i.e., being aware of seeing the prime). Therefore, to claim successful 
subliminal priming, it was necessary to search for the presence or absence of conscious 
awareness of the prime. This was achieved by adopting subjective measures of 
assessing subliminality in the form of confidence ratings (CRs) to search for the 
presence of conscious knowledge (cf. Cheesman & Merikle, 1984, 1986). Therefore, if 
a participant was not aware that they had seen the prime, then whether they had or had 
not seen the prime was irrelevant in determining whether the stimuli was subliminal or 
not. In both Articles I and II, subliminal priming effects were directly evidenced when 
participants believed themselves to be guessing. A meta-analysis of the zero-correlation 
criteria (ZCC) results in Article I further indicated a non-significant relation between 
confidence and accuracy; further supporting the proposition that participants lacked 
conscious awareness of the subliminal stimuli. However, whilst CRs indicated a lack of 
conscious knowledge in Article II, a meta-analysis of the ZCC results indicated a 
positive relation between confidence and accuracy, suggesting the potential for 
conscious awareness. In Article III, an objective threshold test (i.e., a more stringent 
measurement of conscious knowledge) indicated potential performance at the objective 
threshold as opposed to the subjective (though the evidence was insensitive). However, 
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a subliminal priming effect in the form of the activation of generalised anxiety was 
evidenced.  
Nevertheless, one could argue that participants in Article I were able to 
consciously perceive fragments of the prime to the extent that they could distinguish 
between ‘pick’ and ‘not’ instructions, and that it was this awareness that lead to the 
priming effects evidenced rather than unconscious processing. The same argument 
could be applied to the active and passive sentence priming in Article II. However, if 
this were the case, the participants’ knowledge would have been reflected in their 
confidence ratings. Participants were provided with an explicit definition of what 
constituted a ‘guess’ and were actively encouraged to give an above 50% confidence 
rating if they believed that they saw anything at all. Furthermore, in Article I, if the 
participant saw fragments of the presented noun and chose the primed noun 
accordingly, this would lead to a correct response for ‘pick’ trials, but an incorrect 
response for ‘not’ trials. So, the participant would have needed to have consciously seen 
informative fragments of both the instructional word and the noun. In Article II, the 
participant would have needed to have consciously seen at the very least the lead in 
character or the final character, as well as the presence or absence of ‘by’. However, if 
the participants had had informative conscious experience of these fragments to that 
extent in both articles, there would have been no reason not to have reflected this 
experience in the confidence ratings, just as they were instructed to.  
In Greenwald’s (1992) somewhat critical summation of subliminal perception 
and its consequent potential, he concluded that unconscious cognition is often 
exaggerated in its analytical abilities, and unsophisticated and limited in its processing 
capabilities. He further issued a challenge regarding sentence priming in which he 
asserted that no one word in a multiple word prime should individually impart sentence 
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level meaning. The research presented here demonstrated not only the priming of 
multiple words, but also demonstrated that a set of rather sophisticated analyses needed 
to be completed in order to successfully fulfil task requirements. 
In Article I, the first word in each prime informed the participant of the 
subsequent task to be completed. To successfully indicate the correct word, the 
participant must first recognise and comprehend the semantic meaning of pick and not 
instructions. The next cognitive task would require the participant to analyse the noun 
word to the extent that they could recognise the word when presented again. Whether 
this analysis of the noun was completed at the semantic or letter level is disputable. 
However, it seems likely that if the instructional word was analysed at the semantic 
level, then so was the noun. When subsequently presented with a choice of two nouns, 
the primed noun and an accompanying noun, the participant must have known whether 
the instruction was to include or to exclude, and thus recognised which noun to include 
or exclude. An average error rate of 4% for conscious trials illustrates the relative 
difficulty in identifying the correct noun without the constraints synonymous with 
subliminality. The successful priming results evidenced in Article I are in direct contrast 
with Jacoby et al. (1992), who argue that the ability to control cognition by excluding 
responses is a uniquely conscious ability. Not only could participants exercise control 
over excluding items, they could do so when the instruction to exclude was itself 
subliminal. These results support additional research which demonstrates the cognitive 
control of unconscious knowledge (e.g., Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans, & Hansenne, 2011; 
Dienes, Altmann, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Perner, 2007; Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 
2010; Norman, Price, & Jones, 2011; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; 
Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 2008). 
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Naccache and Dehaene (2001) have previously commented on the lack of 
empirical research attempting to demonstrate manipulations of material presented 
outside of conscious awareness. Therefore, Article II subliminally presented participants 
with short four word (e.g., ‘A is injecting B’) and five word (e.g., ‘A is injected by B’) 
sentences, portraying two characters activity or passivity within the sentence, in an 
attempt to demonstrate the manipulation of semantic textual information into a pictorial 
representation. The wording of the sentences ensured that the only difference between A 
is injecting B and A is injected by B was verb voice, and the presence or absence of ‘by’, 
whilst the meaning of both sentences was quite different. In the first example, the lead 
character is active whilst the second character is passive. However, in the second 
example, the lead character is now passive whilst the second character is active. If the 
participant was able to correctly identify the image representing the prime sentence, this 
would indicate that the participant had inferred sufficient semantic information to create 
a visual schematic representation from the prime. To do that, the participant must first 
know who the lead in character was, before moving on to process verb voice in order to 
determine whether the lead character was active or passive. At that point, if the lead in 
character (or even the final character) and verb voice were understood, then the 
participant had the information necessary to translate that knowledge into a pictorial 
representation to identify the correct image. 
As similarly evidenced in Article I, the difficulty in completing such a task in 
Article II was demonstrated by an average 7% error rate for trials in which the prime 
sentence was presented consciously. The subliminal priming results indicated that 
participants were able to identify the correct image beyond chance level performance 
for trials in which the lead in character was active, but not for trials in which the lead in 
character was passive. Although, a meta-analysis across all three experiments 
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demonstrated a significant priming effect for passive trials also. This variation in 
priming effects is highlighted by research demonstrating the relative difference in 
cognitive difficulty between understanding and processing active versus passive 
sentences (Chomsky, 1965; Miller, 1962). The simplest way of identifying the image 
without necessitating a full syntactic analysis of the active and passive sentences would 
have been for the participant to have searched for the lead in character and the presence 
or absence of ‘by’. The absence of ‘by’ would mean the lead in character (or final 
character) was active; whilst its presence would mean the lead in (or final) was passive, 
thus allowing a semantic analysis. Nevertheless, if participants were able to correctly 
identify image without processing verb voice, this would still demonstrate processing of 
the syntactic functioning of two words (lead in character/final character, and ‘by’). 
However, a significant difference in response times between active and passive trials 
reflects the additional processing time required to comprehend passive sentences 
(similarly demonstrated by Gough, 1965, 1966). If subjects were using “by” and the 
lead word, to conclude the sentence was active requires determining “by” was not there. 
In general, determining the absence of a search target takes longer than determining the 
presence (e.g., Treisman, 1988). Thus, on the theory that people search specifically for 
“by”, active sentences would take longer than passive sentences, which is opposite to 
our results. 
Whilst there are many studies successfully demonstrating the activation of 
anxiety through the presentation of subliminal stimuli (e.g., Naccache et al., 2005; 
Soares & Öhman, 1993; Tyrer et al., 1978; Williams et al., 2006), the type of anxiety 
induced tends to be a general and non-specific level of anxiety. Therefore, Article III 
explored the extent of subliminal priming by attempting to activate very specific 
relationship anxieties relating to the fear of being close to a partner, far from a partner, 
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controlled by a partner, or controlling with a partner. That is, rather than the activation 
of a general relationship anxiety (which is in itself distinct from other anxieties such as 
phobias), we attempted to specifically prime the fear of being close to a partner rather 
than the fear of being far, the fear of being far from a partner rather than the fear of 
being controlled, etc. The results of Article III suggested that participants that had been 
subliminally primed with a specific relationship anxiety were both quicker (although not 
significantly quicker) and made fewer errors in classifying items as congruent and 
incongruent with the induced anxiety when compared to a control group that had not 
been primed. However, the evidence was insensitive for showing whether specific 
anxieties rather than generalised anxiety could be subliminally primed. As well as 
extending previous research into the activation of anxiety through supraliminal and 
subliminal manipulation, the results also argue for a semantic interpretation of 
subliminal material, which may or may not be semantically finely resolved. 
Furthermore, the subliminal priming of anxiety evidenced in Article III was not 
associated with significant conscious subjective anxiety. The null result for conscious 
anxiety was not sensitive however; thus the issue of whether an emotion can be 
unconscious is not directly addressed by the current data.  Article III does however 
provide a paradigm by which the issue could be further explored. 
5.4. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Past research has demonstrated that backward masks in the form of letter 
strings and symbols can adversely interfere with the subsequent processing of textual 
primes (Di Lollo et al., 2000; Grainger et al., 2003; Walley & Weiden, 1973), as 
evidenced in Experiment 3 of Article I, and Experiment 1 of Article II. Therefore, 
within the current research, we adopted a grey-scale contrast method of masking 
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subliminal stimuli established by Lamy et al. (2008) in an attempt to successfully 
demonstrate subliminal semantic priming effects. However, whilst successful in 
increasing performance accuracy, the subliminal priming effects evidenced were 
relatively small. For example, in Articles I and II, correct noun choice and image 
identification on subliminal trials ranged from just 2% to 4% above an expected 
baseline chance performance of 50%. Furthermore, an overall meta-analysis comparing 
accuracy in subliminal trials from backward masking and contrast masking experiments 
in Articles I and II revealed that performance did not significantly increase in contrast 
masking experiments, mean increase in accuracy of .03%, SE = .71, t(193) = -.03, p = 
.97, d = 0.06, 95% CI (-1.38, 1.42) (to eliminate any potential confounding effects of 
conscious awareness, only experiments including trial by trial confidence ratings were 
included). In the current research, we reduced prime presentation speeds whilst keeping 
the contrast between text and background constant to achieve subliminality. However, 
Lamy et al. (2008) kept prime presentation at 500 ms whilst reducing the contrast 
between text and background until the prime was rendered subliminal. It is possible that 
this procedure adopted by Lamy et al., and the longer prime presentation durations 
afforded, would have resulted in a higher percentage of correct responses to noun choice 
and image identification in Articles I and II, and anxiety priming in Article III. 
Therefore, future research may benefit from further investigation into the benefits of 
contrast masking, and additional more sensitive methods of masking subliminal stimuli. 
In addition to issues regarding methodological masking procedures, further 
research may benefit from exploring the priming effects evidenced from multiple prime 
presentations. In Articles I, II, and III, we produced small priming effects using three 
presentations of each subliminal prime as opposed to just one single presentation. 
However, a comparison of experiments 4 (using one presentation) and 5 (using three 
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presentations) in Article I did not reveal a significant increase in priming effects using 
repeated presentations. Furthermore, an overall meta-analysis comparing priming 
effects from one and three presentations in Articles I and II revealed that three 
presentations did not significantly increase performance, mean increase in accuracy of 
.44%, SE = .82, t(139) = -.53, p = .59, d = 0.10, 95% CI (-2.06, 1.19). However, 
Wentura and Frings (2005) investigated multiple priming by comparing the 
effectiveness of a standard single prime presentation with a repeated priming procedure 
in which the prime was presented 10 times in quick succession. Their results 
demonstrated a significant subliminal priming effect only in the repeated priming 
condition. Furthermore, performance in the repeated priming condition was comparable 
to performance in a further visible priming condition. Whilst Atas et al. (2012) attribute 
repeated priming effects to the progressive emergence of conscious visual awareness, 
Wentura and Frings argue that the cumulative duration of prime presentations increase 
access to the semantic content of the prime whilst continuing to remain below the 
threshold of conscious perception. Similarly, Marcel (1983b) demonstrated an 
increasing priming effect by using up to 20 repetitions of the subliminal prime. 
Therefore, it may be that more than three presentations of the prime were necessary to 
significantly boost subliminal priming. As such, future research may benefit from 
exploring the extent of subliminal priming in conjunction with adopting a repeated 
priming procedure.  
The use of computers to present subliminal stimuli can lead to further 
methodological issues regarding presentation durations. For example, the current 
research utilised a 60 Hz laptop with a screen refresh rate of 16 ms for the presentation 
of experimental material. That is, when assessing subjective thresholds of subliminality, 
we were limited to decrements in presentation durations of 16 ms (i.e., one screen 
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refresh). As the millisecond difference between subjective and objective thresholds is 
often relatively small, it is quite likely that participants fell far below the threshold of 
subjective conscious awareness to the objective threshold or perhaps below. This 
limitation was aptly demonstrated by Article III, whereby despite measuring conscious 
perception using subjective methods, a subsequent discrimination task indicated 
performance at the objective threshold. Furthermore, performance at this OIT threshold 
is believed to correspond to minimal unconscious processing according to Snodgrass 
and colleagues (2004). Therefore, it would be beneficial to utilise alternative methods of 
presenting subliminal stimuli such as through the use of a tachistoscope. A 
tachistoscope allows for millisecond precision in manipulating presentation speeds, thus 
making it more likely to lead to performance below the subjective threshold whilst 
continuing to remain above the objective. Additional methods of prime presentation 
include continuous flash suppression (CFS). As discussed previously, CFS involves the 
presentation of a rapidly moving stimulus to one eye so as to prevent the conscious 
perception of a static stimulus presented to the other eye (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). 
Using this method, stimuli can be presented for periods of time in excess of one second 
whilst remaining outside of conscious awareness, thereby increasing subliminal 
processing time. For example, Sklar et al. (2012) demonstrated subliminal sentence 
priming using CFS. Therefore, further research may benefit from investigating 
subliminal priming, and in particular sentence priming, using either a tachistoscope or 
CFS. 
Within the current research, we used confidence ratings (CR) to measure 
subjective awareness of subliminal stimuli. Both in the instructions and on each screen 
in which the participant was required to rate confidence, the participants were given a 
definition of what ‘guessing’ and ‘know’ means. The participants were told to give a 
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value of 50% if they believed that they were purely guessing; that they had no idea 
which word/image to choose and that they may as well have tossed a coin. They were 
told to give a value of 100% if they knew which word/image to choose, that is if they 
saw the prime. They were also told that if they had any confidence at all, if they 
believed they saw something even if they did not know what it was, they were to give a 
value above 50. In Articles I and II, it is possible that participants consciously saw 
fragments of the prime and could distinguish between pick and not instructions or active 
and passive sentences; but if this were the case it would be reflected in their confidence 
ratings as participants were actively encouraged to give an above 50% confidence rating 
if they believed that they saw anything. On the conscious trials that were interspersed 
within the subliminal trials, participants did in fact use confidence accurately. Further, 
there was no incentive to say one was completely guessing if one felt one was not. 
Therefore, if a participant stated that confidence was at 50% (guessing) whilst 
identifying the correct word or image, we assumed that they possessed unconscious 
knowledge. Nevertheless, a different way of defining subliminality is when a subject 
regards themselves as having no visual experience whatsoever, not even visual 
experience that is irrelevant to the judgment (Sandberg et al., 2010). As such, Ramsøy 
and Overgaard (2004) constructed the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) as a measure of 
subjective conscious awareness, requiring the participant to rate visual perception on a 
scale of no visual experience to clear visual experience. When PAS, CR and post 
decision wagering (PDW) were directly compared based on their effectiveness at 
measuring subjective conscious awareness, Sandberg et al. (2010) found that when 
subjects believe they are guessing they may be having some visual experience, and this 
experience is associated with objective accuracy in classification. Therefore, future 
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research may benefit from investigating the extent of subliminal priming using the PAS 
to address different definitions of subliminality.   
Using a definition of subliminal perception and unconscious processing as 
determined by higher order thought theories of consciousness (i.e., the primes were 
subliminal as the participants were unaware of having seen what the primes were), we 
argue that we have successfully demonstrated subliminal priming of negation, active 
versus passive sentence priming, and anxiety priming relating to relationship anxiety. 
Our results show the unconscious has a power previously denied it, perhaps because of  
a tendency in the field to use a methodology ill-suited to showing just what the 
unconscious can do. 
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Appendix A: Noun pairs employed in Experiment 1 of Article I 
 
Table A1: Noun Pairs 
Conscious and  
SOA Practice  
Trial Pairs:  
 
SOA Setting and 
Threshold Drift 
Trial Pairs: 
Conscious and 
Subliminal Trial 
Pairs: 
Conscious Trial 
Pairs in Subliminal 
Blocks: 
 
lost - home 
tank - pool  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fog - hat 
top - vet 
mask - tree 
shoe - mail 
 
cup -  jar 
fan - pie 
map - fly 
sun - cat 
frog - cave 
game - lake 
nest - jail 
spoon - horse 
light - coach 
judge - water 
 
fog - hat 
top - vet 
man - pod 
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Appendix B: Noun pairs employed in Experiment 2, Experiment 3, 
Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 of Article I 
 
Table B1: Noun Pairs 
Conscious and  
SOA Practice  
Trial Pairs:  
 
SOA Setting 
and Threshold 
Drift Trial 
Pairs: 
Conscious Trial 
Pairs: 
Subliminal 
Trial Pairs: 
Conscious 
Trial Pairs in 
Subliminal 
Blocks: 
 
lost - home 
tank - pool  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fog - hat 
top - vet 
mask - tree 
shoe - mail 
 
cup -  jar 
fan - pie 
map - fly 
sun - cat 
frog - cave 
game - lake 
nest - jail 
spoon - horse 
light - coach 
judge - water 
 
ant - sky 
bat - sea 
bed - oil 
box - pen 
baby - yard 
camp - page 
ball - vein 
apple - steam 
brick - space 
plant - train 
 
fog - hat 
top - vet 
man - pod 
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Appendix C: Verbs used in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 of Article II 
 
Table C1: Verbs in their Simple Present Form 
Conscious and  
SOA Practice  
Trial Verbs:  
 
SOA Setting 
Trial Verbs: 
Conscious Trial 
Verbs: 
Subliminal 
Trial Verbs: 
Conscious 
Trial Verbs in 
Subliminal 
Blocks: 
 
stops 
punches 
follows 
 
stops 
punches 
follows 
 
pokes 
burns 
whips 
kisses 
 
protects 
kills 
washes 
feeds 
films 
injects 
fans 
pushes 
measures 
carries 
brushes 
chases 
 
 
 
 
stops 
punches 
follows 
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Appendix D: Schematic images employed in Experiment 1, Experiment 
2, and Experiment 3 of Article II 
 
Stops 
           
Punches 
                  
Follows 
                       
Pokes 
                    
 
 
 
233 
 
Burns 
                     
Whips 
                 
Kisses 
                            
Protects 
                
Kills 
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Washes 
                            
Feeds 
                         
Films 
                        
Injects 
                      
Fans 
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Pushes 
                          
Measures 
                 
Carries 
                          
Brushes 
                        
Chases 
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Appendix E: IAT items employed in Article III 
 
Related 
Relationship 
Anxiety: 
IAT Classification 
Items: 
Related 
Relationship 
Anxiety: 
 
IAT Classification 
Items: 
 
 
Close 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Far 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Couple 
Restricted 
Intimate 
Devoted 
Clingy 
Affectionate 
Obliged  
Bored 
Conform  
Unloved 
Apart 
Deserted 
Single 
Isolated 
Lonely 
Cold 
Individual 
Solitary 
 
Controlled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controlling 
 
Restrained 
Bossed 
Surrendered 
Hampered 
Commanded 
Submissive 
Coerced 
Repressed 
Constrained 
Demanding 
Assertive 
Decisive 
Overwhelming 
Compelling 
Persuasive 
Strong 
Bully 
Offensive 
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Appendix F: Words used to induce anxiety in Article III  
 
Relationship 
Anxiety: 
Anxiety Inducing 
Words: 
 
Close 
 
 
Far 
 
 
Controlled 
 
 
Controlling 
 
Suffocated 
Trapped 
Confined 
Abandoned 
Alone 
Neglected 
Weak  
Powerless 
Controlled 
Dominating 
Powerful 
Forceful 
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Appendix G: Results of the IAT Emotional Adjective Norming in 
Article III  
 
Table G1: Means, standard error and t values of the relatedness ratings 
 
Anxiety: 
 
Consistent 
Anxiety 
M: 
SE Inconsistent 
Anxiety 
M: 
SE t: 
 
Close 
 
Far 
 
Controlled 
 
Controlling 
 
5.19 
 
5.97 
 
5.51 
 
5.68 
 
.09 
 
.13 
 
.12 
 
.19 
 
3.31 
 
3.26 
 
3.64 
 
3.56 
 
.09 
 
.11 
 
.07 
 
.11 
 
 
13.60*** 
 
16.03*** 
 
12.21*** 
 
7.58*** 
*** p < .001 
 
Table G2: Means, standard error and t values for the emotional valence ratings 
 
Anxiety: 
 
Consistent 
Anxiety 
M: 
SE Inconsistent 
Anxiety 
M: 
SE t: 
 
Close 
 
Far 
 
Controlled 
 
Controlling 
 
5.59 
 
5.68 
 
5.42 
 
5.78 
 
.11 
 
.19 
 
.20 
 
.15 
 
3.38 
 
3.48 
 
3.45 
 
3.54 
 
.05 
 
.06 
 
.06 
 
.02 
 
 
16.64*** 
 
10.08*** 
 
8.04*** 
 
16.93*** 
*** p < .001 
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Appendix H: Passages relating to the fear of being close, far, controlled 
and controlling employed in Article III 
 
Fear of being Close: 
Joanna has been in a romantic relationship with David for just over six months. 
They live in different towns and Joanna is happy with the way the relationship works. 
She sees David at weekends, and the rest of the time she can see her friends or do 
whatever she likes. Recently, David has been calling on the phone more often, wanting 
to spend more time together, and has begun to suggest that they move in together. The 
idea of living together and spending so much time with each other scares Joanna. She 
likes the current situation, that she can see David when she wants but gets to keep her 
own identity and have her own space, she doesn’t want to have to give up her 
independence and answer to someone else. Joanna is going to have to come up with a 
way of keeping David at arm’s length or she is going to have to finish the relationship. 
 
Fear of being Far: 
Joanna has been in a romantic relationship with David for just over six months. 
She loves being in a relationship but she isn’t happy with the way the relationship is 
currently working. She and David live in different towns and Joanna only gets to see 
David at weekends and she wants to spend far more time with him. Joanna and David 
spend a lot of time during the week talking on the phone and Joanna has suggested that 
they move in together. Living apart from each other and only getting to speak on the 
phone during the week upsets Joanna and makes her worry. However, the idea of seeing 
him every day, spending the evenings and every spare minute together sounds ideal. 
The sooner they move in together the better. 
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Fear of being Controlled: 
Joanna has been in a romantic relationship with David for just over six months. 
They live in different towns but get to spend quite a lot of time together. David has 
recently begun suggesting that they move in together. Although she loves David, Joanna 
worries about living together. If they are going out anywhere together, David decides 
where they go. If they get a takeaway, David decides what it will be. If they go to see a 
movie, David decides what they will see. If there is any decision to make, David will 
make it and Joanna feels as though she is completely under the thumb and unable to 
choose anything for herself. Joanna worries that if they were to move in together, David 
may become more controlling. 
 
Fear of being Controlling: 
Joanna has been in a romantic relationship with David for just over six months. 
They live in different towns but get to spend quite a lot of time together and there has 
been talk recently of moving in together. However, Joanna worries that she is too 
controlling for David. If there is a decision to be made, on where to go out, on what to 
eat, on what to watch, Joanna makes the decision. She knows that if they move in 
together, then she will be the one to decide where they will live and how they will 
decorate. She can’t seem to help herself and Joanna worries that it will be too much for 
David. 
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Appendix I: Questions used to measure current anxiety levels 
employed in Article III  
 
Close 
1. I enjoy having a familiar routine with my partner 
2. I am afraid of getting close to my partner 
3. I am afraid of losing my own identity and becoming part of my partner’s 
4. I enjoy feeling committed to my partner 
 
Far 
1. I enjoy having a separate identity from my partner 
2. I am afraid of being alone without my partner 
3. I enjoy having my own space away from my partner 
4. I am afraid of my partner being distant 
 
Controlled 
1. I am afraid of being owned by my partner 
2. I enjoy not having responsibility in our relationship 
3. I am afraid of being controlled by my partner 
4. I am happy to accept guidance from my partner 
 
Controlling 
1. I am happy taking charge for our plans because I know I can make things work out 
OK 
2. I know my partner is strong and can thus happily take any demand I might make of 
them 
3. I am afraid of being too controlling with my partner 
4. I am afraid that my partner is weak and can’t stand up to me 
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Appendix J: ECR Scale employed in Article III 
 
The ECR Scale: Even numbered items measure Anxious Attachment; Odd numbered 
items measure Avoidant Attachment. 
 
1. I prefer not to show others how I feel deep down 
2. I worry about being rejected or abandoned 
3. I am very comfortable being close to other people 
4. I worry a lot about my relationships 
5. Just when someone starts getting close to me, I find myself pulling away 
6. I worry that others won't care about me as much as I care about them 
7. I get uncomfortable when someone wants to be very close to me 
8. I worry a fair amount about losing my close relationship partners 
9. I don't feel comfortable opening up to others 
10. I often wish that close relationship partners' feelings for me were as strong as my 
feelings for them 
11. I want to get close to others but I keep pulling back 
12. I want to get very close to others, and this sometimes scares them away 
13. I am nervous when another person gets too close to me 
14. I worry about being alone 
15. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with others 
16. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away 
17. I try to avoid getting too close to others 
18. I need a lot of reassurance that close relationship partners really care about me 
19. I find it relatively easy to get close to others 
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20. Sometimes I feel that I try to force others to show more feeling, more commitment 
to our relationship than they otherwise would 
21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on close relationship partners 
22. I do not often worry about being abandoned 
23. I prefer not to be too close to others 
24. If I can't get a relationship partner to show an interest in me, I get upset or angry 
25. I tell my close relationship partners just about everything 
26. I find that my partners don't like to get as close as I would like 
27. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with close others 
28. When I don't have close others around, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure 
29. I feel comfortable depending on others 
30. I get frustrated when my close relationship partners are not around as much as I 
would like 
31. I don't mind asking close others for comfort, advice, or help 
32. I get frustrated if relationship partners are not available when I need them 
33. It helps to turn to close others in times of need 
34. When other people disapprove of me, I feel really bad about myself 
35. I turn to close relationship partners for many things, including comfort and 
reassurance 
36. I resent it when my relationship partners spend time away from me 
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Appendix K: Words used to eliminate anxiety in Article III 
 
Relationship 
Anxiety: 
Anxiety 
Eliminating Words: 
 
Close 
 
 
Far 
 
 
Controlled 
 
 
Controlling 
 
Supportive 
Warm 
Loving 
Liberated 
Carefree 
Independent 
Assertive 
Dominant 
Powerful 
Compliant 
Humble 
Agreeable 
 
 
 
 
 
  
